

A STUDY OF TWO RIVALRIES IN THE UMMA (1-11AH)
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE SĪRA LITERATURE

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A B S T R A C T

This thesis is an attempt to clarify, and hence to understand, two of the rivalries which were disunifying factors in the umma of Medina during the lifetime of Muhammad. The divisive qualities of the Anṣār and the Munāfiqūn have, in the past, been ignored and only their influence upon the religious development of Islam has been examined.

The rivalry between the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn of Quraysh was the origin of the great north/south rivalry which plagued the Islamic empire in the centuries to come, although the seeds of the dispute may be found in the Jāhiliya. There remains very little historical evidence of this rivalry although on one occasion it was sufficiently serious to suggest that a minor incident might have provoked a full scale civil war. When it was realized that the Muslims were going to be successful in their conflict with the Quraysh, the Anṣār became more resigned to their fate although the election of Abū Bakr indicated that they were not yet reconciled to their position as second class citizens.

A study of the historical activities of the Munāfiqūn indicates that the English word 'hypocrite' does not adequately translate the more complex connotations of the word Munāfiq. Their rivalry with the other Muslims was another facet of the struggle of the Madinese against the domination of the Quraysh. They focused the resentment of the Anṣār and acted as an internal opposition party until it was realized that victory was impossible. They have been portrayed as the villains of

Islamic history and their name has been blackened to an extent which is not justified by a careful study of the available information. The story of their withdrawal from the Muslim army on the route to Uhud is held as an example of their perfidy and yet it seems certain that the story was a later creation designed to shift the blame for the defeat from Muhammad. The Munāfiqūn represented the traditional values of Madinese society and as such were closely allied to the Jewish tribes. When Muhammad finally joined the pro-Arab faction of Medina they allied themselves to the Jewish faction out of a desire to maintain the status quo.

Ibn Ubayy was the leader of the Munāfiqūn and as such has been vilified by the Muslim historians. During the Jāhiliya he had been one of the leading figures of Medina and he continued to play this role after the Hijra, championing the rights of the Madinese against the Quraysh. His early conversion led to a final reconciliation with Muhammad as evidenced by the Prophet praying for him. He failed in his objective of retaining power in the face of the threat posed by Islam because he and the Munāfiqūn were unable to offer an ideology which could cope with the changing society of the community. By accepting a principle of independent action as a tenet of belief he was unable to maintain a body of support upon which he could rely. With the loss of his Jewish allies his failure was complete.

Muhammad was forced to control the two rivalries in order to preserve the existence of the umma. In many ways he acted as a traditional tribal leader but, by virtue of the fact that

he was also the Messenger of God, he was able to apply innovative methods which had never been used effectively in Arabia. Unity was not finally achieved until after his death; however, by the emphasis which was placed upon it the basis was laid for the later expansion of Islam.

From the study of the rivalries certain implications as to the beginnings of historical writing among the Arabs can be drawn, especially in relation to the biography of Muhammad. The Islamic bias of the historians should have precluded the inclusion of all but a small portion of the material which relates to the rivalries; however, it did not. It may be concluded that the material was retained in explanation of the descent of Qur'ānic verses and to glorify the person of Muhammad. By analysing the basic accounts of some incidents there is an obvious development seen in the handling of the material until the time of al-Tabarī when tafsīr was divorced from history. Ibn Ishāq had expected his readers to be conversant with the verses of the Qur'ān and al-Wāqidī had felt it necessary to add a more detailed explanation.

It is obvious from the texts that there were other rivalries and disunifying factors in the umma, but any records of them have been removed as unnecessary for the understanding of the Qur'ān and as unsuitable for the image of Muhammad as it was conceived in the years after his death. It is also certain that there were other outbreaks of the rivalry between the groups under study in this thesis which have been omitted for the same reasons.

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Abbreviation</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Bal, <u>A</u>	al-Balādhurī, <u>Ansāb al-Ashraf</u>
Bal, <u>F</u>	al-Balādhurī, <u>Liber Expugnationis Regionum.</u> English Translation by Phillip Hitti, <u>The</u> <u>Origins of the Islamic State.</u> All references are to the English translation unless noted.
Bay	al-Baydāwī, <u>Anwār al-Tanzīl w'Asrār al-Ta'wīl</u>
Bell	Richard Bell, <u>The Qur'ān Translated</u>
Bukh	al-Bukhārī, <u>al-Sahīh</u>
II	Alfred Guillaume. <u>The Life of Muhammad.</u> All references are to the English translation unless noted.
IS	Ibn Sa'd, <u>al-Tabaqāt al-Kubrā</u>
<u>Kāmil</u>	Ibn al-Athīr, <u>al-Kāmil fī'l-Tārīkh</u>
<u>Materials</u>	William Montgomery Watt, 'The Materials Used by Ibn Ishāq', in <u>Historians of the</u> <u>Middle East</u>
Muh/Med	William Montgomery Watt, <u>Muhammad at Medina.</u>
<u>Qur'ān</u>	All references to the Qur'ān are to the English translation by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, <u>The Meaning of the Glorious</u> <u>Koran,</u> unless noted.
Tab	al-Tabarī, <u>Tārīkh al-Rusul w'al-Mulūk</u>
Tab, <u>Taf</u>	al-Tabarī, <u>Jāmi' al-Bayan 'an Ta'wīl Ayat</u> <u>al-Qur'ān</u>
<u>Usd</u>	Ibn al-Athīr, <u>Usd al-Ghāba</u>
Wāq	al-Wāqidī, <u>Kitāb al-Maghāzī</u>

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The study of the two rivalries which is indicated by the title of this work is a clarification of the historical incidents surrounding two areas of conflict in the umma as it was founded and led by the Prophet Muhammad during his life in Medina. From the material devoted to these rivalries and the way it is handled in the major historical texts, implications as to the development of historical writing and the comprehensiveness of the sīra literature as an historical source will be drawn.

The two rivalries in question are those between the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn and between the Munāfiqūn and the other Muslims. These two disputes formed a continuing and serious problem for Muhammad in his attempts to incorporate his followers into the single cohesive unit which he advocated as the proper body politic for the believers. These two areas of dissension were chosen because of their close relationship to each other. On occasion an incident properly belongs to either of the two rivalries. Furthermore the parties involved in the disputes were all Muslims. In both cases the rivalries occur within the community of the Muslims and are a disruptive force with which Muhammad was forced to deal in order to preserve the community itself.

The study is restricted to the lifetime of the Prophet by the material covered by the sīra literature. Events before and after this period are indicated when they are relevant to the study, but in the case of the Munāfiqūn this group had dissolved before the death of Muhammad when it became obvious that

a victory, returning a share of political power to the citizens of Medina, was no longer possible. The sentiments which were expressed by the Munāfiqūn and which formed the base on which they built their power, were those that later caused the Ansār to attempt to regain the position of leadership at the time of the election of Abū Bakr to the Caliphate. The activities of the Ansār continued on after the death of the Prophet. The city of Medina acted as a focal point of opposition to the established authority during the Umayyad period until it was finally crushed at the battle of al-Harra, when the influence of the Ansār and their descendants was destroyed.

There has never been an attempt to clarify the incidents of the rivalries in such a way as to extract, from the information available, the material which may be considered historically accurate and hence to present a picture of the factions which has not been over-shadowed by the person of the Prophet. This is especially true in the case of the Munāfiqūn. A proper understanding of their name has been attempted; however, this only dwells upon the religious aspects of the group. The usage of the name as it appears in the historical texts is compared with the religious application as it is seen in the Qur'ān and this study suggests that the usual translation, 'hypocrites', is not an accurate representation of the role which they played.

The leader of the Munāfiqūn, 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy, is also examined and again there is a conflict with the traditional view of the man. His name has been vilified by the early Muslim commentators and their attitudes toward him have

coloured even modern scholarship. He was not a sinner, yet nor was he a saint. From within the Muslim faith he acted as the proponent of the traditional values of Arab society at that time, a role which placed him firmly in opposition to many, but not all, of the changes that were being instituted by Muhammad. The attacks upon him by the commentators and historians were justified by the many references to his activities in the Qur'ān. Yet the strength of those values which he championed was evidenced by the resurgence of the traditional Arab society during the rule of the Umayyad dynasty.

The study of the rivalries brings into question the reasons for the preservation and writing of the sīra literature by the earliest scholars and its development until the field of history became an accepted academic discipline in its own right. The material has a very close relationship with the Qur'ānic exegesis and it was to this end that the information was collected and preserved by the earliest transmitters. To this was added the material which glorified the position and the role of the Prophet. From these two types of material comes almost all the information which bears on the two rivalries. How the material is used by the historians bears this out. It also becomes logical to assume that there were other incidents which have not been preserved by the transmitters because they cast no light on the understanding of the Qur'ān and because they were believed to show Muhammad and some of his followers in an unbecoming light. For the purposes of this portion of the study the three texts of Ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidī and

al-Tabarī will be used as being representative of the development of the historical writing about the life of the Prophet.

The focal point for the study is the Qur'ān itself. It is the only source which can be accepted as being authentic and it can be used, as it is in this study, as a source of confirmation for the accuracy of the historical information. The Qur'ān rarely gives actual historical details, however it often alludes to incidents in terms which are supported by the texts. The text of the Qur'ān which has been used is the standard Egyptian edition and quotations are from the translation by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall. A second translation, that of Richard Bell, has been used throughout for the chronological dating of the verses rather than for the translation itself. The commentaries of al-Bayḍāwī and al-Tabarī have been used and the latter especially has proven, because of its historical overtones, to be particularly illuminating as to the incidents surrounding the descent of certain verses.

As regards the historical texts, the primary ones have been those of Ibn Ishāq, al-Wāqidī, al-Balādhurī and al-Tabarī. Although these form the basis for the study, other works, especially the biographical dictionaries of Ibn Sa'd, Ibn Hajar and Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, have been used wherever relevant. Other works, some of which incorporate what may be considered as primary material, such as Abū al-Faraj al-Isbahānī (Kitāb al-Aghānī) and Ibn al-Athīr (Al-Kāmil fī-'l-Tārīkh) have also been consulted.

The literature on the rivalries in question is of little value, as all too often the roles of the Ansār and the Munāfiqūn

are left with a description that conforms with the traditional Muslim accounts.⁽¹⁾ There has been very little work done on their activities as disunifying agents operating from within the umma. This is especially true in the case of the Munāfiqūn. The best modern account and the work upon which this study is based is that of W.M. Watt, Muhammad in Medina. In many ways this study might be considered as an amplification of the original work done by Watt. Studies of the political activities of the Ansār are largely concentrated on their later movements during the time of the civil wars. The earlier period is largely ignored, possibly because of the lack of concrete information.

The primary texts are used with the utmost of caution and the basic principle is a comparison with the Qur'ān. An incident as it is preserved must conform with the relevant Qur'ānic passages in order to be accepted as historically accurate. There is one notable exception to this rule of procedure, the account of events preceding the battle of Uhud, and this is treated as a special case for reasons which will become apparent. Poetry has been almost totally excluded from this study, and this is particularly pertinent to the rivalry between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn where a large amount of information is in this form. Modern scholarship has cast such grave doubts upon this poetry that it can no longer be used for a study of the history of the Prophet despite its

(1) The most important of these works are mentioned in the various chapters.

importance to a study of the political activities of the Ansār at a later date.

This is not a study of the political activities of Muhammad but rather of the factions that were at work during the time that he was establishing his control over the community. There is, however, a thread running throughout the work which shows Muhammad acting as a statesman and a politician endeavouring to control the internal disunity threatening his larger goal. His prophetic function is of primary importance here as the admonition of the Qur'ānic verses was a major weapon which could be used with some effect as all the parties in these disputes were, at least nominally, Muslim.

CHAPTER I

THE ANSĀR AND THE MUHĀJIRŪN

The Ansār were the citizens of Medina who helped Muhammad during his life with them and to them is traditionally given much of the credit for his final success. The word ansār is commonly translated into English as 'helpers', referring to them as the 'helpers of the Prophet'. This conforms to the sense of the word as it appears in the dictionaries, the Qur'ān, and the historical texts. After the Hijra of the Prophet their tribal names gradually came to be discarded in favour of this new title. It must be pointed out that the use of Ansār as a designation was not complete until many years after the death of Muhammad, possibly during the early years of the Umayyad dynasty.

The Madinese were divided into two tribal groupings, B.al-Aws and B.al-Khazraj, who were known together as the B.Qayla. Despite this close relationship there had been a state of almost continual hostility between these tribes for a period possibly as long as a century. This feuding culminated in the 'day of Bu'āth' only a few years before the Hijra. The result of this battle was the predominance of Aws over Khazraj and, due to the death of the leaders, a political vacuum into which Muhammad was able to step. There is a tradition, ultimately derived from 'Ā'isha, stating that the battle of Bu'āth was instigated by God in order to facilitate Muhammad's mission.⁽¹⁾

(1) Bukh, v, 38.

The isnād for this tradition, 'Urwa b. al-Zubayr, his son Hishām, and finally two Kufans with close connections with the B. Quraysh, Abū Usama and 'Ubayd b. Ismā'il, would seem to be sound but the tradition itself was certainly produced at some later date.

When Muhammad first led his party to Medina several of the clans of the settlement did not enter into agreement with him. Certain clans of the Aws were kept from joining the community of Muhammad by the leadership of Abū Qays b. al-Aslat⁽²⁾ of B. Wā'il b. Zayd. Other sources indicate that Abū Qays fled to Mecca rather than submit to Muhammad.⁽³⁾ Abū 'Āmir al-Rāhib was so opposed to the arrival of Muhammad that he fled to Mecca with fifty followers from Aws and fought with the Quraysh at Uhud.⁽⁴⁾ The opposition, in these cases, may have been due to the influence of the Jewish tribes although this is more easily seen in the relationship between the Munāfiqūn and the Jews. However, as evidence of his success grew, all the tribal groupings joined.

Despite their honoured place in the history of the period many of them were opposed to the position which was rapidly gained by the Muhājirūn in Medina, although most of them do not seem to have objected to the overall role of Muhammad. This resentment against the growing power and influence of the newcomers was led by the Munāfiqūn, upon whom were focused the

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(2) II, 201.

(3) Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, al-Istī'āb fī Ma'rifat al-Ashāb, Ed.

'Alī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī, (Cairo, 1960), iv, 1734; Usd, vi, 256.

(4) Bal, A, i, 313; Wāq, i, 205-206.

feelings of the people. The final gasp of this resentment was the attempt of the Khazraj to elect Sa'd b. 'Ubāda as the successor of Muhammad. When this failed the Ansār were destined to political obscurity although for many years the city remained a centre of opposition to the ruling power of Islam.

Throughout the period of Muhammad's life in Medina there was a continuing rivalry between the native inhabitants of the community, the Ansār, and the newcomers, the Muhājirūn. The latter were held to represent the Quraysh of Mecca even in the later years when Arab tribesmen were admitted to their ranks. When listing the groups that made up the Muslim army at the conquest of Mecca the Muhājirūn are equated with the Quraysh although the citizens of Medina are grouped together as the Ansār.⁽⁵⁾ On at least one occasion this rivalry was used as the impetus for what may be considered as an attempt to provoke a civil war between the two parties.

The beginning of the rivalry between these two groups, representing the citizens of Mecca and Medina, is shrouded in mystery. It has been argued that the lack of close relations between the two cities was due to a commercial conflict stemming from rival trade networks.⁽⁶⁾ Mecca, by having its sanctuary established as the centre of the worship of Allah, 'the supreme God', and hence the main site of pilgrimage for the area, had achieved a religious victory over the other cults of the area.

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(5) II, 557.

(6) M.A. Shaban, Islamic History AD 600-750 (AH 132): A New Interpretation, (Cambridge, 1969), 10.

This gave the Quraysh a distinct advantage in their economic dealings over any competition. In addition to the benefits which the security of the sanctuary and the regular visit of the pilgrims gave to them, the Quraysh would certainly be aided in their dealings with the other tribes by the prestige gained from being the custodians of the shrine.

It has been declared that another cause of this rivalry was the hostility between the Arabs of the north and the south.⁽⁷⁾ This is not the place to delve into the beginnings of the struggle between the north and the south but again some persons trace it to a mercantile origin. The traders of Medina were envious of the success of the Meccans who, by virtue of their trade connections, were pro-Byzantine in their feelings. In reaction to this the Madinese were pro-Persian, thus giving themselves the orientation toward the south which later Muslim scholars expanded into a southern genealogy.⁽⁸⁾ There are, unfortunately, no primary sources which give support to this theory. Its development is due to the implications drawn from the few available facts and the theory, therefore, must be considered as doubtful.

Goldziher's monumental study of the question does give some support to the preceding theory, but only in a general way. He definitely puts the formal beginnings of the north/south rivalry into the Islamic period stating that it was based upon those

(7) Joseph Chelhod, Introduction à la Sociologie de l'Islam, (Paris, 1958), 88.

(8) De Lacy O'Leary, Arabia Before Muhammad, (London, 1927), 17.

tribes who joined each side with those on the side of the Ansār coming to be considered of southern descent and those with the Quraysh from the north. He supports this with the fact that the Prophet's poet, Ḥassān b. Thābit al-Ansārī, was considered to be the major propagandist for the southern cause and as late as the third century a poetry contest proved that the Ansār were still considered as the leading representatives of the southern tribes.⁽⁹⁾ Yet he also accepts that during the pre-Islamic period there was already a consciousness of the difference between the Arabs of the north and the south and this feeling of difference was later developed into the feuds of the Islamic period.⁽¹⁰⁾

This rivalry, despite the problems which it later gave Muhammad, may actually have helped his cause and the acceptance of his people by the Madinese. As mentioned above, it has been postulated that there was a trade network operated by the Jews of Medina in opposition to that of the Quraysh. It operated through the Jewish communities on the west coast of Arabia, extending from Najran to southern Syria. Hence the Madinese were willing to accept the arrival of Muhammad and his followers if it would further the dissensions in the ranks of the Quraysh and would bring to Medina the technical assistance of members of this tribe of mercantile experts.⁽¹¹⁾

(9) Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, Vol.1, Ed. S.M. Stern, (Chicago, 1967), 90-92.

(10) ibid, 89ff.

(11) Shaban, op.cit., 10-11.

The two theories for the beginnings of this rivalry, as they are stated by Goldziher and Shaban, conflict. Although possible, the idea propounded by Shaban is not as well supported as that of Goldziher and, until further evidence comes to light to support it, it must be considered as an interesting proposition rather than an acceptable theory.

The rivalry between the two groups continued, as can be seen from the reference to the poetry contest above, long after the death of Muhammad. The Ansār consistently resisted the accretion of power by the Quraysh, especially the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty which they saw, correctly, as the movement of the powerbase away from Arabia, where they could claim a position of some dominance, to Syria, a stronghold of the Quraysh based on the emigrants in the conquering Muslim armies. The manpower of the Syrian armies under the Umayyads was largely made up of those Arabs who had infiltrated into this area and settled there before the coming of Islam. After the conquests these men were led by the newcomers whose leaders were all from the Quraysh and hence, opposed to the Ansār.

The beginning and end of this rivalry are beyond the scope of this study which is limited to those activities which took place during the tenure of Muhammad in Medina. The welcome with which Muhammad was received is described in various sources as enthusiastic at the very least. As he passed through the streets upon his entry, the people vied for the honour of having him as a guest in their homes, but he refused them all.⁽¹²⁾

(12) al-Ya'qūbī, Tārīkh al-Ya'qūbī, (Beirut, 1960), ii, 41;

Tab, ii, 396; Bal. F., 18-19.

Further traditions relate that he was offered all the unoccupied lands or even the people's houses if he wished but he again refused.⁽¹³⁾ Al-Bukhārī records two versions of the same incident. In one, each man of the Ansār gave to Muḥammad the revenues of certain palm trees as a support. In the second, the Muslims alone gave the revenues of their trees.⁽¹⁴⁾ In both cases the revenues remained with Muḥammad until after B. Qurayza and B. al-Nadīr had been dealt with and they were then returned to their original owners. These stories must always be received with a large degree of scepticism as they seem all too eager to prove how well Muḥammad was received. Almost certainly they were compiled later by members of the Ansār trying to prove their claim vis à vis the Quraysh.

Al-Ya'qūbī records one contrary tradition when he relates that Muḥammad stayed with Sa'd b. Khaythama of B. 'Amr b. 'Awf. The B. 'Amr became insolent and during the night their Munāfiqūn either threw stones at him or reviled him (yarjūmunahu).⁽¹⁵⁾ This would seem to support the view that not all the Madinese were in favour of the arrival of the Prophet. It has been pointed out that it was the closeness of the ties with the Jewish tribes which kept some clans, particularly of Aws, from joining the Muslims.⁽¹⁶⁾

It is much more likely that his first followers, in any

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(13) Bal, F. 19.

(14) Bukh, v, 113; Bukh, iv, 106.

(15) al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 41.

(16) Muh/Med. 194.

number, were those members of the Ansār who were related to him, the B. al-Najjār⁽¹⁷⁾, and those other tribesmen such as the Khazraj who had heard of the Messiah from their Jewish neighbours and wanted to become associated with him before the Jews.⁽¹⁸⁾ By virtue of this one should beware of the term Ansār, especially during the early part of Muhammad's life in Medina. It would seem to refer to all the people of the community; however, it is much more probable that it only means those persons who had already declared a conversion to Islam. It is generally accepted that there was no outcry at the time of the Hijra and that most people, although not all, accepted the presence of Muhammad and his followers. Al-Tabarī records, and states that he accepts as true, that the site chosen by Muhammad for his mosque had previously been used, in part, as a graveyard.⁽¹⁹⁾ Al-Samhūdī preserves several traditions which refer to the graves although there is some confusion with a mosque built by a private individual. Muhammad ordered the graves to be dug up and the bones moved or even thrown out.⁽²⁰⁾ The fact that there were no protests, or at least none worth recording, at what could only be regarded as an act of desecration

(17) II, 235.

(18) ibid. 198.

(19) Tab, ii, 397; al-Suhaylī, al-Raud al-Unuf fī Tafsīr al-Sīrat al-Nabawīya l'Ibn Hishām, Ed. Ṭaha 'Abd al-Ru'ūf Sa'd, (Cairo, 1971), ii, 247; Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya w'al-Nihāya, (Beirut, 1966), iii, 215.

(20) al-Samhūdī, Wafā' al-Wafā, (Cairo, 1326 AH), i, 233, 240.

would certainly indicate a friendly acceptance of the situation.

The battle of Badr in March, 624 AD (Ramadan, 2 AH) was the first occasion on which a lack of unity between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn can be seen. When Muhammad announced his intention of attacking the caravan of Quraysh, the people answered his summons, some eagerly, others reluctantly, because they had not thought that the apostle would go to war. (21)

While it can be easily accepted that some of the Muslims were not eager to go out with the party, the excuse given would seem to be weak and could quite easily be a later addition to the story. Some men, including 'Uthmān b. 'Affān, Talha b. 'Ubayd Allah, Usayd b. Hudayr and Sa'id b. Zayd, were not present at the battle for varying reasons. Some gave excuses but none were blamed for not being present. The fact that it was difficult to raise the army is referred to in the Qur'an:

Even as thy Lord caused thee (Muhammad) to go
forth from home with the Truth, and lo! a party
of the believers were averse (to it)
Disputing with thee of the Truth after it
had been made manifest, as if they were
being driven to death visible. (22)

These verses would seem to indicate that there was a great deal more opposition than merely the thought that there would not be any fighting. The same point is stressed in the tradition

(21) II, 289; Tab. ii, 427. Both traditions are from the same source: 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbās.

(22) Qur'an, 8/5-6

about the building of the shelter for Muhammad for his use during the battle and the presence of a riding beast for the possibility of a hasty retreat. Sa'd b. Mu'adh recommended this on the grounds that there were many men who had been left behind who were loyal and would have joined them had they suspected that there would be a battle.⁽²³⁾ Several of these men who did not attend the battle were given shares in the booty by Muhammad and were not blamed for their absence.⁽²⁴⁾ Al-Tabarī records that the men went out only hoping for some booty easily obtained from the relatively weak caravan of Abū Sufyān and it was because of this attitude that God sent down the verses above and below.⁽²⁵⁾ Al-Balādhurī records the story of Khubayb b. Isāf who converted to Islam so that he might join the Muslim army in hope of gaining some booty.⁽²⁶⁾

When the Muslim party realised that the Quraysh had sent a large relief force toward them, another problem seems to have arisen. With the threat of a major battle before him, Muhammad felt it necessary to ask his men if they would support him. Representatives of the Muhājirūn spoke and confirmed their willingness to fight the Quraysh and they were followed by Sa'd b. Mu'adh on behalf of the Anṣār who also agreed to support⁽²⁷⁾ Muhammad. It seems likely that Abū Bakr and 'Umar did not actually speak at this time. Only Miqdād b. 'Umar and Sa'd

(23) II, 297; Tab, ii, 440.

(24) Wāq, i, 101.

(25) Tab, Taf, ix, 185.

(26) Bal, A, i, 288.

(27) II, 293-294; Tab. ii, 434-435.

b. Mu'adh are actually quoted and it is only stated that Abū Bakr and 'Umar spoke well. One version of the incident says that only Miqdād spoke, omitting even Sa'd, and says that he made his statement either when they were about to fight or at the time when Muhammad, still in Medina, was urging them to go out to Badr.⁽²⁸⁾ This tradition would support the supposition that Abū Bakr and 'Umar did not speak publicly at this time and casts some doubt on the participation of Sa'd. Nevertheless if the incident is to be accepted, and the evidence is in favour of this, it is probable that the two men, one Muhājir and one from the Ansār, spoke. The former encouraged the latter by the use of a Qur'ānic quotation which implied a stain on the honour of those who might leave the Prophet with even fewer men. The entire story of the incident of the oath-taking is confused in some of the sources, with the order of the speakers changed and words commonly attributed to one person given to another.⁽²⁹⁾ Despite the confusion in some of the texts, the outlines of the story are clear and confirmed by the existence of Qur'ānic verses alluding to it.

The reason for the oath, as given by Ibn Ishāq, is that the oath sworn by the Ansār at al-'Aqaba was only for the defence of Muhammad within the territory of Medina.⁽³⁰⁾ This implies that a battle with the Quraysh would be an offensive

(28) Bal, A, i, 293-294.

(29) cf. Tab, Taf, ix, 186; Bay,iii, 42; Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 262-264.

(30) II, 293-294.

action, beyond the letter of the oath, and hence would require a new undertaking. However, this also implies that an attack on a caravan would be a defensive act; a point which is hard to accept.

The commentary about the two Qur'ānic verses above, supports the idea that the two are a single unit as they are discussed together.⁽³¹⁾ and this is followed by Bell in his division of the Sūra into its component parts.⁽³²⁾ Throughout the commentaries the consensus of opinion is that the Muslims were very averse to facing the Quraysh who had come in defence of their caravan. It is emphasised that it was the fighting that was objected to rather than the raid on a virtually defenceless group of merchants.⁽³³⁾ There is a tradition which states that those who were "disputing with Thee of the truth" were the unbelievers of Mecca.⁽³⁴⁾ However, this is rejected and almost certainly is an attempt to alter the impression that might have been gained of the attitude of the early Muslims. These verses are very closely connected with the following one, quoted below, and the historical background to them, taken largely from Ibn Ishāq, is stated in the section devoted to verse seven⁽³⁵⁾ and it is also in this section that is found the description of the oaths given before Badr.

(31) Tab, Taf. ix, 181 ff.

(32) Bell, i, 162.

(33) Tab, Taf. ix, 182.

(34) ibid. ix, 183.

(35) ibid. ix, 184 ff.

Al-Tabarī preserves a tradition concerning the speech of Miqdād which may cast some light on the incident. Immediately before narrating the speech of Miqdād it is reported that when Muhammad was angry his cheeks became red. Miqdād came across Muhammad in this condition and said, "Rejoice O Messenger of God; by God we will not say to you ..."(36). This would seem to indicate that Muhammad was very disturbed before this incident and would argue in support of the supposition that there was a great fear that the Muslims might not support the Prophet. This point is made very clearly in a tradition, which is not transmitted by Ibn Ishāq, where it is stated that Muhammad, having been informed by Gabriel of the advance of the Qurashī army, feared that the Ansār would desert him because of the terms of their original oath.(37) In the version of the story transmitted by al-Bayḍawī, Muhammad is described as becoming angry at the attitude of the people when they realised that the caravan had escaped them and that now they had to face the enemy army. Muhammad had asked for advice from the people and this was the reaction that he received. Therefore Abū Bakr and 'Umar spoke and were followed by Sa'd and Miqdād.(38)

Another point must be mentioned. In the texts it is stressed that Badr was the first expedition which included men from the Ansār. Yet Watt has pointed out that in order to raise

(36) Tab, ii, 434; Abū al-Faraj, Kitāb al-Aghānī, (Cairo, 1969-1974), iv, 1391.

(37) Tab, Taf, ix, 186.

(38) Bay, iii, 42.

the numbers involved in some of the earlier expeditions Muhammad must certainly have made use of men from the Ansār.⁽³⁹⁾ Once again it must be said that these raids would have been offensive and beyond the confines of Medina. Consequently the story of the oath, with the reason given for it, is probably an attempt, by legal argument, to obscure a charge of timidity, or even cowardice, which might possibly be levelled against the entire party, but most definitely against the Ansār who had the most to lose in a 'total' war with the Quraysh. A reference to this charge may be seen in the verse immediately following the two given above:

And when Allah promised you one of the two
bands (of the enemy) that it should be yours,
and ye longed that other than the armed one
might be yours. And Allah willed that He
should cause the Truth to triumph by His words,
and cut the root of the disbeliever; ⁽⁴⁰⁾

The commentary on this verse demonstrates the relationship of this verse to the hesitation of the Muslims, and especially the Ansār, and it relates the details of the movements as the parties advanced to Badr.⁽⁴¹⁾ It is stressed that the Muslims were hoping for booty and not a battle and that the two parties were the caravan and the army of Quraysh.

It must be said that once the issue was joined no members

(39) Muh/Med. 3.

(40) Qur'an. 8/7.

(41) Tab. Taf. ix, 184 ff.

of the Muslim party are recorded as having faltered but this does not obliterate the initial hesitations which may have been due more to a fear of the financial and political consequences than to any physical fear.

The distinction drawn by the contemporaries between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn is pointed out by the incident which immediately preceded the general mêlée. In common with other battles of the era, this one began with a series of single combats. Three heroes of Quraysh made a challenge to an equal number from the Muslim side. Three men from the Ansār responded but al-Wāqidī reports that Muhammad did not wish to have these men strike the first blows for Islam. Therefore he ordered them to return to their places in the ranks and their places in the field to be taken by Muhājirūn from his own clan of B. Hāshim.⁽⁴²⁾ This version is also reported from the transmission of al-Umawī although the same text also gives the following account.⁽⁴³⁾ This description is drawn largely from Ibn Ishāq and recounts that the return of the Ansār was requested by the Quraysh saying, "You are nobles and our peers but we desire men of our own lineage."⁽⁴⁴⁾ Both stories may be considered suspect, however the latter would seem more likely. The Quraysh, as yet, had no reason to fight with the Ansār, the only Meccan blood having been spilled so far by a Muhājir. By asking for men of their own people the Quraysh were attempting to remove

(42) Wāq, i, 68; IS, ii, 17.

(43) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 273.

(44) II, 299; Tab, ii, 426.

a stain on the honour of the tribe created when relatives went into opposition to their own families. This, however, may also have been an attempt to weaken the Muslim force by widening an already present division. It is strange that the Anṣār made no protest despite the importance the Arabs attached to prowess in warfare as a part of muruwwa.

One text⁽⁴⁵⁾ reports that the following verses were sent down about the duels before the battle:

These twain (the believers and the dis-believers) are two opponents who contend concerning their Lord. But as for those who disbelieve, garments of fire will be cut out for them; boiling fluid will be poured on their heads.

Whereby that which is in their bellies, and their skins too, will be melted.

And for them are hooked rods of iron.

Whenever, in their anguish, they would go forth from thence they are driven back therein and (it is said unto them):

Taste the doom of burning. (46)

There is, however, a great deal of controversy as to whether the "two opponents" referred to are the contenders in the duels before Badr. Al-Tabarī seems to say that they are; however, he also records traditions which indicate that the opponents to the believers are the 'people of the Book' or all those who do

(45) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 273.

(46) Qur'an, 22/19-22.

not believe in God's message. There is also one tradition which states that the reference is to heaven and hell.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Al-Wāhidī gives two traditions which indicate that the reference is to the duellists or to the 'people of the book' but makes no judgement.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Al-Baydāwī indicates that the reference may be to the unbelievers in general but devotes more space and details to stating that it refers to the Jews and the Muslims.⁽⁴⁹⁾ It seems probable that, as a modern commentator has said, the parties in dispute are the believers and those who debate with them.⁽⁵⁰⁾ The references to Badr were an attempt to find an historic hook on which to hang the verses.

It is also interesting to note that the Anṣār made no protest when Muḥammad declared that members of the B. Ḥāshim and certain others were not to be killed if met on the battlefield.⁽⁵¹⁾ The only protest that was raised was by a Muhājir who knew that he would be facing close members of his own family.⁽⁵²⁾ These stories sound like a later addition to explain away the fact that the father of the ruling house (the 'Abbāsids) had opposed Muḥammad. The pro-'Abbāsīd nature of these reports is even more striking in a later account which implies that al-'Abbās had become a Muslim before this, possibly

(47) Tab, Taf, xvii, 131-132.

(48) al-Wāhidī, Asbāb al-Nuzūl, (Cairo, 1968), 207-208.

(49) Bay, iv, 52.

(50) Bell, i, 315.

(51) II, 301-302; Tab, ii, 449-451.

(52) II, 301.

even before the Hijra, and remained in Mecca helping those Muslims who remained there and passing on information to Muhammad. When he requested permission to emigrate he was told: "You are the last of the Muhājirūn as I am the last of the Prophets."⁽⁵³⁾

The battle of Uhud in March 625 AD (Shawwal, 3 AH) is, as will be seen later, of far more importance for a study of the activities of Ibn Ubayy and his followers than for an examination of the rivalry between the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn. However, al-Tabarī, and following him Ibn al-Athīr, record that before the battle began Abū Sufyān sent to the Anṣār saying:

You men of Aws and Khazraj, leave me to
deal with my cousin and we will depart from
you, for we have no need to fight you.

The Anṣār remained loyal to Muhammad and refused his offer.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The point of this incident is lost, for certainly after the battle of Badr in which the Anṣār played such a prominent role, there were sufficient blood feuds engendered to make this offer impossible. Al-Tabarī claims to have received this tradition from Ibn Ishāq but this is not confirmed as it is not found in the Sīra, nor is there any reference to it in the Qur'ān. It is much more likely that this is a later creation intended to strengthen the position of the Anṣār by indicating their loyalty to Muhammad. In this context it may be noted that the isnād given by al-Tabarī passes back through Ibn

(53) Uṣd, iii, 165.

(54) Tab, ii, 511; Kāmil, ii, 151; Abū al-Faraj, op.cit., xv, 5498.

Ishāq to a man from the Ansār of B. Salima and the other references to the incident are both, almost certainly, lifted from al-Tabarī.

The story of the siege and the expulsion of the B. al-Nadīr rightly belongs to the section concerned with the Munāfiqūn, however the division of the booty which was obtained from this group involves the Ansār.

And that which Allah gave as spoil unto His messenger from them, ye urged not any horse or riding-camel for the sake thereof, but Allah giveth His messenger lordship over whom He will. Allah is Able to do all things. (55)

This verse is commonly accepted as having been sent down concerning the booty which was obtained after the expulsion of the B. al-Nadīr from their homes. (56) It might be pointed out that some of the accounts preserved by al-Tabarī say that it may have come down on this occasion, although others indicate that it came down about the submission of Fadak, the destruction of B. Qurayza or the attack on Khaybar. (57) One account states that it refers to the booty taken from the B. Qurayza which was then given to the Muhājirūn of Quraysh (58); an incident which is almost certainly a confusion with the

(55) Qur'an, 59/6.

(56) Bay, v, 125; al-Wāhidī, op.cit., 278-279; Bell, ii, 568.

(57) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 35-36.

(58) ibid, xxviii, 36.

event which occurred as described below. Whatever the occasion of its descent, and it almost certainly relates to the expulsion of B. al-Nadīr, it formed the legal and religious justification for the distribution of the booty.

Various versions of how this booty was distributed have been given to us. Al-Husayn from al-Kalbī records that Muhammad went to the Ansār and asked their permission to add the new possessions to those of the Ansār and then to divide the total between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn because of the poverty among the latter. If they preferred he would give all of the booty to the Muhājirūn leaving the Ansār with what was theirs already. The Ansār are said to have answered that the Muhājirūn were welcome to all of the booty and any other of their possessions which they needed.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Al-Wāqidī gives the same basic story with the additional detail that Sa'd b. 'Ubāda and Sa'd b. Mu'adh were the spokesmen for the Ansār.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Hence the booty was given only to the Muhājirūn with the exception of two poor men from the Ansār. Ibn Ishāq specifies that only the 'first' Muhājirūn were given a share.⁽⁶¹⁾ There is preserved a report that Sa'd b. Mu'adh was given a sword but there is no other mention of awards to the Ansār.⁽⁶²⁾ Other versions in al-Ya'qūbī, al-Tabarī, and Ibn al-Athīr make no mention of the initial offer although the end results are the

(59) Bal, F, 38.

(60) Wāq, i, 378-379.

(61) II, 438; Tab, ii, 555; Kamīl, ii, 174; Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iv, 76.

(62) Wāq, i, 379.

same.

This kindness from the Ansār on behalf of the Muhājirūn is extolled in two Qur'ānic verses following the one given above:

And (it is) for the poor fugitives who have been driven out from their homes and their belongings, who seek bounty from Allah and help Allah and His messenger; They are the loyal.

Those who entered the city and the faith before them love those who flee unto them for refuge, and find in their breasts no need for that which hath been given them, but prefer (the fugitives) above themselves though poverty become their lot. And whoso is saved from his own avarice — such are they who are successful. (63)

The commentary on these verses confirms that they were sent down concerning the attitude of the Ansār toward the booty received at the time of the capitulation of the B. al-Nadīr. (64) The version which states that it was the booty taken from B. Qurayza is repeated; (65) however, no comment is made and other traditions relate to B. al-Nadīr.

(63) Qur'an, 59/8-9.

(64) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 40 ff; Bay, v, 126; al-Wāhidī, op.cit., 280-281.

(65) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 40.

There does seem to be an inconsistency in the story that led the Ansār to donate magnanimously the booty to the Muhājirūn. The point to the story is that until this time the Ansār had been supporting the Muhājirūn and this distribution of the booty relieved them of this necessity. Yet references in the texts would indicate that by this time the subsidy from the Ansār was only a portion of the amount required and that the Muhājirūn, or at least a portion of them, were capable of supporting themselves.

There had been several successful expeditions before the expulsion of the B. al-Nadīr. Nakhla, Badr, al-Kudr, al-Qarada and Qatan were all occasions on which booty had been taken and the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqā' certainly must have aided in supporting the Muslims. The amount of booty taken on only one of these raids, al-Qarada, is emphasized and the portion given to Muhammad, the fifth, reached twenty thousand dirhams. (66)

Traditionally it is also implied that the Muhājirūn arrived in Medina penniless and were, of necessity, forced to subsist upon the generosity of the Ansār. Although there is evidence to support this (67) there is also evidence to show that some of the Muhājirūn were able to bring considerable resources with them. 'Umar stated that he was one of the wealthiest men of Quraysh and offered half of it to a man if

(66) Wāq, i, 198; al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i, 200.

(67) An example is the story of Suhayb b. Sinān who was forced to give all his funds to the Quraysh before they would let him leave. II, 729, #266 from Ibn Hishām.

he would remain in Medina and not return to Mecca.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Abū Bakr was said to have taken five or six thousand dirhams with him, a not inconsiderable sum.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Three families are listed who made the emigration in toto and "with their property".⁽⁷⁰⁾ It is also certain that the Muhājirūn, true to their tribal profession, established themselves in trade soon after their arrival, as the well-known story of 'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Awf indicates.⁽⁷¹⁾ A tradition reports that as Muhammad and Abū Bakr were approaching Medina on their journey of emigration from Mecca, they met al-Zubayr and a group of Muslim merchants who were returning from Syria with a caravan. Al-Zubayr clothed both Muhammad and Abū Bakr in white robes.⁽⁷²⁾

A tradition from Mūsā b. 'Uqba states that this caravan was made up of Muslims but was returning to Mecca.⁽⁷³⁾ There is no indication that al-Zubayr and other Muslims moved to Medina after Muhammad made the Hijra and therefore the reference to Mecca is inconsistent with the facts as they are now known. Even if the story is a later creation it indicates a belief that commerce was begun by the Muslims at the time of the Hijra.

Assuming that there would be a continuing development,

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(68) II, 217.

(69) ibid., 225.

(70) ibid., 230.

(71) IS, iii, 125; Bukh, v, 39.

(72) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 186; al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i, 174.

(73) II, xliv.

and the expedition against the B. al-Nadīr was almost exactly three years after the arrival of Muhammad in Medina, some of the Muhājirūn, and probably the largest number of them, would be capable of supporting themselves by this time. This would substantiate Watt's view that the Ansār were not forced to pay regularly but were urged to 'contribute' as much as possible. (74)

Because the Muhājirūn were almost certainly not in such desperate straits as is commonly accepted, it seems strange that there is no mention of any outcry from the Ansār at the loss of the booty. They had taken equal risks with the Muhājirūn during the siege and the later incident at al-Ji'rāna shows that they were willing to protest when they felt that they had been done an injustice. Several statements indicate that it was only the "first Emigrants" who were given shares in what must have been a fairly considerable amount of booty and hence another source of agitation. A desire for the material goods of life or, more bluntly, greed, is too deeply engrained into the human soul for there not to have been some protest. The Munāfiqūn had been active in their opposition to Muhammad during the siege and surely they would have led any opposition, or if there was none, they would have tried to create it. No record of any protest has been preserved, probably because it is not referred to in any Qur'ānic verses. It seems likely that the Qur'ānic verses given above were intended to indicate God's gratitude to those who agreed to the distribution and to

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(74) Muh/Med. 251.

shame into silence those who disapproved.

The raid on the B. al-Mustaliq at al-Muraysī' was the occasion for the most serious outbreak of the rivalry between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn. As many of the details of this incident involve the leader of the Munāfiqūn, 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy, it is also dealt with in the next chapter. However, as regards the problems between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn, Ibn Ishāq records that a dispute broke out over first rights to the water between Jahjāh b. Mas'ūd of the B. Ghifār, a hired servant of 'Umar, and Sinān b. Wabar al-Juhanī, an ally of B. 'Awf b. al-Khazraj. They came to blows and each tried to summon help from his party, either the Muhājirūn or the Ansār. 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy used this incident to try and inflame the Ansār against the newcomers quoting the proverb: "Feed a dog and it will devour you." He urged his followers to turn upon the Qurashī emigrants after the return to Medina saying that "the stronger will drive out the weaker." This must have fallen upon ears made receptive by the growing wealth, power and control of the Muhājirūn in Medina, for, when word of this was brought to Muhammad by Zayd b. 'Arqam, 'Umar suggested that Ibn Ubayy be killed. Muhammad refrained from this act but, rather, exhausted both parties by a forced march toward Medina. (75)

Ibn Sa'd briefly recounts the same tale, however he states that Jahjāh called for the help of the Quraysh and the Kināna rather than from the Muhājirūn. He also adds that the violence was ended by the Quraysh speaking with the Aws and Khazraj and

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(75) II, 490-491.

finally the two instigators made peace.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Al-Wāqidī confirms the story with many details and much dialogue and he emphasizes the seriousness of the affair by mentioning that there was a fear of fitna.⁽⁷⁷⁾ The story is also confirmed by al-Bukhārī who gives several traditions with different isnāds.⁽⁷⁸⁾ In his commentary on the incident al-Suhaylī emphasizes the fear of disunity which the incident provoked. Muhammad, having heard the cries for help, denounces them and declares that the believers are brothers and members of one party. These shouts were forbidden by Islam and the incident is linked to the legal punishments for the act.⁽⁷⁹⁾

The incident is referred to in the Qur'ān in Sura LXIII, which is entitled "al-Munāfiqūn". Although the first eight verses are traditionally associated with the expedition to al-Muraysī', Bell in his study of the chronological order of the verses states that only verse eight is actually concerned with the affair and was added to the others which had been composed earlier.⁽⁸⁰⁾

They say: Surely, if we return to al-Madīnah
the mightier will soon drive out the weaker:

(76) IS, ii, 65.

(77) Wāq, ii, 415 ff. Fitna: civil discord or civil strife, among other meanings. A fear of this is found throughout Islamic history as one of the greatest of civil disasters.

(78) Bukh, vi, 189-193.

(79) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iv, 17.

(80) Bell, ii, 581.

when might belongeth to Allah and to His messenger and the believers; but the hypocrites know not. (81)

The commentators, by the way in which each verse is handled, tend to support the statement of Bell about the sending down of this verse. Although the preceding verses are attributed to the actions of Ibn Ubayy and the Munāfiqūn, the details of the incident are narrated in the section dealing with the verse above and the earlier verses are rather summarily dealt with. (82) Although all three commentaries link the saying in verse seven

... Spend not on behalf of those (who dwell) with Allah's messenger that they may disperse (and go away from you) ... (83)

to 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy only al-Baydāwī and al-Wāhidī link it to the incident at al-Muraysī' and the threat to expel the Muhājirūn from Medina and al-Tabarī does not mention this possibility. (84) The final tradition in al-Tabarī's commentary on verse seven would tend to indicate that it was the verse that exonerated Zayd b. Arqam from the charges that were being made on him. (85) This is, however, almost certainly a confusion with verse eight due to the similarity of their

(81) Qur'an, 63/8

(82) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 106 ff; Bay, v, 133-134.

(83) Qur'an, 63/7

(84) Bay, v, 134; al-Wāhidī, op.cit., 287; Tab, Taf, xxviii, 111-112.

(85) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 112.

opening words and would tend to support Bell's supposition that verse eight was a later replacement for verse seven.⁽⁸⁶⁾

This incident would be seen as lessening the aura which surrounded the Companions and there is some evidence that attempts were made to change the image of the incident. Both al-Bayḍāwī and al-Wāḥidī record versions which would indicate that the fight was begun by a bedouin, and neither version mentions that this man was working for 'Umar and called upon the Muhājirūn to support him.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Al-Wāḥidī includes the more common version with the additional details in a second tradition, however al-Bayḍāwī does not mention it. It would seem probable that this account, which omits rather than changes, certain pertinent facts, was a later attempt to transmit the incident as it was believed that it would have been.

It can readily be seen that this incident might have finally involved all the citizens of Medina if the warriors had returned still incensed by the words of Ibn Ubayy. Had Ibn Ubayy been killed as 'Umar suggested, and even Ibn Ubayy's son offered to perform the act, this would probably have created a martyr about whose memory the Ansār could have gathered. Muhammad wisely refrained from this assassination and chose to exhaust the two parties with a forced march. Muhammad was conscious of the political implications that the killing of Ibn Ubayy would involve, or at least a later transmitter believed that he was. This may be seen in the statement

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(86) Bell, ii, 581.

(87) Bay, v, 134; al-Wāḥidī, op.cit., 287.

Muhammad is said to have made to 'Umar at some later time when discussing the incident:

Now what do you think, 'Umar? Had I killed him on the day you wanted me to kill him the leading men would have trembled with rage. If I ordered them to kill him today they would kill him. (88)

Although dialogue is notoriously unreliable, this statement is certainly an accurate representation of Muhammad's reason for reacting as he did.

Upon the return to Medina the so-called 'Affair of the Lie' broke out which further distracted the populace from the incident. It has even been suggested that the outbreak of the rivalry between the Aws and the Khazraj which, as will be seen below, protected Ibn Ubayy from punishment, may have been deliberately provoked in an effort to make the Anṣār forget their quarrel with the Muhājirūn and to provide time for the statements of Ibn Ubayy to be forgotten. (89) Although this is certainly possible, it is more likely that the distraction offered by the scandal had already achieved this purpose. From this time forward the rivalry of the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn only appears as a minor irritant for the Muslim state.

The siege of the Trench in March and April, 627 AD (Dhū al-Qa'da, 5AH) was not the occasion for a major outbreak of the rivalry between the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn, however it

(88) II, 492; Tab, ii, 608-609.

(89) Muh/Med. 186.

does give evidence as to the day-to-day bickering which may have gone on between these two parties.

When word reached Medina of the coming of the Confederates, Muhammad took counsel as to the best means of defending the city against attack. The idea of digging a trench to ward off the enemy cavalry is reported to have been that of Salīm al-Farsī, a freedman of Medina.⁽⁹⁰⁾ This fact is not reported by Ibn Ishāq. Upon the advice being taken, the entire community began to work on the defences, albeit as shall be seen later the Munāfiqūn were shirkers and lax in fulfilling their duty. Several fabulous incidents are reported during the progress of the work, all of which can be accepted as later additions.

During this period the Ansār began to argue over the question of to which party Salīm, the hero of the moment, belonged. Being a Persian, he did not readily fall into either category and the Ansār were claiming him as one of theirs by virtue of the fact that he was working with them in digging the trench. Muhammad put an end to the debate by declaring that Salīm was above these questions and a member of his party, or family, the ahl al-bayt.⁽⁹¹⁾ It is of interest to point out that Ibn Sa'd lists Salīm among the Muhājirūn from B. Hāshim b. 'Abd Manāf.

Al Wāqidī records that as the people were working on the

(90) Wāq, ii, 444-445; Kāmil, ii, 178.

(91) Tab, ii, 568-569; Wāq, ii, 446; Kāmil, ii, 179;

IS, iv, 82-83; Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iv, 99.

al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iii, 278-279.

trench the Ansār made up the following verse to work by:

We are those who gave the oath to Muhammad
for the Jihād, we never hang back.

Muhammad responded with a verse of his own:

O God! There is no good except the good
of the life to come
Forgive the sins of the Ansār and the
Muhājirūn. (92)

These verses are appended to a tradition concerning certain miraculous happenings which occurred while working on the ditch and which may be disregarded. There seems to be no connection between the preceding tradition and the verses except that the same isnād does for both. The preceding tradition is given with the same initial transmitter by Ibn Ishāq although the verses are not given.

Ibn Ishāq does, however, preserve a verse which is so similar to the one given above that it must be seen as a variant tradition stemming from the same original verse. As the Muslims were working to build the Prophet's mosque, shortly after his arrival in Medina, they sang:

There's no life but the life of the next
world
O God! have mercy on the Ansār and the
Muhājira.

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(92) Wāq, ii, 452-453.

Muhammad responded by saying:

There's no life but the life of the next
world

O God, have mercy on the Muhājirīn and the
Ansār. (93)

The reason for the change of word order in the version supposedly recited by Muhammad is to show, by loss of the rhyme and the metre, that he was not a poet and hence it would act as proof that the Qur'ān was divinely inspired and not written by the Prophet who was so obviously incapable. In this context it would seem to support the Qur'ānic verse:

And we have not taught him (Muhammad)
poetry, nor is it meet for him. (94)

Yet there is no reference to the poetry in the commentary of al-Tabarī. The reason for the change of situation from the digging of the trench to the building of the mosque is less clear and it may merely have been a desire to locate the event in a more religiously oriented situation. There is another description of a similar verse also on the occasion of the building of the mosque. In this version the point of the version of Ibn Ishāq is lost because two verses are given; however, the first bears no relationship to the verse in question although the second seems to be yet another variant:

There is no care if the remuneration is the
remuneration of the next world

So have mercy on the Ansār and the Muhājira.

(93) II, 229; II, i, 496 (Arabic text).

(94) Qur'ān, 36/68; Qur'ān 36/69 (Arabic text).

Here, rather than showing Muhammad reciting a defective verse, Ibn Shihāb states that the two verses given are the only ones that Muhammad ever used, as far as he knew.⁽⁹⁵⁾

Despite the references to the building of the mosque the majority of the reports relate the verses, or the variations upon it, to the digging of the trench. Ibn Kathīr gives several more versions of the story and the verse, with varying isnāds although most of them he has taken from al-Bukhārī and similar works of a religious nature.⁽⁹⁶⁾ Ibn Sa'd also gives three versions of the verse with varying isnāds, two of which stem from Anas b. Mālīk⁽⁹⁷⁾ who is also the original transmitter for several of the versions presented by Ibn Kathīr. One version, which is from al-Bukhārī and originated with Anas, is almost identical with that of al-Wāqidī with only the most minor differences in the verses themselves, although the first was sung by the Muslims rather than the Ansār⁽⁹⁸⁾. Ibn Sa'd, in a tradition from Anas, but with a different isnād gives versions of the verses which are even closer to those given by al-Wāqidī and attributes the first of the two to the Companions of the Prophet.⁽⁹⁹⁾ Al-Suhaylī, while commenting on the three good Muslims who abstained from the raid on Tabūk, points out that the Ansār had sworn an oath to the Prophet and quotes

(95) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 187.

(96) ibid., iv, 95-97.

(97) IS, ii, 70.

(98) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iv, 96.

(99) IS, ii, 70.

the verse of the Ansār given by al-Wāqidī as proof of this, thus giving further support to the belief that the Ansār were the reciters of the original verse, rather than the Muslims in general. He attributes the occasion of the verse to the day of al-Khandaq.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ It should be pointed out that none of the versions given by Ibn Kathīr have the same chain of transmission or original source as that of al-Wāqidī. Also those of Ibn Sa'd, although similar at certain stages, are different. The versions of the verse, and the circumstances under which it was recited, which are preserved by al-Bukhārī add nothing to its understanding.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ In al-Samhūdī both occasions are mentioned with varying accounts of the verse itself. In two of the traditions it is pointed out that Muhammad was reciting verse composed by someone else.⁽¹⁰²⁾

The verse, or some version of it, would seem to be authentic, confirmed as it is from three separate sources, and the version of al-Wāqidī would seem to be more authentic than the others. It is free of the religious overtones which seem to indicate a later tampering and indeed it would seem to give evidence of the rivalry between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn. The Ansār composed a verse extolling their own merits; surely the Muhājirūn would have responded in kind had not Muhammad interposed his own verse. The very uniqueness of the verse would argue for the possible seriousness of the incident. This

(100) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iv, 198

(101) Bukh, viii, 109.

(102) al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i, 234, 240-241.

would seem to be the only example of his poetry to which there is a reference and it must have been a serious situation which stimulated him to create it. It was originally preserved because of this uniqueness and it was later transmitters who altered its circumstances in order to give it a more acceptable venue and meaning.

The distribution, at al-Ji'rāna, of the booty is of interest for several reasons, not the least of which is the fact Muḥammad is reported to have given back the women and children who had been captured. He did this upon request from the Hawāzin and the other defeated tribes, but he limited himself to presenting and to supporting their request before his victorious army. This he did and only a few of the Arab tribes are said to have held to the letter of the tradition and insisted upon receiving either the women or compensation for them. (103) It is strange that it is also recorded that Muḥammad gave girls from among the captives to 'Alī, 'Uthmān and 'Umar. (104) The account is transmitted from Yazīd b. 'Ubayd Abū Wajza al-Sa'dī al-Madanī who may represent a desire to further indicate the injustice done to the Anṣār by showing Muḥammad giving gifts to those men who later helped to remove the Anṣār from any role in the government. (105)

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(103) II, 592-593; Kāmil, ii, 269; Bukh, iv, 108-109.

(104) II, 593; Tab, iii, 87-88.

(105) Ibn Hajar, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, (Hyderabad, 1325-1327 AH) xi, 349; al-Dhahabī, Mizān al-I'tidāl fī Naqd al-Rijāl, Ed. 'Alī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī, (Cairo, 1963), iv, 434.

This was also the occasion for the distribution of gifts to those who have come to be known as 'those whose hearts are to be reconciled.' As Watt has pointed out these men were probably being paid because of their positions as chieftains of allied tribes rather than in an attempt to confirm their faith in God and His prophet although with some of them this may have been the case. (106)

A reaction to this generosity was immediate among the Anṣār. Having seen the gifts to the Qurashī leaders, who until recently had been violently opposed to Muḥammad and Islam, to their Arab allies, and seemingly to certain highly placed Muhājirūn, the Anṣār, led by Sa'd b. 'Ubāda, complained to Muḥammad and were given a hearing. It is probable that this group was not, in actual fact, all of the Anṣār. Ibn Ishāq refers to it as "this tribe of the Anṣār" and only Sa'd b. 'Ubāda of the B. Sā'ida b. Ka'b b. al-Khazraj is named as their leader; therefore it is likely that only members of the Khazraj were involved, along with certain of the Muhājirūn who were allowed to join them.

Muḥammad made a speech to them in which he outlined the benefits which he had brought to them and the benefits they had given to him. He showed them how deep his love for them was and they were satisfied. (107)

A distinctive contrast can be seen here between this

(106) Muh/Med., 73-75.

(107) II, 596-597; Tab, iii, 93; al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 63-64; Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iv, 355 ff; Bukh, v, 38, 201-202.

incident and the earlier one after the raid on the B. al-Nadīr. On this occasion record has been kept of the affair, probably because the words of Muḥammad were so charged with pro-Ansārī sentiment. Indeed his words are recorded by Mūsā b. 'Uqba as being used after so many of the Ansār and their descendents were killed on the day of al-Harra.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ The incident and its accompanying speech is also used by a later writer in a section devoted to glorifying the Ansār.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ It is of interest to note that al-Suhaylī, commenting upon the incident, describes Muḥammad "reproving" the Ansār although the later usage of the affair ignores this view of the speech.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

The incidents given above are the only samples that have remained of the rivalry between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn. There are other references which have not been included because they are found in the poetry of the sīra literature. In this poetry are found some of the strongest attacks, especially from the Ansār and in opposition to the Muhājirūn, yet modern scholarship has shown that a sufficiently large quantity of this poetry was forged, often to use in later conflicts, that doubt must be cast upon the whole.⁽¹¹¹⁾ Other citizens, or

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(108) II, xlv.

(109) Ibn Qudāma, al-Istibṣār fī Nasab al-Sahāba min al-Ansār, Ed. 'Alī Yūsuf Nuwayhid, (Beirut, 1971), 25-26.

(110) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iv, 169.

(111) Walid 'Arafat, A Critical Introduction to the Study of the Poems Ascribed to Ḥassān Ibn Thābit, (University of London, 1954), 560. M.A. 'Azzām, A Critical Study of the Poetry Content of the Sīra of Ibn Hishām, (University of London, 1953), 365.

groups of citizens, of Medina were opposed to the new power structure of the community. Such persons as Abū 'Āmir al-Rāhib and Abū Qays b. al-Aslat were not even nominally Muslim and were opposing the community from the outside.

The election of Abū Bakr shows that even by the time of the death of Muhammad the Ansār were not reconciled to their fate. An attempt was made to have Sa'd b. 'Ubāda, the leading man of the Ansār, elected as the successor to the Prophet but it was foiled by the party of Abū Bakr, 'Umar and Abū 'Ubayda. The opposition of the Aws to the election of the Khazrajī leader completed his failure and allowed the Quraysh to retain their control. Sa'd so objected to the failure, and the final loss of power, that he went into exile and died in Syria.⁽¹¹²⁾ A modern commentator has speculated that this defeat was avenged by the murder of the Caliph 'Uthman⁽¹¹³⁾; a crime that was in itself avenged by the bloodshed of al-Harra. Despite conclusions drawn from these later incidents the opposition to the election of Abū Bakr was the last gasp of the Ansār and they were destined to remain as supporters to other, more viable political forces and never again were they to be the prime movers in the political life of Islam and its far flung empire.

(112) Ibn Hajar, al-Isāba fī Tamayīz al-Sahāba, (Cairo, 1328 AH), ii, 30.

(113) 'Azzam, op.cit., 365.

CHAPTER II

THE MUNĀFIQŪN AND THE MUSLIMS

What is a Munāfiq?

The usage of the English word 'hypocrite' to describe a 'Munāfiq' is common and yet does not seem to accurately describe such a person as seen in the historical texts.

The root N*F*Q in the fā'ala form which is relevant to this topic occurs thirty seven times in the Qur'ān, for the most part in the active participle shape munāfiq and its plurals. It is this word which is most commonly translated as 'hypocrite'. Izutsu has attempted to describe the usage of nifāq and munāfiq as they appear in the Qur'ān and hence their technical religious meaning. He points out that "roughly speaking, nifāq consists in professing faith with the tongue while secretly disbelieving in the heart."⁽¹⁾ There can be, however, some elaboration upon this rather general statement. The Munāfiq can be paralleled with the disbeliever:

O Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers
(al-Kuffār) and the hypocrites (al-Munāfiqīn),
and be stern with them. Hell will be their
home, a hapless journey's end.⁽²⁾

The Munāfiq is also described in terms of fisq:

Lo! the hypocrites, they are the transgressors
(al-fāsiqūna)⁽³⁾

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(1) Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān, (Montreal, 1966), 178.

(2) Qur'ān, 66/9.

(3) Qur'ān, 9/67.

As they are described in Sūra IX, 49-60, it is obvious that the Fāsiq is almost synonymous with the Munāfiq.

As far as we can gather from this description, a fāsiq is not a down-right kāfir, for, nominally at least, he is in the camp of the Muslims. Only, he is a wavering, very unreliable kind of Muslim who tends to reveal his nifāq-nature on every occasion. (4)

This religious view of the relationship between fāsiq and munāfiq is not seen in the historical texts referring to the time of the Prophet. Abū 'Āmir al-Rāhib was named by Muhammad al-Fāsiq yet was definitely not a member of the Muslim community. As has been seen above, he left Medina in opposition to Muhammad, fought against his own people and finally died in exile. It would seem that he was, indeed, much more of a kāfir than a munāfiq. Despite this it was this theoretical relationship between kufr, fisq and nifāq which led some later commentators to include the Munāfiq with the Mu'min and the Kāfir as one of the three main categories of mankind. (5)

It is this religious aspect of nifāq which is stressed by the dictionaries. The Lisān al-'Arab derives the word munāfiq from the word nafiqā' which is one of the many words for the burrow of the jerboa. A Munāfiq enters (nāfaqa) Islam as a jerboa enters (nāfaqa) his burrow (nafiqā') and yet neither remains there for long and leaves the sanctuary at any time. Ibn Manzur points out that this derivation of the word took place

(4) Izutsu, op.cit., 159.

(5) ibid., 179 quoting Hasan al-Basrī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

during the Islamic period and that the pre-Islamic Arabs did not have this specialized use of the word. In actual definition of the word munāfiq he says, "he it was who concealed his disbelief and gave the appearance of belief."⁽⁶⁾ It is from this derivation that Watt suggests that Munāfiq might be more accurately translated as 'creeper' or 'mole'.⁽⁷⁾ Such a translation would suggest the animal involved but would not imply the action which is contained in the verb. Using this method they might be more accurately described as 'those who dart in and out', but this phrase is far too unwieldy to be useable.

The modern bi-lingual dictionaries have continued, for the most part, to translate nāfaqa in the sense of 'to play the hypocrite' and hence are in accordance with the Qur'ānic usage of the word. Dozy, however, gives it the meaning of 'to be a traitor' with the sense of duplicity and falsehood. Nāfaqa 'alā he gives as meaning 'to revolt against' and hence nifāq means 'rebellion'.⁽⁸⁾ Although this dictionary is largely devoted to the Arabic of Islamic Spain this definition adds a sense to the word which is not altogether lacking in its earlier Arabian usage.

A western scholar, Arthur Jeffery, has stated that munāfiq is a direct borrowing from the Ethiopic and cites several other

(6) Ibn Manzur, Lisān al-ʿArab, (Cairo, 1300-1307), xii, 235-238.

(7) Muh/Med, 184; Bell, i, 61n.

(8) R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes, (Leiden, 1881), ii, 704.

western scholars who agree with this derivation.⁽⁹⁾ Such a borrowing would seem possible, especially in the light of the fact that Ibn Manẓur, as mentioned above, admits that the word only appeared during the Islamic period when the need for such a word arose.

Yet another derivation of the word is that proposed by R.B. Serjeant. In studying the 'Constitution of Medina' he noted that naḥaqa was a term used for some sort of a tax which was paid by the members of the umma and those allied to it such as the Jews. It is from this sense of the word that he believes that munāfiq was derived:

That is to say, it refers to those who shared in paying naḥaqa, but did so with a very bad grace, and while they could not but submit to the will of the majority of Medinans, they were in actual fact opposed to the Prophet.⁽¹⁰⁾

Al-Bukhārī preserves for us more definite descriptions of a Munāfiq. In a tradition traced back through Abū Hurayra to the Prophet, it is said:

Three things characterize the Munāfiq: when he speaks, he lies; if he makes a promise, he does not hold to it; when one places one's confidence in him, he betrays it.⁽¹¹⁾

(9) Arthur Jeffery, The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'ān, (Baroda, 1938) 272

(10) R.B. Serjeant, 'The "Constitution of Medina"', Islamic Quarterly, viii (1964), 14.

(11) Bukh, i, 15.

In another tradition, four indicators of a Munāfiq are given: he betrays one's confidence, he lies when he speaks, he breaks a compact, and he acts immorally when in contention. It is pointed out that any one of these is sufficient to indicate a Munāfiq.⁽¹²⁾ There are other descriptions of this sort in al-Bukhārī but they add little to the basic statement. A similar description, but more detailed, is to be found in the history of al-Ya'qūbī. This states that a Munāfiq performs his religious duties in an impious way but it ends by returning to the same subject as above, the basic dishonesty of the Munāfiq in all his dealings.⁽¹³⁾ These definitions add a sense to the word Munāfiq which is not to be found in the more religiously oriented books and seem to define the word in what can only be described as a legal sense. It is of interest, at this point, to note that al-Bukhārī also records a tradition in which nifāq is equated with hatred of the Ansār.

Abū al-Walīd told us, he said Shu'ba told us,
he said 'Abd Allah b. 'Abd Allah b. Jahr informed
me, he said I heard Anas (report) from the
Prophet, he said:

The sign of faith is love of the Ansār and
the sign of nifāq is hatred of the Ansār.⁽¹⁴⁾

This must certainly be a later creation as almost all those who fall into the ranks of the Munāfiqūn were also listed among the Ansār. Traditions of this sort are quite common and their

(12) ibid., i, 15.

(13) al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 93.

(14) Bukh, i, 11.

emphasis upon love of the Anṣār being a part of the faith in God and His Prophet, which is often placed in opposition to the attitude of the Munāfiqūn, confirm their later creation.⁽¹⁵⁾

Al-Tabarī, in his tafsīr on certain verses dealing with the Munāfiqūn, adds to an understanding of the position of these people. He makes the point that the Munāfiqūn believed that they were the "peacemakers" or "mediators" between the Jews and the Muslims.⁽¹⁶⁾ The use of this term implies a degree of sincerity in their activities which is not present in the English word 'hypocrite'. He also points out that the term Munāfiq was not the only way in which these persons were referred to in the Qur'ān. The phrase 'those whose hearts were diseased' is a synonym for the Munāfiqūn.⁽¹⁷⁾ This point is also made in a tradition preserved in another commentary on the Qur'ān.⁽¹⁸⁾ A modern scholar has suggested that this phrase was used for the waverers among the Muslims until about the time of Uhud when it was replaced, almost completely, by the use of the word Munāfiq.⁽¹⁹⁾ Al-Suhaylī's comment that it refers to the Muslims who refused to leave Mecca and were killed fighting with the Quraysh⁽²⁰⁾ may be disregarded as it does not seem to take into account certain references in the Qur'ān.

(15) Ibn Qudāma, op.cit., 23-25.

(16) Tab, Taf, i, 126-127.

(17) ibid., i, 121-122.

(18) al-Wāhidī, op.cit., 167.

(19) Richard Bell, Introduction to the Qur'ān, (Edinburgh 1953), 109.

(20) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iii, 82.

There remains the problem of what the specific 'disease' was, with which these people were afflicted. Al-Tabarī quotes many different authorities on this problem but there is no definite solution to the question. Among the several possibilities, the following terms are used: hypocrisy (nifāq), doubt (shakk), suspicion (rība), perplexity (hayra), unbelief (rijs), evil (sharr), confusion (dalāla) and denial (takdhīb).⁽²¹⁾ Many of the terms are not applicable to a word which is commonly translated as 'hypocrite'. They would be more applicable to a term such as 'agnostic' and yet this term is not acceptable. The vast majority of the descriptions of the Munāfiqūn indicate the hypocritical aspects of their nature and it seems certain that these people had accepted Islam as their faith. However, once this commitment had been made they seem to have lacked the firmness of belief which characterized the Muslims at this time.

Yet these definitions of a Munāfiq are all in a religious context. Despite this, the role played by the Munāfiqūn in the historical texts is political rather than religious. During this period religious authority and political authority were almost synonymous, yet the religious activities of these people have been ignored by the historians, possibly through lack of information. It would be this sort of information which would be edited out by later transmitters as detrimental to the position of the Prophet. Because of this it is the political meaning of the term Munāfiq which is the most difficult to

(21) Tab, Taf. 1, 118-123.



understand.

This problem is acknowledged by Guillaume in his translation of the Sīra of Ibn Ishāq. At times he refers to the Munāfiqūn as the 'disaffected' and at other times he uses the more common word 'hypocrite'. In a reference to the use of the verb nāfaga he says:

Clearly it includes the meaning of a rebel
against the prophet's authority; perhaps
the underlying idea is feigned obedience. (22)

It is obvious that Guillaume faced the problem of how to translate this word, or idea, into an acceptable form and that he discerned the underlying political meaning. However, he would seem to be inaccurate with his use of the word 'feigned' in reference to the obedience of the Munāfiqūn. Their activities, as reported in the historical texts, are blatant disobedience of the spirit of the Prophet's orders if not the letter of them. It is certain that the Munāfiqūn were considered to be believing Muslims and yet they continued to disobey Muhammad. Later collectors of information could not comprehend how this could occur and hence developed the religious side of their activities at the expense of the more serious incidents which were inspired by their reactionary attitude toward the changes that Muhammad was instituting. The problems that the historians had in relating religious theory to political reality may be seen in reference to Mu'attib b. Qushayr. His career certainly classes him among the leaders of the Munāfiqūn;

(22) II, 301 n.

despite this, Ibn Hishām suggests that he was not, by virtue of the fact that he may have been at Badr. (23)

At this point it may be profitable to indicate another use of the word Munāfiq and this is as a term of abuse. It is used as an insult to be hurled at an enemy or anyone who opposes the orders of the Prophet or the authority of the state. Incidents of this sort are not common; however, they occur throughout the period of the Prophet's life in Medina and, indeed, after his death. Before the battle of Badr, Muḥammad ordered his men not to kill men in the army of Quraysh who were related to him, saying, as the reason for this order, that they were being forced to fight. Abū Hudhayfa objected to this saying that other men also had relatives among the enemy. When word of this reached 'Umar, he accused him of playing the Munāfiq. (laqad nāfaqa). (24)

During the so-called 'affair of the lie' Sa'd b. 'Ubāda was called a Munāfiq arguing on behalf of other Munāfiqūn. (25) This term was used because he led his tribe's opposition to Muḥammad's request to punish a man from his people. Interestingly enough, Sa'd was again accused of being a Munāfiq. This occurred during the uproar after his bid to be chosen as the successor to Muḥammad and the name was hurled at him by 'Umar while he was roughly handling him. (26)

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(23) II, 731-732, #297 from Ibn Hishām.

(24) II, 301; II, i, 629 (Arabic text).

(25) II, 496; II, ii, 300 (Arabic text).

(26) Tab, iii, 223.

From the above it can be seen that there are varying meanings which may be given to the word Munāfiq and associated terms. The word can be seen to have a religious, a political (or anti-authoritarian), and an abusive use. The religious meaning of the word is that which is given the greatest use in the texts and in the secondary literature and yet in those incidents which have been recorded for us the activities of the Munāfiqūn are against the authority of the Prophet rather than his religion. The symbiotic relationship of religion and politics at this time in the Middle East must be re-emphasized for it was this relationship which helped to shape the history of this period. The later transmitters and collectors of the historical anecdotes of this period were unable to picture people who would oppose the authoritarian regime of Islam without opposing the religion itself. Hence they built upon the idea of hypocrisy which was already present, a fact which must be accepted as it is amply indicated in the Qur'ān. Nevertheless the anti-authoritarian aspects of their activities were played down. The words used by al-Tabarī to describe the manifestations of their 'disease' intensify the doubt as to the correctness of the word 'hypocrite' to translate Munāfiq and it may be that Guillaume's choice of 'disaffected' would more suitably indicate the varying aspects of their relationship with Muhammad and Islam.

Incidents of the rivalry

The battle of Badr is the first event in the course of which a reference to the Munāfiqūn may be found. Al-Wāqidī

records that after the battle Zayd b. Haritha was sent to bring the news of the victory to the people of Medina. A Munāfiq is described as trying to spread the opposite news and claiming that Zayd was only saying these things because of the state which he was in. As evidence the Munāfiq pointed out that Zayd was riding the camel of the Prophet and he implied that Zayd had taken it in his panic. Usāma b. Zayd was so frightened by the news that he went to his father to have it denied. This being done, he threatened the Munāfiq with beheading upon the arrival of Muhammad and the army. (27)

Even before the battle when Muhammad gave the order that his uncle al-'Abbās should be spared, Abū Hudhayfa b. 'Utba b. Rabi'a complained and was threatened with execution by 'Umar who said that he had become a Munāfiq. The action was never carried out although it is said that Abū Hudhayfa worried about 'Umar from that time until he was killed as a martyr at Yamāma. (28)

The victory of the Muslims at Badr allowed God to force the polytheists, Munāfiqūn, and Jews to submit. The Jews even conceded that Muhammad was the one described in their texts. (29) In summarizing the events of the second year after the Hijra, Ibn Kathīr declares that large numbers of the polytheists and Jews of Medina submitted in that year. A large portion of them, however, were secretly Munāfiqūn who opposed Islam and

(27) Wāq, i, 115.

(28) II, 301; Tab, ii, 450.

(29) Wāq, i, 121.

they strove to seduce the Muslims from their faith.⁽³⁰⁾
Despite these statements there is no concrete evidence to certify that the process of conversion picked up significantly among these people, although this may be the occasion for the conversion of 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy.

With these few references the historical rivalry between the Munāfiqūn and the Muslims may be said to begin. These reports are, in actual fact, quite trivial and of little importance. There is, however, one point of interest. In the first tradition reported above, the term Munāfiq seems to be equated with the word Yahūd. The relationship between these two groups will be dealt with below.

Ibn Ishāq records that 'Abd Allah the son of 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy, the leader of the Munāfiqūn, was present at the battle.⁽³¹⁾ There is nothing inconsistent in this as he was always reported to be a pious Muslim and in opposition to his father. However, the issue is confused when Ibn al-Athīr records that Ibn Ubayy's shirt was given to al-'Abbās after his capture.⁽³²⁾ Is this a confusion between the father and the son or is it possible that the father was present at the battle and this honour was later given to his son? There would seem, at present, no way of determining the truth of the report; however, an alteration of the texts as would be required by the latter of the two possibilities would be plausible in

(30) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 347.

(31) II, 332.

(32) Uṣd, iii, 167.

light of the way Ibn Ubayy and his followers have been treated by the historians.

The attack on the B. Qaynuqā' was provoked by an incident in the market place but the actual reason for the attack and their expulsion was more probably, as the Arab historians point out, the refusal of the Qaynuqā' to accept the teaching and leadership of Muhammad.⁽³³⁾ This Jewish tribe was allied to the Ghatafan, Khazraj and Qurayza but the only person who was willing to support them was 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy and his own personal body of supporters, the Munāfiqūn. It is at this point that Ibn Ubayy comes to the fore as the leader of the 'Muslim' opposition to Muhammad.

The actual details of Ibn Ubayy's pleading for the Qaynuqā' vary. In certain cases it seems that Ibn Ubayy went so far as to grab hold of Muhammad's clothing and to refuse to leave him until he gave him what he wanted.⁽³⁴⁾ Ibn Sa'd and al-Tabarī only describe him arguing for them.⁽³⁵⁾ Al-Suhaylī emphasizes how angry the Prophet became at the words of Ibn Ubayy.⁽³⁶⁾ It is implied that Ibn Ubayy was willing to take such violent action as is given in the first accounts because moves were already under way for the total destruction of this tribe in a manner like to that in which the B. Qurayza was handled at a later time. It would seem unlikely that Muhammad contemplated

(33) II, 363; Tab, ii, 479.

(34) II, 363; Wāq, i, 177; Kāmil, ii, 138.

(35) IS, ii, 29; Tab, ii, 480.

(36) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iii, 143.

the extermination of the tribe at this time. It would have been unlikely that he would have had sufficient support. It is also so similar to his later actions that it would seem probable that the later story has been projected backwards to explain his actions. If he was willing to lay hands on Muhammad then later historians felt it necessary to provide a suitably desperate reason for this. It is more plausible that Muhammad, despite his recent success, was not yet able to find sufficient support to deny a meeting or to stop the actions of Ibn Ubayy.

Nevertheless Muhammad did have the tacit agreement of the other allies of the Qaynuqā' for the action which he was about to take. 'Ubāda b. al-Sāmit was allied to the Jews in the same manner as Ibn Ubayy; however, he submitted and renounced his alliance.⁽³⁷⁾ Had Muhammad been bent on killing the tribe it would be unlikely that this man and his followers would be willing to forgo the alliance. The new ideals of Islam could not yet have sunk so deeply as to completely eliminate the feelings of loyalty so strong in the pre-Islamic period.

The entire incident, and the unstated but definite comparison between Ibn Ubayy and 'Ubāda b. al-Sāmit, is certainly only preserved in order to explain the relevant Qur'ānic verses.

O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and
Christians for friends. They are friends one
to another. He among you who taketh them for
friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth
not wrongdoing folk.

(37) II, 363; Wāq, i, 179.

And thou seest those in whose heart is a disease race toward them, saying: We fear lest a change of fortune befall us. And it may happen that Allah will vouchsafe (unto thee) the victory, or a commandment from His presence. Then will they repent of their secret thoughts.

Then will the believers say (unto the people of the Scripture): Are these they who swore by Allah their most binding oaths that they were surely with you? Their works have failed, and they have become the losers. (38)

Bell, although grouping these verses as a unit, does not relate them to any specific incident, but rather to the period in which Islam was drawing away from the earlier monotheistic faiths. (39) Al-Tabarī gives several occasions on which the first of the above verses may have been delivered, one of which is the comparison of the actions of Ibn Ubayy and 'Ubāda b. al-Sāmī; however, he is unable to specify which is the more correct. He does state that he is in no doubt that it does involve the Munāfiqūn. (40) This is similar to his commentary on the second verse where he admits that it relates to the Munāfiqūn but is unable to say whether or not it is Ibn Ubayy

(38) Qur'an, 5/51-53.

(39) Bell, i, 101-102.

(40) Tab, Taf, vi, 276.

who is meant.⁽⁴¹⁾ Al-Bayḍāwī states quite specifically that "those in whose hearts is a disease" refers to Ibn Ubayy and his like.⁽⁴²⁾ The phrase "we fear lest a change of fortune befall us" is a reference to a statement of Ibn Ubayy "I fear a change of fortune" when he heard of 'Ubāda renouncing his alliance with the Jews in favour of Muhammad and Islam.⁽⁴³⁾ The comparison between the two men is made by al-Wāḥidī in his commentary on the first two verses above.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Al-Bayḍāwī states that the final verse refers to the promises of aid given to the beleaguered Jewish tribe by the Munāfiqūn and it necessitates the recounting of the tale of the Munāfiqūn vis à vis the B. Qaynuqā' in explanation of it.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Al-Ṭabarī relates the verse to the Munāfiqūn although not to any specific incident.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Verse fifty-five in the same chapter is related to the breaking of the alliance by 'Ubāda in two traditions preserved by al-Ṭabarī,⁽⁴⁷⁾ although other references are also made. The verses following those given above refer to the Munāfiqūn yet they seem to be a warning against apostasy in general rather than to a specific incident, although reference to such an occasion may have been lost since the verses are able to stand

(41) ibid., vi, 278-280.

(42) Bay, ii, 154.

(43) Bay, ii, 154; II, 364.

(44) al-Wāḥidī, op.cit., 132-133.

(45) Bay, ii, 154-155.

(46) Ṭab, Taf., vi, 280-281.

(47) ibid., vi, 287-288.

on their own.

The battle of Uhud is surrounded by such a mass of confusing tradition that "it is not possible to give a full or clear account of the battle."⁽⁴⁸⁾ This confusion carries over into the activities of Ibn Ubayy and his followers at this time. Their action of withdrawing from the army may have led to the Muslim defeat as the battle seems only to have been barely won by the Quraysh.

When Muhammad received the news that the Quraysh were advancing upon Medina, he summoned a council in order to ask their advice on the matter. Al-Tabarī records that he summoned Ibn Ubayy to this council and "this was something he had never done before."⁽⁴⁹⁾ It is probable that this was added later to show that Muhammad was not in the habit of consulting a man who, throughout this period, was Muhammad's most implacable enemy in Medina. The sources are agreed about the outcome of this meeting. Muhammad and Ibn Ubayy were agreed, on this one occasion, in a decision to remain in the fortresses and houses of Medina, thus forcing the Quraysh to attack the city itself where the Ansār, with their long experience of internecine warfare, would be in an advantageous position. Unfortunately, a group of young men who had not been at Badr and others who were eager for martyrdom convinced Muhammad to go into the field.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Although those who had pressed him into giving

(48) Muh/Med., 21.

(49) Tab., ii, 503.

(50) II, 371; Tab., ii, 502-503; Kāmil, ii, 150; Wāq., i, 209-211; IS, ii, 38; al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 47.

battle now worried about the consequences, Muhammad refused to change again. This charge that Muhammad was pressured, against his will, into giving battle is only a portion of the story. That the men were eager to fight is certainly true, but rather than a desire for martyrdom, it is more probable that they were concerned with saving their crops which were near to harvest and which were being consumed, or destroyed, by the Quraysh.

Al-Wāqidī and Ibn Sa'd record that while en route to Uhud from Medina, Muhammad refused the help of a large party of Jews because he did not want to have polytheists fighting with him against polytheists.⁽⁵¹⁾ In another tradition Ibn Sa'd is more detailed and says that Muhammad ordered Ibn Ubayy and six hundred of his allies from the B. Qaynuqā' to return to Medina.⁽⁵²⁾ These reports would seem to be a confusion with, or a re-writing of, the more commonly accepted version. All the sources agree that during this same period, Ibn Ubayy and his followers, comprising about 300 men or a third of the total force, left the army of Muhammad and returned to Medina.⁽⁵³⁾ The implication in the sources is that Ibn Ubayy left because he was still upset over Muhammad's change of heart over the best way to defend Medina. Watt suggests that either Ibn Ubayy had made an agreement with Muhammad that he would return and defend Medina or he may have been trying to increase his power

(51) Wāq, i, 215-216; IS, ii, 39.

(52) IS, ii, 48.

(53) II, 372; Tab, ii, 504; Kamil, ii, 150; Wāq, i, 219, IS, ii, 39.

and influence by a show of neutrality toward both parties. A ploy he seems to have used with success on the day of Bu'āth.⁽⁵⁴⁾ By painting the actions of Ibn Ubayy in the darkest possible shades the later historians were obviously trying to shift some of the blame for the defeat unto Ibn Ubayy. In this context the traditions given above where Muḥammad refused the aid of the large Jewish contingent, or even ordered them to return, seem strange. These would seem to be an attempt to add glory to Muḥammad by having him order Ibn Ubayy away, rather than standing helpless to stop him.

It would seem impossible to determine the true motives behind Ibn Ubayy's withdrawal; however, it did accomplish the purpose set forward by Watt as the first of his two alternate reasons. In a tradition recorded by al-Wāqidī, 'Amr b. al-'Ās says that one of the reasons why the Quraysh did not press home their advantage in Medina was that they had heard that Ibn Ubayy was in Medina with one third of the Muslim force and some of the Aws and Khazraj who had not gone out to Uhud.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Although the Arab texts make great play of the fact that following the battle Muḥammad led his exhausted warriors out in pursuit of Quraysh in order to regain some of his lost prestige and also to keep the Quraysh from returning to Medina, much more important for this latter purpose was his sending of a non-Muslim ally to follow the retreating enemy. His tale of the large force led by Muḥammad and made up of those men who had

(54) Muh/Med, 22.

(55) Wāq, i, 299.

not been present at the battle but had remained in Medina was certainly instrumental in convincing Quraysh to continue on to Mecca. (56)

The entire affair of the battle of Uhud is surrounded by references to the activities of persons called Munāfiqūn.

As Muḥammad received information that the Quraysh were going to attack Medina, it is recorded that the Jews and the Munāfiqūn were spreading alarming news in the city, (57) yet there is no further mention of this fact.

On the way to Uhud, Muḥammad and his followers were not permitted to pass through the garden of al-Mirba' b. Qayzī who is described as a blind man and a Munāfiq. (58)

When Muḥammad had been wounded during the battle itself, it is said that it was the Munāfiqūn who claimed that he was killed. (59) It was also a Munāfiq who told the people to return to their families because Muḥammad had been killed and they entered their houses. (60)

There is also a report that some of the Companions, having heard that Muḥammad was dead, suggested that they approach Abū Sufyān for a safe conduct, using Ibn Ubayy as the intermediary. (61) The implication is that Ibn Ubayy had some sort of connection

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(56) II, 390-391; Tab, ii, 535; Wāq, i, 338-339.

(57) Wāq, i, 204; IS, ii, 37.

(58) Tab, ii, 506; Kāmil, ii, 151.

(59) al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 47.

(60) Wāq, i, 280.

(61) Tab, ii, 520; Kāmil, ii, 156-157; Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iv, 23.

with Abū Sufyān.

After the battle Ibn Ubayy and the Munāfiqūn rejoiced at what had happened to Muhammad and his followers.⁽⁶²⁾ Al-Wāqidī records the same event but adds a description of Ibn Ubayy upbraiding his son for fighting with Muhammad. He also states that the Jews and the Munāfiqūn were trying to turn the Muslims away from their religion. When 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb heard of this he requested permission to kill them but Muhammad declared that the Jews were protected by their status as dhimma and that the Munāfiqūn had pronounced the shahadatayn and hence were also safe.⁽⁶³⁾

Ibn Ubayy is recorded as being roughly handled in the mosque when, on the Friday following the battle, he arose to make his usual speech of praise. He was forced to leave the mosque and when advised to return and seek forgiveness from the Prophet and God he refused to do so. The reason given for this ejection was his action on the day of the battle.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Al-Wāqidī indicates that it was because of this affair that the Qur'ānic verse

And when it is said unto them: Come! The
Messenger of Allah will ask forgiveness for
you! They avert their faces and thou seest
them turning away, disdainful.⁽⁶⁵⁾

was sent down.⁽⁶⁶⁾ A statement which is not borne out by the

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(62) IS, ii, 44.

(63) Wāq, i, 317-318.

(64) II, 391.

(65) Qur'an, 63/5.

(66) Wāq, i, 318-319.

commentaries.

With these and even more minor references the accounts of the battle of Uhud are studded. The question arises as to why this should be. Two reasons may be found. The first is an attempt to shift the blame for the defeat unto Ibn Ubayy and his followers. The second is as a partial explanation of the Qur'ānic verses which have to do with this battle.

A proper understanding of the battle of Uhud can only be obtained through a comparison of the historical texts and the relevant verses in the Qur'ān. Certain verses are described as relating to the battle and the actions of the Munāfiqūn at this time.

Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Malik b. Hishām told us from Ziyād b. 'Abd Allah al-Bakkā'ī from Muḥammad b. Ishāq al-Muṭṭalibī: There are sixty verses in the "Family of Imran" which God sent down concerning the day of Uhud in which there is a description of what happened on that day and the blame of those who merited His rebuke. (67)

Ibn Ishāq then spends a considerable amount of time explaining those verses. The verses in question are numbers 120 to 188 and these make up the majority of the verses dealing with the battle. There is, however, one other verse which is often related to the activities of the Munāfiqūn at this battle.

Muḥammad b. Bashshār told me (he said)
Ghundar and 'Abd al-Rahmān told us they

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said Shu'ba told us from 'Addī from 'Abd
Allah b. Yazīd from Zayd b. Thābit (may God
be pleased with him) - What aileth you that
ye are become two parties regarding the
hypocrites⁽⁶⁸⁾ - (refers to the fact that)
a group of people from the Companions of
the Prophet returned from Uhud and the
people were divided into two parties because
of them. A party said kill them and a
party said no and (therefore) - What aileth
you that ye are become two parties regarding
the hypocrites - was sent down. He
(Muhammad) said: It (Medina) is a perfumed
(city), it expels the dross as fire expels
the dross in silver (or iron).⁽⁶⁹⁾

This same tradition, with only minor variants and stemming from
Zayd b. Thābit, is given by al-Bukhārī in two other places.
Al-Tabarī says that the following verse referred to the departure
of the Munāfiqūn from the army on its way to Uhud.⁽⁷⁰⁾

When two parties of you almost fell away,
and Allah was their protecting friend.
In Allah do believers put their trust.⁽⁷¹⁾

(68) Qur'an, 4/88

(69) Bukh, vi, 59.

(70) Tab, ii, 504.

(71) Qur'an, 3/122.

Most of the incidents surrounding the activities of the Munāfiqūn at the battle of Uhud are referred to in the Qur'ān. The fact that Muḥammad asked the advice of some of his followers, and then did not follow it, is obliquely mentioned in the following verse, where it also seems as if he is being warned about making the same mistake again.

... So pardon them and ask forgiveness for
them and consult with them upon the conduct
of affairs. And when thou art resolved,
then put thy trust in Allah. Lo! Allah
loveth those who put their trust (in Him).⁽⁷²⁾

The commentaries do not specifically relate this verse to Uhud, however, al-Tabarī and al-Bayḍawī both indicate that Muḥammad was being instructed to seek advice in matters relating to military affairs.⁽⁷³⁾ Despite what may be seen as a reprimand to Muḥammad from God, the final phrase of the verse would seem to be a commendation for having been firm in his trust once he had made the decision to give battle to Quraysh. This would seem to be supported by Bell's contention that this was a private verse for Muḥammad himself.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Those young men who are said to have urged Muḥammad to go out to Uhud are referred to in a verse which would seem to be a scathing attack on their actions.⁽⁷⁵⁾

(72) Qur'ān, 3/159.

(73) Tab, Taf, iv, 152; Bay, ii, 50.

(74) Bell, i, 60.

(75) cf. Tab, Taf, iv, 108-110; Bay, ii, 45.

And verily ye used to wish for death before
ye met it (in the field). Now ye have seen
it with your own eyes. (76)

According to al-Baydawī⁽⁷⁷⁾, the following verse refers
to the actions of the Munāfiqūn when the word spread that
Muhammad had been killed. They supposedly urged the believers
to return to their homes and their old religion, arguing that
if Muhammad had been a Prophet he was now dead and things
could return to normal. It was also at this time that the idea
of obtaining a safe conduct from Abū Sufyān was mooted.

O ye who believe! If ye obey those who
disbelieve, they will make you turn back
on your heels, and ye turn back as losers. (78)

Al-Tabarī, interestingly enough, makes no reference to a
specific incident and rather than the Munāfiqūn accuses the
Jews and the Christians of attempting to subvert the Muslims. (79)

In verse 154 there are two statements made by the opponents
of Muhammad after the battle.

... They said: Have we any part in the
cause? Say (O Muhammad): The cause
belongeth wholly to Allah. They hide
within themselves (a thought) which they
reveal not unto thee, saying: Had we any

(76) Qur'an, 3/143.

(77) Bay, ii, 47.

(78) Qur'an, 3/149.

(79) Tab. Taf. iv, 122-123.

part in the cause we should not have been slain here. Say: Even though ye had been in your houses, those appointed to be slain would have gone forth to the places where they were to lie. (All this hath been) in order that Allah might try what is in your breasts and prove what is in your hearts. Allah is Aware of what is hidden in the breasts (of men).⁽⁸⁰⁾

Both the statements are attributed to Ibn Ubayy; the first supposedly having been said when he heard the news of the losses among the Khazraj.⁽⁸¹⁾ The traditions preserved by al-Tabarī agree that both statements were made by the Munāfiqūn; however, they indicate that Ibn Ubayy made the first and Mu'attib b. Qushayr the second.⁽⁸²⁾

These then are the major references to the Munāfiqūn and their actions during the battle. Yet there is one outstanding omission. There is no mention made of the withdrawal of the followers of Ibn Ubayy from the Muslim army. This should be amended to read, there is no acceptable reference to the incident, for there are, indeed, references. The most specific reference is that made in the tradition quoted above and coming from Zayd b. Thābit. Yet when discussing this verse al-Bayḍawī gives four separate and possible reasons for the descent

(80) Qur'an, 3/154.

(81) Bay, ii, 48-49.

(82) Tab, Taf, iv, 142-143.

of the verse. The first was the dissension raised among the Muslims by certain Arab tribes who inhabited the area around Medina and about the quality of whose Islam the people were arguing. This is the version accepted by Pickthall in his translation of the Qur'ān.⁽⁸³⁾ The second is to those who remained behind on the day of Uhud. The third mentions a group who made the Hijra and then returned to their original homes. The fourth possibility was a group who became Muslim but abstained from making the Hijra to Medina.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Al-Tabarī also gives these possible causes and adds to them a tradition which relates the verse to the 'affair of the lie' and the activities of Ibn Ubayy.⁽⁸⁵⁾ However, he does make a comment upon the merits of the various versions and, although vague, indicates a preference for the story of the people of Mecca who apostatized after their conversion.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Al-Wāhidī also gives three possible incidents but makes no judgement upon their merits.⁽⁸⁷⁾

This lack of clarity would argue against accepting this verse as a reference to the incident of the withdrawal. The verse quoted by al-Tabarī, and given above⁽⁸⁸⁾, cannot be

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(83) Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, (New York, nd), 87n.

(84) Bay, ii, 106.

(85) Tab, Taf, v, 192-195.

(86) ibid, v, 194-195.

(87) al-Wāhidī, op.cit., 112-113.

(88) Qur'ān, 3/122.

accepted for a similar reason. The verse is not specific in its reference to the incident. Al-Bayḍāwī, in his commentary on the verse, does describe the withdrawal, however he points out that the two parties mentioned were the B. Sālīma b. Jusham b. al-Khazraj and the B. Ḥāritha b. al-Nabīṭ of al-Aws.⁽⁸⁹⁾ This is confirmed by Ibn Ishāq⁽⁹⁰⁾. Al-Ṭabarī bears out this basic account and also records several traditions which indicate that the two clans were intending to follow Ibn Ubayy and his supporters back to Medina⁽⁹¹⁾ and this is supported by al-Bayḍāwī. These stories are almost certainly later interpretations of the events and one tradition goes so far as to say that Ibn Ubayy was the leader of these two clans.⁽⁹²⁾ A statement which casts more doubt on the incident.

When one considers the fact that for every other major incident involving the two rivalries under question there is a Qur'ānic quotation, only one conclusion can be reached. It would seem likely that Ibn Ubayy and his followers did not withdraw from the army of Muḥammad, rather they were never a part of it and remained behind in Medina rather than venturing forth. This conclusion is supported by certain other facts.

And that He might know the hypocrites, unto
whom it was said: Come, fight in the way
of Allah, or defend yourselves. They

(89) Bay, ii, 41.

(90) II, 392.

(91) Tab, Taf. iv, 72-74.

(92) ibid. iv, 73.

answered: If we knew aught of fighting we would follow you. On that day they were nearer disbelief than faith. They utter with their mouths a thing which is not in their hearts. Allah is best aware of what they hide. (93)

The only interpretation that can be placed on the phrase "If we knew aught of fighting we would follow you" is that they did not follow him. This idea is supported by various statements which are recorded as having been said by Ibn Ubayy or his followers:

If we knew that you will be fighting we would go out with you to them

If we knew that you will be fighting we would not betray you, but we do not think that there will be fighting. (94)

Even al-Bayḍāwī indicates that the Munāfiqūn did not join the Muslims as he refers to them in terms which support the statement made above. The phrase "yukhawwifu awiliya' ahu" meaning "fear his partisans" (95) is described by al-Bayḍāwī as referring to those who refused to go out with the Prophet, "al-qā'idīn 'an al-khurūj ma'a al-rusūli". (96) In his discussion of the following verse, number 176, al-Bayḍāwī refers to the Munāfiqūn

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(93) Qur'an, 3/167.

(94) Tab, Taf, iv, 167-168.

(95) Qur'an, 3/175.

(96) Bay, ii, 54.

as being among those who remained behind, "wahum al-munāfiqīna min al-mutakhallifīna." (97) That this verse refers to the Munāfiqūn is confirmed by al-Tabarī but he does not qualify this statement in any way. (98)

The only verse in the Qur'ān which would seem to relate to the withdrawal on first reading is:

Lo! Those of you who turned back on the day the two hosts met, Satan alone it was who caused them to backslide, because of some of what they have earned. Now Allah hath forgiven them. Lo! Allah is Forgiving.

Clement. (99)

Al-Bayḍawī specifically describes it as having been sent down in relation to the ones who were defeated on the day of Uhud because they disobeyed the order of the Prophet when Satan tempted them with the prospect of the booty, i.e., the archers. (100)

Al-Tabarī offers several alternatives for those who failed Muḥammad at this time, but there is no reference to the Munāfiqūn. (101) This would seem to be confirmed by the text of the verse itself, where in the final phrases these persons are forgiven by God for their actions. Had the reference been to the Munāfiqūn, it is unlikely that this would have been done.

(97) ibid., ii, 55.

(98) Tab, Taf, iv, 174-175.

(99) Qur'ān, 3/155.

(100) Bay, ii, 49.

(101) Tab, Taf, iv, 144-145.

The question arises as to why this deliberate falsehood was included in the texts. Even in the period immediately following the battle the concept of the Prophet having suffered a defeat was difficult for the Muslims to understand. Even the problem of the fact that Muhammad changed his mind would seem to have been difficult to accept despite the verse quoted above. Ibn Ishāq, in his section on the poetry concerning the battle, gives a long composition by Ka'b b. Mālīk in a portion of which he seems to indicate that Muhammad urged his followers to fight from the beginning:

When they made their home in 'Ird our leader said,
'Why do we plant grain if we do not protect it?'
Among us was God's apostle whose command we obey.
When he gives an order we do not examine it.
The spirit descends on his from his Lord
Brought down from the midst of heaven and
taken up again.
We consult him on our wishes, and our desire
Is to obey him in all he wants.
The apostle said when they appeared,
'Cast off the fear of death and desire it
Be like one who sells his life
To draw near to a King by Whom he will be
restored to life.
Take your swords and trust in God
To Whom belongs the disposal of all things.' (102)

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As with all poetry purporting to be authentic from the period of the Prophet it is unlikely that it is authentic. Nevertheless this poem indicates that some people, in the century and a half after the death of Muhammad, found his change of mind difficult to accept and hence this poem shows him urging his followers on. It also indicates that it was believed that the crops were the deciding factor in this decision.

The problem of the explanation of the defeat is seen even in the Qur'ān where several verses seem to be attempts to give excuses and reasons for the defeat.

Allah had already given you the victory at Badr,
when ye were contemptible. So observe your duty
to Allah in order that ye may be thankful

And when thou didst say unto the believers: Is
it not sufficient for you that your Lord should
support you with three thousand angels sent
down (to your help)?

Nay, but if ye persevere, and keep from evil⁽¹⁰³⁾
and (the enemy) attack you suddenly, your Lord
will help you with five thousand angels sweeping on.

Allah ordained this only as a message of good
cheer, and that thereby your hearts might be

(103) A better translation of this word, tattaqu. would
be '... act piously.'

at rest - Victory cometh only from Allah,
the Mighty, the Wise -(104)

Bell believes that the first of the above verses is part of an address made by Muhammad before the battle and therefore not really applicable to the problem in question.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ However, if it is considered to have been sent down after the battle, then it would seem to be recalling to the believers the glory of their first victory in an attempt to overshadow their defeat. The final verses are an attempt to explain the absence of the angelic hordes who aided the believers at Badr but were noticeably absent on this occasion despite the fact that their help had been promised by Muhammad. This would seem to be supported by one group of traditions preserved by al-Tabarī. Although one theory is that verses 124 and 125 only refer to the help the Muslims received at Badr, the second theory is that there was indeed a promise of angelic help. This was, however, conditional upon perseverance and pious actions. The Muslims did not measure up to the required standards and the help was withheld.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ The theory that help was promised but not received is quite plainly seen in the final verse above.

If ye have received a blow, the (disbelieving)
people have received a blow the like thereof.
These are (only) the vicissitudes which We
cause to follow one another for mankind, to

(104) Qur'an, 3/123-126.

(105) Bell, i, 57.

(106) Tab. Taf, iv, 76-81.

the end that Allah may know those who believe and may choose witnesses from among you; and Allah loveth not the wrongdoers.

And that Allah may prove those who believe, and may blight the disbelievers. (107)

Again Bell believes that these verses are part of the address made before the battle and which was later repeated with certain amendments. However, he does not indicate that these verses were altered in any way. (108) Despite this it would seem that they refer to the battle in a past sense rather than a future and are an attempt to explain to the believers that the Quraysh had suffered to an equal extent and that it was all part of God's plan to separate the believers from the unbelievers in any case. A view which is supported by the Muslim commentators. (109)

Lo! those of you who turned back on the day the two hosts met, Satan alone it was who caused them to backslide, because of what they earned. Now Allah hath forgiven them. Lo! Allah is Forgiving. Clement. (110)

In this verse, which is definitely after the battle, Satan is given as the prime mover of the defeat, having tempted persons

(107) Qur'an, 3/140-141.

(108) Bell, i, 58.

(109) Tab, Taf, iv, 103-108; Bay, ii, 44-45.

(110) Qur'an, 3/155.

who were otherwise good believers. (111)

And was it so, when a disaster smote you, though ye had smitten (them with a disaster) twice (as great), that ye said: How is this? Say (unto them, O Muhammad): It is from yourselves. Lo! Allah is able to do all things.

That which befell you on the day when the two parties met, was by the permission of Allah; that He might know the true believers;

And that he might know the hypocrites, unto whom it was said: Come, fight in the way of Allah, or defend yourselves. They answered: If we knew aught of fighting we would follow you. On that day they were nearer disbelief than faith. They utter with their mouths a thing which is not in their hearts. Allah is best aware of what they hide.

Those who, while they sat at home, said of their brethren (who were fighting for the cause of Allah): If they had been guided by us they would not have been slain. Say: (unto them, O Muhammad): Then avert death from yourselves if ye are truthful. (112)

(111) vide supra.

(112) Qur'an. 3/165-168.

These verses, which again are definitely from the post-Uhud period, begin by placing the defeat into relation with the victory of Badr and then explain, yet again, that God caused the defeat for His own reasons. The reason, very carefully laid out, is to distinguish between the faithful and the Munāfiqūn who are strongly criticized for the actions and statements on that day. It is interesting to note that in the first of the verses above the answer given to those who ask how the defeat was possible was: "It is from yourselves". Unless those who were asking were from the Munāfiqūn, it would seem as if this verse were an earlier one in which the Muslims themselves were blamed and that this was later amended by the following verses where the blame was shifted to a more acceptable group. (113)

The number of verses relating to the problem and the varying reasons given for the defeat indicate the seriousness of the problem to Muhammad and his followers. Nevertheless, some sort of explanation must have been found acceptable, probably the idea that God caused the defeat so as to distinguish the Munāfiqūn. It was this idea that was later expanded into the tale of the withdrawal of Ibn Ubayy. There are sufficient Qur'ānic references to the Munāfiqūn and Uhud to make it seem plausible and therefore the story was created. The blame had to be shifted from what can otherwise only be seen as a tactical error on the part of Muhammad and they were the most obvious choice as a scapegoat.

(113) cf. Tab, Taf., iv, 164-170.

The story of the withdrawal is a perfect example of the cultural values of a later period necessitating the re-writing of an incident so that it conforms to the beliefs and ideals of the later age.

The details of the expulsion of the B. al-Nadīr from Medina are well known and are confirmed by the major texts. After the initial demand for their departure the B. al-Nadīr seemed willing to comply; however, Ibn Ubayy offered to support them with his own followers and his allies from among the Arabs. Muhammad and the Muslims laid siege to the Jews who capitulated after Muhammad ordered the cutting down of their palm trees and they realized that Ibn Ubayy was either unable or unwilling to make good his pledge.

Of more interest are the details that this incident gives us about the position of Ibn Ubayy at this time. Ibn Ishāq tells us that the group who had offered their support was made up of men from the B. 'Awf b. al-Khazraj including Ibn Ubayy, Wadī'a, Mālik b. Abī Qawqal, Suwayd and Dā'is.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Although it is possible that Ibn Ubayy was only speaking as the leader of those people who followed him as the head of the Munāfiqūn, especially in the light of the fact that he was unable to follow up his words, he, and Huyayy b. Akhtab who believed him, must have felt that he was speaking on behalf of the entire tribe of al-Khazraj. This is evident from the fact that he promised to deliver the help of 2,000 men from his own people and others from their allies, the B. Qurayza and the B. Ghatafan.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

(114) II, 437; Tab, ii, 554.

(115) Tab, ii, 553; IS, ii, 57.

It would seem that Sa'd b. 'Ubāda had not yet replaced him as leader of the Khazraj although he was making an effort in this direction.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Although they did nothing to help them, the Munāfiqūn are recorded as grieving greatly over the loss of the tribe, which was certainly the loss of a major portion of their support.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

The Qur'ānic references to the incident are as follows:

Hast thou not observed those who are hypocrites,
(how) they tell their brethren who disbelieve
among the People of the Scripture: If ye are
driven out, we surely will go out with you, and
we will never obey anyone against you, and if
ye are attacked we verily will help you. And
Allah beareth witness that they verily are liars.

(For) indeed if they are driven out they go not
out with them, and indeed if they are attacked
they help not, and indeed if they had helped
them they would have turned and fled, and then
they would not have been victorious.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

In quite graphic detail the activities of the Munāfiqūn are laid out and condemned. Bell would date these verses from immediately before the attack on the B. al-Nadīr and states that they "show how well Muhammad gauged the situation beforehand".⁽¹¹⁹⁾ The

(116) Muh/Med., 212.

(117) Wāq, i, 376; IS, ii, 58.

(118) Qur'ān, 59/11-12.

(119) Bell, ii, 568.

closeness of the details to the events as recorded in the texts would argue that the verses were sent down after the event rather than before it. This is supported by the commentators who specifically relate these verses to the actions of Ibn Ubayy and his followers toward the B. al-Nadīr.⁽¹²⁰⁾ If the earlier dating is accepted then one would seem to be granting Muḥammad the gift of precognition or be accepting the possibility that later historians altered the facts so as to make them conform with the Qur'ānic quotation. That Muḥammad was truly able to judge the situation that closely, although possible, is unlikely.

The raid on the B. al-Muṣṭaliq at al-Muraysī' was the occasion for two incidents involving the Munāfiqūn and Ibn Ubayy. The first incident was the dispute between a member of the Anṣār and a man representing the Muhārijūn which Ibn Ubayy and his followers tried to use as an excuse to expel the Qurashī emigrants from Medina, as has been described above. The second incident was the so-called 'affair of the lie' in which Ibn Ubayy played a leading role and which is more important for the information which it gives about him than for any political reason.

As has been said the dispute which occurred on this expedition falls into both categories and must be examined in both sections. As has been mentioned above, the role of the Anṣār is of vital importance. It is, however, now necessary to examine the part played by Ibn Ubayy and his followers in

(120) Tab, Taf. xxviii, 45-46; Bay, v, 126.

this affair. The initial argument which began the affair was of minimal importance but it is indicative of the feelings of the period that Ibn Ubayy was able to use it to whip up the fervour as he was able to do. The account in al-Wāqidī is by far the longest and the most detailed. So detailed is it that much of it becomes suspect. Nevertheless it follows the outline of the account as it is recorded in Ibn Ishāq and al-Tabarī. One particular detail which he gives must be mentioned here. Al-Wāqidī records that Ibn Ubayy was sitting in a group of Munāfiqūn made up of: Ibn Ubayy, Mālik, Dā'is, Suwayd, Aws b. Qayzī, Mu'attib b. Qushayr, Zayd b. al-Lusayt, and 'Abd Allah b. Nabtal.⁽¹²¹⁾ That a list of names such as this should be accepted whereas other details are not is difficult to explain. However, in this case each name on the list is confirmed as a follower of Ibn Ubayy in reference to other events and hence can be accepted on this occasion. It is of interest to note that al-Wāqidī, and following him Ibn Sa'd, record that Muhammad was accompanied on this raid by more of the Munāfiqūn than had ever done so before.⁽¹²²⁾ It would seem likely that this was the body of support upon which Ibn Ubayy drew when he began to agitate. It is unlikely that all those who have on this occasion been grouped together as Munāfiqūn were hard-core members of this group (if there even were any permanent members of the group) but rather were members of the Anṣār who, for one reason or another, were at this time susceptible to the

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(121) Wāq, ii, 416.

(122) Wāq, i, 405; IS, ii, 63.

influence of Ibn Ubayy. It is almost certain that the phrase recording the large numbers of the Munāfiqūn is a later addition attempting to distract the attention from the fact that at this time a large portion of the Anṣār were willing to consider at least the idea of expelling Muḥammad from Medina.

It is on this occasion that the story of the crown being prepared for Ibn Ubayy is recorded. The story in its simplest form can be seen in Ibn Ishāq, whereas in al-Wāqidī it is embellished with additional dialogue and detail. The Prophet was very disturbed by the sayings and actions of Ibn Ubayy; however, he avoided a direct confrontation by the utilization of a forced march which exhausted all the men and consequently took their minds off the words of Ibn Ubayy. Usayd b. Hudayr spoke to Muḥammad asking him to be gentle with Ibn Ubayy, possibly out of a fear of the consequences if he were to be punished for expressing a sentiment that many of the Anṣār felt. In explanation of the hostility shown by Ibn Ubayy, Usayd told Muḥammad that his arrival in Medina came at a time when the people of Medina were actually preparing a crown with which to make Ibn Ubayy their king. His arrival at that time had caused this to be put off and now Ibn Ubayy felt that Muḥammad had deprived him of a kingdom.⁽¹²³⁾ It is unlikely that there is any truth to the details of this story. Kings were not unknown to the Arabs of the peninsula; however, they were a foreign implantation and had never really succeeded in establishing a stable and long-lived base of power. Al-Suhaylī obviously

(123) II, 491; Wāq, ii, 419.

recognized the problem inherent in the statement that Ibn Ubayy was to be crowned. Therefore he carefully points out that the Ansār were of southern extraction and hence had had the experience of kings while they were in the Yemen.⁽¹²⁴⁾ It is much more probable that Ibn Ubayy was becoming accepted as the paramount chieftain in Medina, a position of first among equals, a function which was much more acceptable in the society of the time and one that may be seen in Mecca and, indeed, in the role of Muhammad himself in his middle and later years at Medina. The story of the crown is a later elaboration of the facts which is aimed at further defiling the character of Ibn Ubayy by picturing him as a man who would contemplate the establishment of a kingdom, despite the traditional Arab hatred of such a state.

Since it is certain that this tradition was collected, if not actually created, at a time when the 'Abbāsids were ruling the Islamic empire, it is possible that this story is a subtle attack on their predecessors, the Umayyads. The major charge levelled against the Umayyads was that they converted the theocracy established by Muhammad and his successors into a kingdom. The implication therefore would be a comparison of the Umayyads with Ibn Ubayy, a man known to have been the most persistent enemy of the Prophet and a man whose plans for a kingdom were thwarted by Muhammad as the 'Abbāsids, by their revolution and subsequent changes to the Caliphate, thwarted the endeavours of the Umayyads.

(124) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iii, 14.

Despite the amendments and later additions the incident did occur and is referred to in the Qur'ān. Al-Bukhārī, in several traditions all stemming from Zayd b. Arqam, who was personally involved in the affair, implies that the first eight verses of sūra LXIII (al-Munāfiqūn) were sent down in relation to the activities of Ibn Ubayy on the occasion in question.⁽¹²⁵⁾ Bell, in his study, states that only verse eight is directly related to this affair and the preceding verses are of an earlier date, although they may not have been published until verse eight was sent down as a replacement for number seven.⁽¹²⁶⁾ This would seem to be confirmed by the commentary of al-Baydawī in which only the eighth verse is specifically described as belonging to this event and the earlier ones are only indefinitely related to the Munāfiqūn.⁽¹²⁷⁾ This pattern is also seen in the commentary of al-Tabarī. The major description of the incident at al-Muraysī' is placed in the commentary on the eighth verse.⁽¹²⁸⁾ However, under the fifth verse it is stated that the entire chapter was sent down about this incident.⁽¹²⁹⁾ This is contrasted by a statement in the portion dealing with verse six which claims that this verse came down in relation to another incident and a verse in the ninth chapter.⁽¹³⁰⁾ By

(125) Bukh, vi, 189-193.

(126) Bell, ii, 581.

(127) Bay, v, 133-134.

(128) Tab, Taf, xxviii, 112-117.

(129) ibid, xxviii, 109.

(130) ibid, xxviii, 111.

including the description of the incident under the eighth verse, al-Tabarī seems to be supporting the above view, although he includes the other references.

This is also supported by the Qur'ān itself. The first seven verses are a general condemnation of the Munāfiqūn; however the eighth verse is very specific in its detail

They say: Surely, if we return to al-Madīnah
the mightier will soon drive out the weaker;
when might belongeth to Allah and to His
messenger and the believers; but the
hypocrites know not. (131)

This verse, by quoting what are probably the words of Ibn Ubayy himself, confirms that the incident did indeed take place and probably in the form which is described in the texts.

Perhaps the most complete account of the so-called 'affair of the lie' is that of Nabia Abbott⁽¹³²⁾ in which she declares that this incident indicates the state of the political factions inside the umma as they were at this point in time. It is also from this event that she derives the later political hostility which 'Ā'isha showed toward 'Alī. This may be reading rather more into the affair than there actually is; however the role played by Ibn Ubayy is deserving of some examination.

The details of this incident are well known. It began when 'Ā'isha was accidentally left behind on the return from

(131) Qur'ān, 63/8.

(132) Nabia Abbott, The Beloved of Mohammed, (Chicago, 1942) 29 ff.

the raid. She later appeared riding the camel of a young warrior, Safwān b. Mu'attal al-Sulamī al-Dhakawānī. Immediately rumours began to circulate and they reached such a proportion that 'Ā'isha was forced to leave her home and return to that of her father, Abū Bakr. This matter, which is largely a personal attack on Muhammad through members of his own family, carried on for over a month as he waited for a revelation which would clarify the issue. (133)

Four persons are associated with the spreading of the scandal about 'Ā'isha: Ibn Ubayy, Miṣṭah b. Uthātha, Ḥamna d. Jahsh and Ḥassān b. Thābit. (134) After 'Ā'isha had been cleared by a revelation, Muhammad had three of the major culprits flogged with the prescribed punishment. (135) It is implied that this punishment was the eighty lashes which became the statutory penalty for an offence of this type. Despite this, it is likely that this implication is a later justification of the law. A point which would seem to be substantiated by al-Suhaylī's discussion of the amount of punishment prescribed. (136) In this mention of the punishment there is a problem. It is generally agreed that Ibn Ubayy was the one who escaped. Al-Wāqidī, in a tradition stemming from 'Ā'isha herself, indicates that it was Ḥamna who was the lucky one. He then immediately follows this with a report from Abū 'Abd Allah that none of them

(133) Wāq, ii, 432; Tab, Taf. xviii, 91.

(134) II, 494, 497; Tab, ii, 614, 616; Wāq, ii, 434.

(135) II, 497; Wāq, ii, 434.

(136) Al-Suhaylī, iv, 24.

were punished and he states that this is the report which he considers most trustworthy.⁽¹³⁷⁾ Al-Ya'qūbī reports that all four of them were flogged.⁽¹³⁸⁾ Yet an incident which is well recorded in the texts would seem to indicate that Ibn Ubayy was never punished.

Muhammad went before a meeting of the Anṣār and asked for their permission and help in punishing a man who had been maligning members of his family. As it is described by Ibn Ishāq, and confirmed by other sources with only minor differences of detail, Usayd b. Hudayr immediately offered Muhammad the help of the people of al-Aws if the man proved to be from them or from al-Khazraj. Sa'd b. 'Ubāda leapt to his feet and declared that Aws had only made this offer because they knew that the man was from Khazraj, i.e., Ibn Ubayy. At this point a major dispute broke out; a reviving of the pre-Hijra rivalry between the two tribes. The situation deteriorated at once and name calling, if not actual violence, broke out. Sa'd b. 'Ubāda was accused of being a "Munāfiq arguing on behalf of the Munāfiqūn". Such was the reaction to his request that Muhammad gave up the idea and Ibn Ubayy escaped punishment.⁽¹³⁹⁾ Thus Ibn Ubayy, the major spreader of the scandal, was protected not by the strength of his personal following but rather by the existence of yet another rivalry inside the umma; in this case

(137) Wāq, ii, 434.

(138) al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 53.

(139) II, 495-496; Tab, ii, 614-615; Kāmil, ii, 197;
Wāq, ii, 431-432.

the conflict which was one of the reasons why Muhammad had been accepted as easily as he was in Medina. It has been stated, with some justification, that Muhammad had been expected to play the role of an arbiter in this dispute. If this is the case then he can only have been moderately successful as the outbreak under examination would indicate. Using this case as an example it would seem probable that Ibn Ubayy was protected throughout his career as the major opponent of Muhammad by the continuing feud between these two tribes.

The 'affair of the lie' is referred to in the Qur'an in verses eleven to twenty of Sūrat al-Nūr (XXIV). Of these verses the first is a direct mention of the incident.

Lo! They who spread the scandal are a gang
among you. Deem it not a bad thing among
you; nay, it is good for you. Unto every
man of them (will be paid) that which he
hath earned of the sin; and as for him among
them who had the greatest share therein,
his will be an awful doom. (140)

Also in this verse is the threat of punishment for the person most closely involved in the scandal, Ibn Ubayy. The remaining verses are for the most part an admonition of the believers for giving any credence to the story. Al-Baydawī, in his commentary on the verse above, defines the word 'usba' as a group of between ten and forty persons. He gives us a list of five persons who were included in this group, the person not

(140) Qur'an, 24/11.

included in the other lists being Zayd b. Rifā'a, a man commonly described as a Munāfiq.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Al-Tabarī does not include Zayd as one of those who spread the scandal and recounts the traditional version of the event. Although he discounts them, he includes several traditions which indicate that Ḥassān b. Thābit was the chief spreader of the lie.⁽¹⁴²⁾

From this point on the actions of the Munāfiqūn are of the most minor nature. It would seem that the events surrounding the raid on the B. al-Mustaliq were a final chance for Ibn Ubayy and his followers. They were not supported by the majority of the population and when they failed to supplant Muhammad and his Qurashī emigrants they were defeated. They were never again able to gain the type of support which they seem to have had before.

The siege of Medina was the final attempt of the Quraysh of Mecca to defeat the growing power of Muhammad. When it failed, despite the overwhelming size of the Meccan army, which included all those tribal allies who could be persuaded to join, the victory of Muhammad was assured. It was now only a matter of time.

The activities of the Munāfiqūn were minor at this time and had only an irritant value at best. While Muhammad and the Muslims were digging the trench, after word had been received of the approach of the Quraysh, the Munāfiqūn

...held back from them and began to hide their

(141) Bay, iv, 75.

(142) Tab, Taf. xviii, 86-95.

real object by working slackly and by stealing away to their families without the apostle's permission or knowledge.⁽¹⁴³⁾

This incident would seem to be confirmed by the Qur'ān in the following verses:

They only are the true believers who believe in Allah and His messenger and, when they are with him on some common errand, go not away until they have asked leave of him. Lo! those who ask leave of thee, those are they who believe in Allah and His messenger. So, if they ask thy leave for some affair of theirs, give leave to whom thou wilt of them, and ask for them forgiveness of Allah. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.

Make not your calling of the messenger among you as your calling one of another. Allah knowest those of you who steal away, hiding themselves. And let those who conspire to evade orders beware lest grief and painful punishment befall them.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

Although Bell says that these verses are commonly associated with the siege of Medina and that they suit this

(143) II, 450-451; similar reports may be found in Tab, ii, 566-567 and Kāmil, ii, 178.

(144) Qur'ān, 24/62-63.

occasion⁽¹⁴⁵⁾, neither al-Tabarī nor al-Bayḍawī give any support to this. Both discuss the meaning of the verses without relating them to any specifically historical incident.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Despite this, Ibn Ishāq cites the verse as having been sent on this occasion.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

During the course of the siege the Munāfiqūn were scornful of the promises, or prophecies, which Muḥammad had made to them. Ibn Ishāq reports that Mu'attib b. Qushayr complained that whereas Muḥammad had promised them that they would capture the great cities of the world they were unable to go outside the community to attend to their personal needs.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ The prophecy which Muḥammad made, and to which these comments refer, was made during the digging of the trench;⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ however the story seems to give Muḥammad the power of precognition, a power which he never claimed for himself. It is much more probable that the story was written after the fact of the Muslim conquests in order to provide the basis for the explanation of the following verse:

And when the hypocrites, and those in whose hearts is a disease, were saying: Allah and his messenger promised us naught but delusion.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

(145) Bell, i, 335-336.

(146) Tab, Taf. xviii, 175-178; Bay, iv, 87.

(147) II, 451; Tab, ii, 567.

(148) II, 454; Tab, ii, 572; Kāmil, ii, 179; Wāq, ii, 459-460; al-Ya'qūbī, op. cit., ii, 51.

(149) Tab, ii, 570.

(150) Qur'an, 33/12.

Bell confirms that this verse and those connected to it are concerned with the siege of Medina⁽¹⁵¹⁾ and al-Tabarī and al-Bayḍawī are even more specific in relating this verse to the saying of Mu'attib b. Qushayr at the time of the siege.⁽¹⁵²⁾

It is pointed out that nifāq grew among the people during the siege and that this was a cause of Mu'attib speaking as openly as he did.⁽¹⁵³⁾ Such was the despair of the Muslims, and it is implied that this was due to the activities of the Munāfiqūn, that even Muhammad was affected and he began negotiations to bribe the Arab allies of Quraysh to break off the siege. When he consulted with the two Sa'ds, as leaders of the Ansār, they convinced him to continue the fight.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ This incident does not seem to be confirmed by a Qur'ānic quotation; however, the fact that it shows Muhammad in a less than perfect light argues for its veracity. It has probably been preserved because it adds glory to the role of the Ansār who are seen as remaining steadfast, even when Muhammad was beginning to despair.

The expedition to Tabūk is one of the most confusing of all the raids for the purpose of this study and is replete with references to the activities of the Munāfiqūn. A cursory reading would indicate that the umma, as seen on this expedition,

(151) Bell, ii, 409.

(152) Tab, Taf, xxi, 133-134; Bay, iv, 159.

(153) II, 454; Tab, ii, 572; Kāmil, ii, 180; Wāq, ii, 459.
al-Ya'qūbī, ii, 51.

(154) II, 454; Tab, ii, 542-543; Kāmil, ii, 180-181; Wāq, ii, 477-480;
Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iv, 104-105.

was rife with dissension. However a more careful reading shows that these were all trifling incidents and were an expression of the feelings current in Medina at that time.

When Muhammad ordered the men to prepare for the raid on Tabūk it would seem that he had great difficulty in getting them to respond to his request. Ibn al-Athīr reports that the weather was hot, the enemy strong, the country barren, and the date crop good.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ But the usual report is that the Munāfiqūn urged the people not to join because the heat was so intense.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ This is confirmed in the Qur'ān in the following verse:

Those who were left behind rejoiced at
sitting still behind the messenger of
Allah, and were averse to striving with
their wealth and their lives in Allah's
way. And they said: Go not forth in the
heat! Say: The heat of hell is more
intense of heat, if they but understood.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

Bell admits that this verse is usually related to the raid on Tabūk but suggests, from a textual study, that it, with others connected to it, may refer to the expedition to Ḥudaybiya.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Although al-Bayḍawī is rather vague⁽¹⁵⁹⁾, al-Ṭabarī is quite

(155) Kāmil, ii, 277.

(156) II, 603; Tab, iii, 101-102; Kāmil, ii, 277.

(157) Qur'ān, 9/81.

(158) Bell, i, 172.

(159) Bay, iii, 76.

specific and relates it to the activities of those who were opposed to joining Muhammad on the raid to Tabūk. (160)

The problems that Muhammad had in raising his army for this raid are emphasized in the texts as the stories concerning them are repeated. A group of eighty odd persons, described as Arabs or Munāfiqūn, who may or may not have been from the B. Ghifār, came to Muhammad and asked permission to be excused from the raid. Muhammad gave them this permission but he did not accept their excuses. They became known as the 'excuse-makers' (al-mu'adhdhirūn) (161). Specific mention is made of one man, al-Jadd b. Qays of B. Sālīma, who requested permission to remain behind on the grounds that because of his strong attachment to women, he would be sorely tempted by the Byzantine women and might not be able to control himself. Muhammad gave him the requisite permission. (162) It was because of him that the following verse was sent down:

Of them is he who saith: Grant me leave
(to stay at home) and tempt me not. Surely
it is into temptation that they (thus) have
fallen. Lo! Hell is all around the
disbelievers. (163)

The traditions preserved by al-Tabarī support the view that

(160) Tab, Taf. x, 200-201.

(161) II, 603, 610-612; Tab, iii, 103; Wāq, iii, 995;
IS, ii, 165; Kāmil, ii, 278, 282.

(162) II, 602; Tab, iii, 101; Kāmil, ii, 277

(163) Qur'an, 9/49.

al-Jadd was the cause of the descent of this verse.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Al-Bayḍawī confirms this as one of the possible reasons for the sending of this verse; however he does give several other reasons.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

Another man who attempted to cause trouble on this raid was al-Julās b. Suwayd b. al-Sāmit who attempted to draw people away from Muhammad. His step-son reacted against him and when the following verse came down he repented although later his nifāq-nature returned.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

They swear by Allah that they said nothing (wrong), yet they did say the word of disbelief, and they did disbelieve after their Surrender (to Allah). And they purposed that which they could not attain, and they sought revenge only that Allah by His messenger should enrich them of His bounty. If they repent it will be better for them; and if they turn away, Allah will afflict them with a painful doom in the world and the Hereafter, and they have no protecting friend nor helper in the earth.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

Al-Bayḍawī agrees that the opening phrase of this verse refers to the sayings of al-Julās although he says that after repenting he remained a good Muslim.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ The traditions

(164) Tab, Taf. x, 148-149.

(165) Bay, iii, 70.

(166) Usd. i, 346-347; Usd. iv, 292-293.

(167) Qur'an. 9/74.

(168) Bay, iii, 74-75; cf. II, 622.

preserved by al-Ṭabarī give other possibilities; however, the largest proportion of them also relate the verse to al-Julās. He says that he is unable to determine the truth; however the weight of the issue would seem to fall on the side of al-Julās being the cause of the descent of the verse. (169)

It is interesting to note that al-Bayḍawī breaks the verse down into its component parts, as is his usual practice, and gives varying reasons for the descent of various parts. The phrase "And they purposed that which they could not attain" may refer to an attempted assassination of Muhammad on the return from Tabūk which failed. Al-Ṭabarī is much less definite and transmits several possible reasons for this phrase although not the story of the attempt to kill Muhammad. (170) Al-Wāḥidī, in contrast, is quite definite in assigning this as the explanation of the descent of the verse. (171) Almost nothing is known about this attempt beyond the fact that a group of Munāfiqūn planned to assault the Prophet at night on a particularly treacherous part of the route and to make his death look accidental. The plot was foiled when their approach was heard. (172) If this incident actually occurred it would be probable that there would be more definite reference to it in the Qur'ān as it would certainly be seen as more serious than other incidents which are much better known. Despite this, an

(169) Ṭab, Taf., x, 184 ff.

(170) ibid., x, 186-187.

(171) al-Wāḥidī, op.cit., 170.

(172) Wāq, iii, 1042-1045; al-Wāḥidī, op.cit., 170

attempt on his life may be the reason why Muhammad's attitude toward the Munāfiqūn underwent a change and he was soon ordered to treat them harshly, as will be seen below.

Yet it was not only those persons who were opposed to Muhammad who abstained from the raid. Three men about whom there was no suspicion about the sincerity of their beliefs, Ka'b b. Mālik, Hilāl b. Umayya and Murāra b. al-Rabī', remained behind and they were excommunicated for fifty days as a punishment. They were later forgiven and their punishment lifted by a revelation referred to in sūrat al-Tauba, verse 118.⁽¹⁷³⁾

These problems would seem to be in addition to, or perhaps confused with, the problems imposed by the men more commonly referred to as the Munāfiqūn. Al-Wāqidī reports that Muhammad was accompanied on this occasion by a very large number of Munāfiqūn, but only from a desire for booty rather than a desire to fight in the way of God.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ It is recorded that when Muhammad and his party set out, Ibn Ubayy and his followers made a separate camp, which was not the smaller of the two, and then remained behind when Muhammad and the Muslim army moved on.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ In this passage Ibn Ishāq states that the leaders of the Munāfiqūn were Ibn Ubayy, 'Abd Allah b. Nabtāl of the B. 'Amr b. 'Awf and Rifā'a b. Zayd b. al-Tābūt of B. Qaynuqā' and that it was because of them that the following verse was sent down:

Aforetime they sought to cause sedition

(173) II, 603-604, 610; Tab, iii, 103, 111; Kāmil, ii, 278, 282.

(174) Wāq, iii, 995-996.

(175) II, 604; Tab, iii, 103; Wāq, iii, 995, IS, ii, 165.

and raised difficulties for thee until
the Truth came and the decree of Allah
was made manifest, though they were loth. (176)

The commentators agree that this verse refers to the actions of Ibn Ubayy and his followers at the time of the Tabūk raid as they tried to restrain the Muslims from going with Muhammad. Their actions are compared to their earlier ones at Uhud. (177)

Ibn Ishāq confuses the matter by stating that Ibn Ubayy and al-Jadd b. Qays were given permission to remain at home because they were influential men among their own people and there was a fear of their influence among the men of the army. (178) The verse given above would seem to refer to this possibility as much as to the idea of the second camp, which sounds suspiciously like the story of Uhud which has already been discounted. That Ibn Ubayy and a group of people remained behind is certain; however, the other details must be suspect as later additions attempting to further blacken the name of the Munāfiqūn. It is probable that Ibn Ubayy was able to plead ill-health as his excuse, (179) especially in the light of the fact that he died shortly after this expedition. Nevertheless Muhammad was accompanied by some of the men accepted as Munāfiqūn. Al-Wāqidī includes in his account of the expedition the following list of names: Wadī'a b. Thābit of B. 'Amr b. 'Awf,

(176) Qur'an, 9/48.

(177) Tab, Taf, x, 147-148; Bay, iii, 70.

(178) II, 621.

(179) Muh/Med, 190.

al-Julās b. Suwayd b. al-Sāmit, Makhshī b. Humayyir of Ashja', an ally of B. Sālīma, and Tha'laba b. Hātib.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

Even after the army was on the march it would seem as if Muhammad was plagued by problems. He had left his son-in-law, 'Alī, in charge of his family during his absence, but the Munāfiqūn taunted 'Alī with the idea that Muhammad must have been displeased with him or felt that he would have been of no use because he had left him behind. Finally 'Alī was so moved that he gathered his weapons and joined Muhammad whereupon he was reassured of the Prophet's regard for him.⁽¹⁸¹⁾ It is interesting to note that Ibn Sa'd, when recounting the same story, says that it was 'the people' who taunted 'Alī.⁽¹⁸²⁾ This story can, however, be discounted. There is no Qur'ānic verse to support it and the words used by Muhammad sound suspiciously like a designation as an heir and hence the incident is probably an early Shī'ite creation.

During the journey Muhammad's camel strayed and men went out looking for it. Zayd b. Lusayt (or Lusayb) began to mock Muhammad as a man who claimed the gift of prophecy and to receive revelations and yet was unable to find a lost camel. Finally Muhammad received a revelation which indicated the whereabouts of the camel and the men sent to find it were able to go directly to it. This demonstration of his ability as a prophet may, or may not, have converted Zayd into a good

(180) Wāq, iii, 1003.

(181) II, 604; Tab, iii, 103-104; Kāmil, ii, 278.

(182) IS, iii, 24-25.

Muslim. (183)

A group of Munāfiqūn who were with Muhammad, including Wadī'a b. Thābit and Mukhashshin (or Mukhshī) b. Humayyir, were attempting to discourage the Muslims by stressing the difficulties involved in fighting with the Byzantines. Muhammad received a revelation telling him what they were saying and when they were confronted with their statements they tried to talk their way out of the trouble which they had caused for themselves. Because of this the following verses were sent down:

The hypocrites fear lest a sūrah should be revealed concerning them, proclaiming what is in their hearts. Say: Scoff (your fill)! Lo! Allah is disclosing what you fear.

And if you ask them (O Muhammad) they will say: We did but talk and jest. Say: Was it at Allah and His messenger that ye did scoff?

Make no excuse. Ye have disbelieved after your (confession of) belief. If We forgive a party of you We shall punish because they have been guilty. (184)

(183) II, 605-606; Wāq, iii, 1009-1010; Kāmil, ii, 279; Usd, ii, 298-299.

(184) Qur'ān, 9/64-66.

These verses converted Mukhashshin and he died as a martyr at al-Yamāma.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ Al-Bayḍawī does not seem to confirm the story of the descent of these verses. He attributes them to the raid on Tabūk and though some of the details are the same, no names are given.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ But also it must be said that he does not deny the story. Al-Tabarī preserves a tradition which names Mukhashshin only in relation to the last verse, although a tradition referring to the second describes an unnamed man who is almost certainly the same person. The verses are, however, quite definitely related to an incident, or incidents, on the raid to Tabūk.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

On the return to Medina from Tabūk, Muḥammad ordered that no-one was to drink from a certain spring until he himself arrived, probably so that he could arrange for the distribution of the small amount of water available. When he arrived the water had been used so he cursed those responsible and then performed a miracle by bringing forth water from the rock for his men to drink.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ Al-Wāqidī lists those men who disobeyed the order as: Mu‘attib b. Qushayr, al-Ḥārith b. Yazīd al-Ta’ī (an ally of B. ‘Amr b. ‘Awf), Wadī‘a b. Thābit and Zayd b. Luṣayt.

Earlier on the way to Tabūk, Muḥammad ordered that no-one was to leave the camp except with a companion. This was obeyed except for two men of B. Sā‘ida who went out for separate

(185) II, 606-607; Tab, iii, 108.

(186) Bay, iii, 73.

(187) Tab, Taf, x, 171-174.

(188) II, 608; Tab, iii, 109; Wāq, iii, 1039; Kāmil, ii, 281.

reasons. One was almost choked to death, but recovered when Muḥammad prayed for him, and the other was picked up by a strong wind and transported to the mountains of the B. Tayyi', (189).

It is obvious that the problem of the Munāfiqūn was preying on the mind of the Prophet for as they were travelling he asked one of his Companions if the people knew who the Munāfiqūn were. The man replied that they did but that their families protected them. (190)

Ibn Ishāq records several references to men dropping out while on the march and he records a plaintive cry from Muḥammad: "The most painful thing to me is that Muhājirūn from Quraysh and the Anṣār and Ghīfar and Aslam should stay behind." (191)

These incidents, taken as a group, give a picture of massive unrest and dissension in the ranks of the Muslims. Yet the picture could not have been as bleak as would seem from this. The raid on Tabūk, even if not especially successful, was the most massive of the efforts of the Muslims and in consideration of the large numbers that took part the incidents which are recorded seem to be miniscule. The view taken by Watt that the problems were due to the fact that many of the Muslims, especially among the Anṣār, felt that now that they had won their victory they could begin a life of ease and comfort, would seem to be

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(189) II, 605; Kāmil, ii, 279; Ibn Sallām, Kitāb al-Amwāl.

Ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqā, (Cairo, 1353 AH), 483n.

(190) II, 605; Tab, iii, 105-106; Wāq, iii, 1009.

(191) II, 609.

tenable. (192)

It is at this time that Muhammad seems to have put an end to the Munāfiqūn in his community. In a verse that is repeated a second time Muhammad is ordered to deal with them:

O Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers
and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them.
Their ultimate abode is hell, a hapless
journey's-end. (193)

These verses, which are not dated by the commentators, could quite easily come from the period of the raid on Tabūk, for in the only remaining incident which involved the Munāfiqūn they were dealt with harshly.

The story of the so-called 'mosque of opposition' can be told very easily. As Muhammad was preparing for his departure for Tabūk a group of men came to him and informed him that they had built a mosque and they wanted him to come and pray with them in it. He said that he would do so upon his return from the raid. However, as he was returning he received a warning about the true purpose of the mosque and therefore he sent two men to burn it down. This was done and the following verses came down about the incident: (194)

And as for those who chose a place of
worship out of opposition and disbelief,
and in order to cause dissent among the

(192) Muh/Med., 190-191.

(193) Qur'an, 9/73; Qur'an, 66/9.

(194) II, 609; Tab, iii, 110; Kāmil, ii, 281-282;
Wāq, iii, 1045-1049.

believers, and as an outpost for those who warred against Allah and His messenger aforetime, they will surely swear: We purposed naught save good. Allah beareth witness that they verily are liars.

Never stand (to pray) there. A place of worship founded upon duty (to Allah) from the first day is more worthy that thou shouldst stand (to pray) therein, wherein are men who love to purify themselves. Allah loveth the purifiers.

Is he who founded his buildings upon duty (to Allah) and His good pleasure better; or he who founded his building on the brink of a crumbling, over-hanging precipice so that it toppled with him into the fire of hell? Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk.

The building which they built will never cease to be a misgiving in their hearts unless their hearts be torn to pieces. Allah is Knower, Wise. (195)

The commentators confirm that the passage was sent down

in reference to the incident⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ but in this, as in other accounts, there are many confusing details. Ibn Ishāq states that Muḥammad sent two men, Mālīk b. al-Dukhshum and Ma'n b. 'Adīy (or his brother 'Āsim)⁽¹⁹⁷⁾. Another source states that three men, 'Āmir b. Qays, 'Āsim b. 'Adīy and Suwayd b. 'Ayyāsh (al-Ansārī), were sent.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ Al-Baydāwī includes four men in the party: Mālīk b. al-Dukhsham, Ma'n b. 'Adīy, 'Āmir b. al-Sakan and al-Wahshī.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ He also lays stress on the role of Abū 'Āmir al-Rāhib whom he indicates was the person "who warred against Allah and His messenger aforetime". He states that it was in hope that Abū 'Āmir would join them in worship whenever he passed by that the B. Ghanm b. 'Awf built the mosque. This point is also made by al-Wāqidī, although he makes no mention of the clan involved. Ibn Ishāq makes no mention of Abū 'Āmir in this affair. The strongest support for the role of Abū 'Āmir in the affair is to be found in the traditions preserved in al-Tabarī's commentary on the first of these verses. Not only is he implicated in the building of the mosque, he actually wrote to these people ordering them to build it while he was seeking help from Caesar in his conflict with Muḥammad,⁽²⁰⁰⁾ a statement which is supported by a later writer. Al-Samhūdī, in a tradition supposedly originating from al-'Abbās, transmits

(196) Tab, Taf, xi, 22-35; Bay, iii, 80-2

(197) II, 609.

(198) Usd, ii, 492.

(199) Bay, iii, 80.

(200) Tab, Taf, xi, 23-24.

the same story.⁽²⁰¹⁾ Despite these references the account would seem to be a later addition to the story in order to further blacken the name of Abū 'Āmir and to increase the seriousness of the affair in justification of the descent of the verse.

There remains the problem of who was actually involved in the building of the mosque. As seen above al-Bayḍawī attributes the mosque to the B. Ghanm b. 'Awf, a statement which is also found in al-Balādhurī⁽²⁰²⁾ and the commentary of al-Tabarī.⁽²⁰³⁾ In none of these cases is a number given, nor any names. Ibn Ishāq says that the number of men was twelve and gives their names. Al-Wāqidī gives the number as fifteen but only lists twelve names, the majority of whom are in the list of Ibn Ishāq.

This confusion, the resolution of which is impossible, is found among the western commentators on this incident. Watt connects the plot against Muhammad's life, mentioned above in connection with the Tabūk raid, and the building of this mosque. It was to act as a centre for future plots and therefore had to be eliminated. This was done secretly, by night, and the affair was closed.⁽²⁰⁴⁾ Blachère emphasizes the role of Abū 'Āmir, whom he describes as a Christian missionary, and

(201) al-Samhūdī, op.cit., ii, 28.

(202) Bal, F, 16.

(203) Tab, Taf, xi, 25.

(204) William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought,
(Edinburgh, 1968), 25.

postulates that under the influence of this man a schism had broken out in Medina and this is what Muhammad was eliminating.⁽²⁰⁵⁾ Another interpretation is that of Margoliouth. He suggests that having realized from the example of Muhammad that a religious movement must, in the circumstances of the time, precede any political movement a group was beginning a revolution by establishing a rival religion.⁽²⁰⁶⁾ It would seem likely that the interpretation of Watt is the most probable. The mosque would act as a centre for those persons who were disenchanted with the rule of Muhammad and it is possible that the destruction of the mosque was sparked off by the assassination attempt.

The Munāfiqūn and the Jews

The relationship between the Munāfiqūn and the Jews of Medina as it is reported in the historical texts is one that needs to be mentioned. The major incidents have been dealt with above and yet the two groups seem to be mingled in a way that confuses rather than clarifies.

One of the largest passages in the Qur'ān which deals with these groups is the first hundred verses from the second sūra. Yet here passages which refer to the Jews and the Munāfiqūn are mixed to the extent that it is impossible to determine to which

(205) Régis Blachère, Le Problème de Mahomet, (Paris, 1952), 122.

(206) D.S. Margoliouth, Mohammed and the Rise of Islam, (New York and London, 1905), 425.

group certain verses refer. This would seem to have been confusing to some of the early commentators.

And when they fall in with those who believe,
they say: We believe; but when they go apart
to their devils they declare: Lo! we are with
you; verily we did but mock. (207)

This verse would seem to refer to the Munāfiqūn who are often accused of acting in this manner and, indeed, several traditions say that this verse describes the Munāfiqūn. There is, however, a tradition stemming from Ibn 'Abbās in which he specifically states that these men were from among the Jews. (208) This confusion continues with this verse in the explanation of the word 'devils' which is taken as a reference to their leaders. Among descriptions of these leaders as 'unbelievers' or 'polytheists' is the statement of Ibn Ishāq that these 'devils' were "the Jews who order them to deny the truth and contradict what the apostle brought." (209) The confusion between the Jews and the Munāfiqūn is seen in the verses relating to the change of the Qibla. (210) "The foolish of the people" may have been the Jews or the Munāfiqūn but which of the two groups was originally meant can no longer be discerned. (211)

(207) Qur'an, 2/14.

(208) Tab, Taf, i, 129-130.

(209) II, 248; this is also recorded in Tab, Taf, i, 130
from the same source but with different words.

(210) Qur'an, 2/142-144.

(211) Tab, Taf, ii, 1-2.

There are lists of both Munāfiqūn and the Jewish opponents of Muḥammad in the Sīra of Ibn Ishāq; however they are mixed and confused one with the other. Ibn Ishāq includes a definition of the Munāfiqūn in his section on the Jewish adversaries of Muḥammad and he ends the definition by saying:

But in secret they were hypocrites whose inclination was toward the Jews because they considered the apostle a liar and strove against Islam. (212)

There is also the record of a man who "was suspected of hypocrisy and love of the Jews." (213) Ḥassān b. Thābit recited some verses reviling him, not for his nifāq but only for the preference which he showed to the Jews over Muḥammad. (214) Even Ibn Ubayy is linked with 'love of the Jews'. As he lay dying, Muḥammad came to him and said: "I prohibited you from love of the Jews" to which Ibn Ubayy responded: "Sa'd b. Zurāra hated them and he did not profit by it." (215) In a similar scene Muḥammad's first words to Ibn Ubayy were: "Love of the Jews destroyed you." (216) In these references is a very clear indication of the confusion between these two parties which seemed to prevail.

Perhaps the best study of the Prophet's relationship with

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(212) II, 239.

(213) ibid., 245.

(214) ibid., 239.

(215) Wāq, iii, 1057.

(216) Tab, Taf. x, 206.

the Jews, before his final break with them, is that of Watt.⁽²¹⁷⁾ Throughout this it is obvious that Muhammad was attempting to be reconciled with the Jews and yet very early on the break occurred and the physical attack on the major Jewish clans began.

It is possible that the community in Medina was divided into pro-Jewish and pro-Arab factions and that Muhammad began by trying to ally himself with the former. In addition to the religious impetus behind this attempt he was claiming that his new faith was a continuation and a rejuvenation of the original faith of Abraham and Moses there was also a political impetus. Many of the clans of Aws were kept from conversion by their relationship with the Jews and this represented the most powerful of the two factions as a result of the victory for Aws at Bu'āth. The Khazraj, for the most part of pro-Arab leaning, were the losers at Bu'āth and also more readily accepted the leadership of Muhammad. This may be supported by the story of al-Barā' b. Ma'rūr of B. Salima (Khazraj) who refused to pray toward Jerusalem, preferring the Ka'ba in Mecca, until ordered to do so by Muhammad.⁽²¹⁸⁾ This man may be representative of the faction which refused to ally themselves with the Jews, thus forming a pro-Arab group. The change of the Qibla from Jerusalem to the Ka'ba and the institution of the fast of Ramadān rather than that of 'Āshūrā mark the switch from the pro-Jewish to the pro-Arab faction. These changes occurred

(217) Muh/Med, 198 ff.

(218) II, 202; Tab, ii, 360.

before and after the battle of Badr and it is at the time of the expulsion of the B. Qaynuqā' that the first solid references to Ibn Ubayy and the Munāfiqūn appear. They probably represent the pro-Jewish group among the Ansār and they disappear as their Jewish allies were expelled or destroyed. This would seem to be confirmed by references which state that Muhammad was praying toward Jerusalem, the Qibla of the Jews, in an attempt to draw them into his community. When he realized that he was failing he changed the direction of prayer to Mecca. (219)

To describe this as a faction implies that there was a solid body of support which remained loyal throughout this period. This is almost certainly untrue. The supporters of the Munāfiqūn were fickle and men drifted in and out of their ranks as they willed. This made it difficult for later writers to clearly identify the group and led to the confusion in the sources.

Ibn Ubayy

In any study which touches on the Munāfiqūn the person of Ibn Ubayy looms large. Through the centuries he has been vilified as the chief, or leader of the Munāfiqūn and only rarely does any vestige of his actual personality appear. As the 'enemy of God and His Prophet' Ibn Ubayy was neglected by the historians except in cases where it could not be avoided and his name is not included among the lists of the Companions

(219) Tab, Taf. ii, 4; al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i, 259.

except under his son's name, where a large part of each listing deals with the father rather than the son.

He is commonly known as Ibn Ubayy in order to lessen the confusion stemming from the fact that both he and his son had the name of 'Abd Allah. His full name was 'Abd Allah b. Ubayy b. Mālik (this name is usually replaced by Salūl, a woman of Khuzā'a, who was the mother of Ubayy) b. al-Hārith b. 'Ubayd b. Mālik b. Sālim b. Ghanm b. 'Awf b. al-Khazraj, and his kunya was Abū al-Hubāb.⁽²²⁰⁾ He was the cousin of another famous opponent of Muḥammad, Abū 'Āmir al-Rāhib.⁽²²¹⁾ It is also reported that Jamīla, the daughter of Ibn Ubayy, was married to Hanzala, the son of Abū 'Āmir.⁽²²²⁾ Another report says that Jamīla was the sister of Ibn Ubayy.⁽²²³⁾

In the days before the coming of Muḥammad he was one of the nobles of his people and he was known as a 'forbearing' leader.⁽²²⁴⁾ Ibn Ubayy is recorded as one of those who was able to ride a corpulent mare and his two great toes would draw lines on the ground.⁽²²⁵⁾ Anas b. Mālik commented on the height

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(220) Usd, iii, 296.

(221) IS, iii, 540.

(222) Wāq, i, 273.

(223) al-Suhaylī, op.cit., iii, 164.

(224) Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, et al., Ayyām al-'Arab fī-l-Islām, (Cairo, 1968), 74. 'Forbearing' is not a good translation of halīm, however no better one suggests itself.

(225) Ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Muḥabbir, Ed., Ilse Lichtenstädter, (Beirut, 1361 AH), 233.

of Ibn Ubayy after seeing his feet extending beyond the end of the bed. (226)

Little is known about the activities of Ibn Ubayy during the Jāhiliya period but that which we do know indicates the position which he held. During the battle known as the first day of Fijār he led the contingent from the B. al-Khazraj. (227) He was not present at the day of Muzāhim because he was ill and his people were led by Sa'd b. 'Ubāda. (228) Nor did he and those people who would follow him go out to the battle of Bu'āth. (229) The result of this latter action, in addition to the damaging of his home fortress, was the high position which he held when Muhammad came to Medina. During this battle the leaders of the two tribal groups were killed and Ibn Ubayy was able to make use of the resulting lack of leadership to establish himself as the paramount chieftain of the community.

It was this position which has led to the story of the crown which was being prepared for Ibn Ubayy when Muhammad arrived in Medina. This story is very commonly repeated in the texts to explain Ibn Ubayy's hostility toward Muhammad. Hamīdullah indicates that he feels that the idea of crowning Ibn Ubayy was purely instigated by the Khazraj and was resented by the Aws and probably the Jews. Hence the idea was given up

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(226) Wāq, iii, 1058.

(227) Kāmil, i, 676.

(228) Abū al-Faraj, op.cit., xviii, 6460.

(229) Kāmil, i, 681.

when the arrival of Muhammad offered an alternative plan.⁽²³⁰⁾ This theory, unfortunately, fails to take into account the fact that the sources agree that both Aws and Khazraj followed Ibn Ubayy. This would seem to be confirmed by the fact that the majority of the followers of Ibn Ubayy during his time as leader of the 'opposition' were from the Aws.

The arrival of Muhammad placed Ibn Ubayy in a difficult position for he now had a rival to his role as leader of the Madinese. He was an ambitious man and he did not give up his claim on the leadership although he found it difficult to compete with Muhammad who had the advantage of being the Prophet of God and hence was able to call upon a higher authority for his judgements.

A tradition from Mūsā b. 'Uqba reports that Muhammad was rebuffed by Ibn Ubayy and it is implied that this occurred shortly after Muhammad's arrival in Medina.⁽²³¹⁾ A similar tradition on the same incident is even more definite. When Muhammad arrived in Medina he wished to stay with Ibn Ubayy but he was told to go to those persons who had invited him.⁽²³²⁾ Both traditions include a reference to the story of the crown and hence are suspect; however, they may indicate the attitude of Ibn Ubayy to Muhammad upon his arrival.

There is no definite information as to when Ibn Ubayy

(230) Muhammad Hamidullah, Le Prophète de l'Islam, (Paris, 1959), i, 120-121.

(231) Ibn Kathīr, op.cit., iii, 199.

(232) al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i, 183-184.

became a Muslim, however al-Bukhārī records that he did so after the Muslim victory at Badr which was seen as a judgement of God upon the destiny of the Muslims.⁽²³³⁾ This would seem to be a likely date for his conversion and it is unlikely that he was prompted to this out of personal conviction. Throughout his life Ibn Ubayy was aware of the popular feeling in his community and almost certainly it was this instinct which led him to make his conversion. As one of the most respected leaders of the Madinese he would be in a position, as a convert, to agitate from inside the community to regain his position as leader.

As has been seen above, Ibn Ubayy continually harrassed Muḥammad and the Muslims in his attempts to regain a place of some power and influence. Although these incidents all seem to have taken place after his conversion, it is recorded that as early as the first year after the Hijra he attempted to keep Abū Qays b. al-Aslat from converting to Islam.⁽²³⁴⁾ This would seem indicative of anti-Islamic activities even before his own conversion and, indeed, this would seem probable. These activities weighed very heavily on his son 'Abd Allah, who is always mentioned as one of the most excellent of the Muslims and who took part with the Prophet on all his major raids. Ibn Hishām records that when Muḥammad led his men out to meet the

(233) Bukh, viii, 66-67.

(234) Tab, ii, 406; Bal, A, i, 274; Kāmil, ii, 112; al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i, 194.

Quraysh at the appointed place of Badr in the fourth year of the Hijra, he placed 'Abd Allah in charge of Medina. (235)

'Abd Allah was so affected by the subversive activities of his father that, on at least one occasion, he offered to kill his father himself so that there would be no further bloodshed from an ensuing blood feud.

Ibn Ubayy fell ill in the last nights of Shawwāl of 9 AH and died in Dhū al-Qa'da after having been ill for twenty nights. (236) His absence from the Tabūk raid, which occurred at this time, may indicate that his final illness actually began earlier than this. His death has preserved yet another incident of the re-writing of history so that it conforms with the beliefs of a later age. The basic story is as follows: when Ibn Ubayy died, Muhammad prayed for him despite the protests of 'Umar who listed the occasions on which he had opposed the will of the Prophet. Shortly after he had prayed for Ibn Ubayy the following verse was sent down:

And never (O Muhammad) pray for one of them
who dieth, nor stand by his grave. Lo! they
disbelieved in Allah and His messenger, and
they died while they were evil-doers. (237)

As a result of this admonition from God, Muhammad never again prayed for one of the Munāfiqūn. (238) The fact that

(235) II, 763, #692 from Ibn Hishām.

(236) Tab, iii, 120; Wāq, iii, 1057.

(237) Qur'an, 9/84.

(238) II, 623; Bukh, viii, 121.

Muhammad prayed on behalf of Ibn Ubayy is confirmed by the quotation from the Qur'ān but there are several variants on the basic story.

It is recorded that 'Abd Allah, the son of Ibn Ubayy, asked Muhammad to pray on behalf of his father, to give one of his own shirts to be used as a shroud and to ask God for forgiveness for Ibn Ubayy. Muhammad did these things despite the protests of 'Umar and then was reprimanded.⁽²³⁹⁾ In another version it was Ibn Ubayy himself who made these requests of Muhammad as he lay dying.⁽²⁴⁰⁾ It is also suggested that Ibn Ubayy asked in his will for this to be done.⁽²⁴¹⁾ Yet another tradition reports that the angel Gabriel warned Muhammad not to do these things.⁽²⁴²⁾ Al-Wāqidī records that Muhammad consoled 'Abd Allah upon the death of his father.⁽²⁴³⁾

These variants may be seen as later additions to the story in an attempt to justify the action of the Prophet toward an opponent. Sufficient excuses are made for Muhammad's giving of one of his shirts to be used as a shroud that it may be accepted as true. The reason that is given for this action is that after the battle of Badr, al-'Abbās, who had been captured, was in need of a shirt and the only one that could be found to

(239) Kāmil, ii, 292; Tab, Taf, x, 204-206; al-Wāhidī, op.cit., 173-174.

(240) Tab, Taf, x, 206; Wāq, iii, 1057.

(241) Tab, Taf, x, 205.

(242) Tab, Taf, x, 205; Bal, A, i, 274.

(243) Wāq, iii, 1059; IS, iii, 541-542.

fit him belonged to Ibn Ubayy and this was given to al-'Abbās. (244)
This reason has been accepted by at least one modern scholar. (245)
Ibn Ubayy is not included in any of the lists of the participants
in the battle and, as stated above, it seems likely that he
did not convert to Islam until after the battle. Nevertheless
it is possible that he was present at the battle. In a similar
manner it is possible that he was present at the negotiations
referred to as the second pledge at al-'Aqaba although he
certainly didn't play a leading part. (246)

The picture of Ibn Ubayy that has been preserved for us
in the texts has been prejudiced by the later collectors and
writers of history with their preconceived ideas about him.
Few indications of his true nature have been kept for us. On
the expedition to al-Hudaybiya the Quraysh offered to him the
opportunity of circumambulating the Ka'ba if he wished. His
son urged him that it would be a disgrace to do so if the
Prophet himself did not and Ibn Ubayy rejected the offer. (247)
Abū Qatāda quotes Ibn Ubayy commenting on the strangeness of
the rain which fell on that same expedition. (248) In the first
tradition an honourable action (according to the tenets of
Islam) is due to the influence of his son. Yet in the light

(244) Usd, iii, 167.

(245) Hamīdullah, op.cit., i, 158-159.

(246) II, 205-206; IS, i, 222-223; Tab, ii, 364-367;
Kāmil, ii, 100.

(247) Wāq, ii, 605.

(248) ibid, ii, 590.

of the vast amount of re-writing which took place in relation to the history of Ibn Ubayy is it not possible that Ibn Ubayy refused on his own accord and the name of his son was added later in order to deny Ibn Ubayy the honour? The second tradition is of interest because he is quoted as would be any other Companion and this leads to the speculation that he was not considered as extraordinary by his contemporaries and that other traditions transmitted on his authority have been forgotten.

Throughout his life Ibn Ubayy acted in a manner which was faithful to those ideals in which he believed. He attempted to support his Jewish allies when they were being attacked by Muhammad. His opposition to the Muslims seems not to have stemmed from his personal ambition but rather from his fear that his people, the citizens of Medina, were being supplanted in their own homes by the emigrants of Quraysh, a fear that was completely justified by later events. It is unfortunate that there are only Muslim sources to describe his career as leader of the opposition. A more neutral source would certainly confirm that Ibn Ubayy was, within the moral values of the Jāhiliya, an honourable man. The fact that Muhammad prayed for his forgiveness indicates that he, at least, agreed with this.

The failure of the Munāfiqūn

The failure of Ibn Ubayy and his followers was seen, by themselves, as the failure to repel the invaders from Mecca, yet it was more than their inability to expel physically the

Muslims. As Watt has pointed out, they were unable "to move with the times" (249). Although they recognized the problems, they tried to solve them along lines which were traditional and failed to take into account the fact that their society itself was changing. There was a basic disregard for the ideological needs of the people of the community as can be seen by the fact that, although they were opposed to the growing power of the Muslims, they rapidly became Muslims themselves. Their continuing opposition was then seen as evidence of the insincerity of their conversion. It may be that they would have been more successful had they remained firmly aligned with the old religion since it was rooted in the traditional values of the community which they felt they were trying to protect.

The Munāfiqūn also suffered from a basic lack of unity and continuity in their support from the people. There was a small hard-core of men who were in opposition but they were joined by the other people of the community only on those occasions when they felt personally involved in the incident or when they were disgruntled with the policies of Muhammad or with his apparent lack of success. An example would be the refusal of a third of the army to go out to Uhud with Muhammad. This very large group was certainly made up of men who believed with Ibn Ubayy, and even Muhammad originally, that the Madinese could better face their enemies from the fortresses in a type of fighting which they understood better than the

(249) Muh/Med. 187.

formal battle which took place at Uhud. Yet there seems to have been no indication that this large number of men were in firm support of the Munāfiqūn. This ability of the people to change from one side to the other would work to the advantage of Muhammad who was continually proving himself during the early period. As his power and influence grew, more people would hesitate to oppose him and would remain loyal rather than join the Munāfiqūn. A source of support upon which Ibn Ubayy could draw was the major Jewish tribes and they were eliminated as obstacles to the growing strength of the Muslims. Gradually the hard-core would be isolated and then they too must have finally been won over as evidence of their activities becomes rarer after the siege of al-Khandaq when it finally became apparent that Muhammad would be the victor in his struggle with the Quraysh. By the time of the expedition against Tabūk they were only of irritant value. Those persons referred to as Munāfiqūn at this time were Muslim malcontents rather than a 'Muslim opposition'.

CHAPTER III

MUHAMMAD'S CONTROL OF THE RIVALRIES

In order to establish the methods whereby Muhammad controlled the two rivalries described above it is necessary to determine the underlying causes for them. This is not as difficult as it might seem, despite the problems engendered by the subtle editing of the texts undertaken by the later historians. Three basic causes may be discerned at work among the people. It may be suggested that the unrest was anti-Islamic, anti-Muhammad, or anti-Quraysh in its nature.

The most serious charge is that the rivalries were prompted by a basic dislike, or distrust, of Islam itself by the citizens of Medina. This is implicit in the charges levelled against the Munāfiqūn in the texts and the commentaries. Yet, as demonstrated above, throughout the period of their activities they were considered as Muslims. They did not advocate a return to the traditional religion of the area. Their activities were political in their nature rather than religious.

The actions of Ibn Ubayy can be seen as anti-Muhammad in their direction. This was brought to the fore with the story of the crown which was being prepared for him before Muhammad's arrival in Medina. This story suggests that Ibn Ubayy was opposed to Muhammad, and not the political reforms which he was instituting, because he had been denied a kingdom which he felt was his by right. It would seem probable that there was an element of personal animosity in the position taken by Ibn

Ubayy which was exposed during the 'affair of the lie', a personal attack on the Prophet through his family. Nevertheless most of the actions of Ibn Ubayy were on a more honourable plane than this incident.

It is the third cause that must be seen as the underlying grievance of the Madinese. They were opposed to the position of the Muhājirūn from Quraysh who were seen as imposing themselves upon the people who were helping them. In some ways Muhammad was seen not only as the leader of the Muslims but as the leader of the Qurashī Muhājirūn. As the Quraysh became increasingly dominant the reaction grew and was focused through the two rivalries. It was by playing upon this grievance that Ibn Ubayy was able to threaten the stability of the community. Eventually they were controlled and the dominance of the Quraysh was assured.

The position of Muhammad in the community of Medina was that of leader of his people combined with the religious aspects of his unique role as the Prophet of God. The Islamic community is to be considered as a pre-Islamic tribe in its political activity and therefore the role of Muhammad was, in many ways, that of a tribal chieftain. As the Prophet, Muhammad received the revelations from God which governed the religious life of the community. As some of these revelations were of a legal nature he was, to some extent, a law-giver. As the chieftain he was the supreme arbiter of the laws, whether they were the new ones sent from God or the traditional ones of the community. He also acted as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, was the head of the state and hence

responsible for all external relations, and he also supervised the finances of the state both incoming and outgoing. Although these powers would seem to make him omnipotent he was restricted by the traditions of the age in all his dealings which were beyond his role as a Prophet. Even here he was bounded by what his followers would accept. It was within the bounds of his position that Muhammad sought to control the two rivalries which have been described above.

In his daily activities as ruler of the community Muhammad, acting in the manner of a traditional leader, would not have used his position as a Prophet to enforce his policies or decisions. He would have had to consult the other leaders of the community and, indeed, the mosque seems to have acted as the site for regular meetings of the majlis of Medina. Yet most references to such a body, advising the Prophet and speaking with the voice of the people, have been removed from the historical texts. A desire to represent the Prophet as a ruler advised only by God and always instinctively aware of the feelings of his people is certainly the cause of this. There would also be a desire to forget that Muhammad ever made use of the traditional forms of government from the Jāhiliya period, a way of life with which he claimed he was leading the break. Yet it is not only a process of rational thought which proves that he must have regularly sought and received advice from his fellows in the community.

Al-Wāqidī reports from Abū Hurayra that he never saw anyone who consulted his companions more often than Muhammad. He then, however, qualifies this statement by saying that he only

ever consulted them on matters having to do with warfare.⁽¹⁾ Ibn Sa'd reports that the Prophet said that if he did not have a council of the Muslims to advise him he would invest 'Abd Allah b. Mas'ūd with power.⁽²⁾ The implication from a statement of this kind is that there was a council (shūrā) advising the Prophet. There are other traditions of this type, all stating that the Prophet used to take counsel from his Companions. Indeed, it would seem that such an action is enjoined upon the Muslims in the Qur'ān as one of the marks of a true believer.

And those who answer the call of their
Lord and establish worship, and whose
affairs are a matter of counsel (shūrā),
and those who spend of what we have
bestowed on them.⁽³⁾

Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, writing for the edification and education of the rulers of his time, was in no doubt that Muhammad sought advice from his Companions. The only question that was to be answered was why he did this. After outlining the various theories that had been put forth, he states that he believes that Muhammad was ordered to take advice so as to act as an example for those people who were to follow him in the position of power.⁽⁴⁾ Interestingly enough, a modern Arab scholar,

(1) Wāq, ii, 580.

(2) IS, iii, 154.

(3) Qur'ān, 42/38.

(4) Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, al-Fakhri, English translation by C.E.J. Whitting, (London, 1947), 22.

points out that Muhammad always made a point of consulting his Companions as a lesson to them of his humanity and the need for consultation on all affairs.⁽⁵⁾

Despite the agreement on the fact that Muhammad held regular meetings with his Companions and the other tribal leaders of Medina there are few references in the historical texts to give support to this fact. The most famous incident of this type is the meeting which occurred before the battle of Uhud. This meeting is important because it indicates that Muhammad was acting exactly as a tribal leader of the time. The major leaders of the various tribal groupings of Medina were present in the mosque and they agreed that they would remain in the city. Included in this group was Ibn Ubayy although it is carefully pointed out that he had never before been invited to such a gathering.⁽⁶⁾ When Muhammad was convinced that he should face the Quraysh in a set battle Ibn Ubayy exercised his right as an equal and did not lead his party out. Muhammad was attempting to follow public opinion in this matter but having changed his mind he also was exercising the right of a leader to lead all those who would follow him. That Ibn Ubayy was able to run counter to the decision of the Prophet indicates that at this time Muhammad had no more power or influence than any other leader of a tribe or tribal grouping. This power came much later in his

(5) Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Hayāt Muhammad, 9th edition, (Cairo, 1965), 261.

(6) Tab, ii, 503.

life although he probably never gave up the traditions which he had been following.

On occasion, when Muḥammad contemplated an action which one or other of the parties might not approve, he would speak to the relevant persons to get their approval or their advice. During the siege of al-Khandaq Muḥammad entered into negotiations with 'Uyayna b. Ḥiṣn in an attempt to bribe him to lift the siege. When they were asked the two Sa'ds both refused to allow him to give away the dates which were the property of the Anṣār. This may be seen as Muḥammad making use of the consultative role of the majlis when thinking of an action which might bring about an unwanted reaction from a group in the community.

The meeting with the Anṣār after their complaints about the distribution of the booty at al-Ji'rāna may be seen as a type of majlis in which Muḥammad was forced to explain his actions to the satisfaction of his followers.

These incidents would seem to indicate that Muḥammad used the institution of the majlis in an attempt to gain an idea of the consensus of opinion in the community or to control public opinion. This was perfectly in line with the traditions of government in the area and would help him to forestall outbreaks of the two rivalries. That it was not always successful may be seen from the incident before Uhud but it was perfectly in line with common usage.

Another traditional form of the guaranteeing of obedience was the swearing of an oath. In a society in which tribal and personal honour played a major role, an oath would act as

an effective bond on a man's conduct once he had agreed to the subject. The oath, or oaths, at 'Aqaba may be seen as the method that Muhammad used to guarantee the security of his followers and himself upon arrival at Medina. Throughout his life at Medina Muhammad resorted to the oath when he felt in doubt as to the loyalty of his people in the face of a difficult situation. As has been described above, the pledge which Muhammad received before the battle of Badr was of this nature. He had to be certain that the Ansār would stand by him in the face of the Qurashī army. Their attendance in the raiding party demonstrates that they were not opposed to fighting per se but when the odds had changed in favour of the enemy their steadfastness had to be guaranteed. A similar pledge was made on the expedition to al-Hudaybiya, the pledge of al-Ridwān, when Muhammad had the men swear either to fight unto death, or not to run away in the face of a threat from Quraysh. That these oaths were of an individual nature is shown at this time when al-Jadd b. Qays refused. He was mocked for not coming forth but he was not forced to do so. (7)

The covenant which Muhammad wrote in Medina, the so-called 'Constitution of Medina' is another method which Muhammad used to regularize his position in the community and hence increase his control over the factions. This document, the authenticity of which is not challenged, is actually made up of portions which were agreed upon at different dates and were probably

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(7) II, 503-504.

altered as the situation changed in the community.⁽⁸⁾ The major stress in the Constitution is upon the unity of the umma. Repeatedly throughout the document there is an emphasis upon unity and the need for solidarity. The first clause "They are a single community distinct from (other) people"⁽⁹⁾ is perhaps the most straightforward expression of the desire for unity and the remaining clauses referring to it do so by laying down guide-lines or legislation to create or enforce it.

The God-fearing believers are against whoever of them acts wrongfully or seeks an act that is unjust or treacherous or hostile or corrupt among the believers; their hands are all against him, even if he is the son of one of them.⁽¹⁰⁾

No idolater gives 'neighbourly protection' for goods or person to Quraysh, nor intervenes in his (a Qurashī's) favour against a believer.⁽¹¹⁾

Between them (the people of this document) is help against whoever suddenly attacks Medina.⁽¹²⁾

(8) Muh/Med, 226-228.

(9) ibid, 221.

(10) ibid, 222.

(11) ibid, 223.

(12) ibid, 225.

These and other portions of the document are concerned with the maintenance of the unity once it had been declared in the community. As Ibn Ishāq pointed out this document included the Muhājirūn, the Anṣār, and the Jews. The preamble of the document itself speaks of "those who followed them (the Muslims) and joined them and laboured with them".⁽¹³⁾ Within these limits fall almost the entire community of Medina including all those persons involved in the two rivalries under discussion. Hence this 'Constitution' although not probably designed as such, would act as a controlling factor on the rivalries between the factions.

Soon after he came to Medina Muḥammad established a pact of brotherhood between individuals of the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn.⁽¹⁴⁾ This was an attempt to prove that a religion would be a better binding force than the traditional reliance on blood relationship for the formation of a community. He was attempting to create a unity which would deny all the ancient customs and rules of blood relationship.⁽¹⁵⁾ Yet Muḥammad was making use of a traditional form of relationship common to the era.

The idea of the brotherhood was that of the alliance (hilf) between tribes reduced to the individual level. A unity based on this concept would have made inconceivable the rivalry between the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn yet it failed

(13) II, 231-232.

(14) ibid., 234-235.

(15) Izutsu, op.cit., 61.

as the continued existence of the rivalry proves. The fact that this was an alliance between individuals is specifically made in one tradition which explains how this was possible in the face of the famous tradition of Muhammad: "There is no alliance in Islam."⁽¹⁶⁾ It is probable that the word hilm was dropped from the accounts of the pact of brotherhood because of this tradition.

The pact was finally abrogated by a revelation:

The Prophet is closer to the believers than their selves, and his wives are (as) their mothers. And the owners of kinship are closer to one another in the ordinance of Allah than (other) believers and the fugitives (who fled from Mecca), except that ye should do kindness to your friends.

This is written in the Book (of nature).⁽¹⁷⁾

It is traditionally accepted that this verse reinstated the older rules as regards inheritance, hence ending a major facet of the 'brotherhood', that a brother would inherit a man's goods rather than his blood relations. This view is supported by the relevant traditions in the tafsīr of al-Tabarī.⁽¹⁸⁾ Al-Bukhārī records a tradition from Ibn 'Abbas that another verse was the one which ended this arrangement.⁽¹⁹⁾

(16) al-Samhūdī, op.cit., i. 191.

(17) Qur'an, 33/6.

(18) Tab, Taf, xxi, 121-125.

(19) Bukh, iii, 125.

And unto each We appointed heirs of that
which parents and near kindred leave; and
as for those with whom your right hands
have made a covenant, give them their due.

Lo! Allah is ever Witness over all things.⁽²⁰⁾

Although there are a few references to the pact of brotherhood in the relevant portions of the tafsīr of al-Tabarī, the largest number of the traditions relate this verse to a form of alliance which was practised in the pre-Islamic period and which was abrogated by this verse.⁽²¹⁾ Bell dates the first of the two verses as sometime before the marriage of Muhammad to Zaynab d. Jahsh in the year five.⁽²²⁾ The second verse Bell says is early Madinese; however, it was revised later and the portion of interest for this study was added at that time, probably in the fourth or fifth years of the Hijra.⁽²³⁾ It seems probable that the first of the two verses is the one which abrogated the pact as the second is much more involved with the problem of inheritance itself.

The Prophet had another method of pleading for unity among his community and this was his recourse to revelations from God. As Watt has pointed out:

The words 'obey God and His messenger' and
the various equivalents occur about forty

(20) Qur'an, 4/33.

(21) Tab, Taf, v, 50-57.

(22) Bell, ii, 411.

(23) ibid, i, 66, 73.

times in the Qur'ān, and are to be dated mostly before and after the battle of Uhud. (24)

These verses are either exhortations in general

Say: Obey Allah and the messenger. But if they turn away, lo! Allah loveth not the disbelievers (in His guidance). (25)

or in particular

O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority; and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the messenger if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end. (26)

By the revelation of phrases such as these Muhammad was appealing to the growing belief in his prophetic mission; a belief which developed in conjunction with his ability to control politically his followers. This appeal to an authority higher than any earthly power and, to the believers, more certain of final retribution, was an innovative technique which could not have been applied by any of the pre-Islamic political leaders in Arabia. Muhammad was the first person

(24) Muh/Med. 233.

(25) Qur'ān. 3/32.

(26) Qur'ān. 4/59.

who combined leadership in the religious and political fields and who was able to wield these two joint power bases in an effective way. In these passages Muḥammad used his position as a religious leader to increase his political control.

Although he always emphasized that his appeal was to all the Arabs and despite the fact that he made war against his own people, Muḥammad seems to have taken care of his fellow tribesmen after they had converted and agreed to follow him. Al-Ya'qūbī records two instances in which B. Ḥāshim were given the first portion of the booty before it was distributed among the other people.⁽²⁷⁾ There are other traditions that Muḥammad kept his revenues from the settlements at Khaybar and Fadak for his own purposes which included the support of members of his immediate family and members of the B. Ḥāshim and the B. al-Muṭṭalib b. 'Abd Manāf.⁽²⁸⁾ On other occasions he seems to have distinguished between these two clans although he still gave them preference over other clans from Quraysh.⁽²⁹⁾

During the conquest of Mecca Muḥammad gave security of life and property to the members of the Quraysh despite their opposition to him. The Anṣār seem to have protested saying that he was doing this because he was still held by his love for his family and clan. When Muḥammad heard of this

(27) al-Ya'qūbī, op.cit., ii, 52-53, 56.

(28) Bal, F., 49, 53.

(29) Ibn Sallām, op.cit., 331; Bukh, v, 174.

he spoke to the Ansār and having spoken of his closeness to the Ansār convinced them that he was acting for the best.⁽³⁰⁾ There are other traditions in which Muhammad seems to be giving the Quraysh a position of importance which would go against the equality which he had been preaching as a basic tenet of Islam. By far the majority of these references would seem to be later creations attempting to give a prophetic sanction to the rule of the Umayyad or 'Abbāsīd dynasties. Such statements as

... Those who were the best in the pre-Islamic times are the best in the Islamic period when they have been instructed.⁽³¹⁾

would seem too biased to be accepted.

It is, however, obvious that Muhammad made use of some of the men of Quraysh very shortly after they had converted to Islam. This can be seen in the case of 'Amr b. al-'Ās who seems to have converted sometime after al-Hudaybiya and before the conquest of Mecca⁽³²⁾ but within a year and a half led the Muslim army on the raid to Dhāt al-Salāsīl. Reinforcements under Abū 'Ubayda b. al-Jarrāh and including such luminaries as Abū Bakr and 'Umar were sent out and 'Amr was able to dispute the leadership with Abū 'Ubayda and to

(30) Bal, F. 65-66.

(31) Bukh, iv, 217.

(32) cf. Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri I: Historical Texts, (Chicago, 1957), 85.

succeed in retaining command.⁽³³⁾ Ibn Ishāq indicates that Muḥammad gave 'Amr the command because he was related to the people of the area;⁽³⁴⁾ however, this does seem to have been a very important position to be held by a new convert.

Other members of the ruling families of Quraysh also seem to have received commands soon after their conversion despite the fact that many of them had long been leaders of the opposition to Muḥammad. 'Ikrima b. Abī Jahl was one of those who was proscribed at the time of the conquest of Mecca; however, after fleeing to the Yemen he returned, converted, and by the year of the pilgrimage had been placed in charge of the sadaga of the B. Hawāzin.⁽³⁵⁾ Shortly after his conversion Muḥammad threatened to send Abū Sufyān b. Harb to destroy an idol when its people requested that it be allowed to remain.⁽³⁶⁾ Abū Sufyān was actually sent to act as the representative of the Prophet in Jurash or Najrān.⁽³⁷⁾ Yazīd b. Abī Sufyān was also given a governorship although his conversion was very late.⁽³⁸⁾ 'Attāb b. Usayd was placed in charge of Mecca shortly after its conquest despite the fact that he had not converted until the conquest of the city.⁽³⁹⁾

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(33) II, 668; Tab, iii, 31; Kāmil, ii, 230-232; IS, ii, 132.

(34) II, 668.

(35) Usd, iv, 70-72.

(36) Tab, iii, 99.

(37) Bal, F, 91; Usd, iii, 10.

(38) Bal, F, 58.

(39) Ibn Hajar, al-Isāba fī Tamyīz al-Sahāba, (Cairo, 1328 AH), ii, 451; Usd, iii, 556.

This usage of the members of the ruling families may have been for any of several reasons. Their positions in the pre-Islamic period would have accustomed them to command and this is a facility worth utilizing. It is also possible that this was a form of nepotism with Muhammad able to distribute favours to those persons of the Quraysh whose co-operation he wished to cultivate. It may also be that by giving these people these positions he was avoiding antagonism among the rivalries of Medina. These new-comers would be outside the feuds and he would be able to trust their loyalty in the face of an outbreak of the older enmities. Their usage in these roles sealed the fate of the Ansār who were now completely superceded by the Quraysh.

It is by the use of these various concepts that Muhammad attempted to control the rivalries in the Muslim community of Medina. Some of them were traditional forms of government in Arabia at that time, such as the majlis, or the taking of oaths and pledges of support. Others were innovative such as the 'Constitution' or the use of the Qur'ānic revelations to support his control. Despite the fact that some of these failed in their objective of reinforcing the unity of mutually antagonistic forces, notably the pact of brotherhood, the continuation of the umma after the death of Muhammad says as much for the statesmanship of the Prophet as it does for the ideal of unity so strongly expressed in the tenets of Islam.

The concept of the unity of the Islamic community and the ideal of the brotherhood of all Muslims owes a great deal to the rivalries which were found in Medina during the lifetime

of Muhammad. Although the idea of this unity was present in the doctrines of Islam as promulgated at Mecca, it was the emphasis placed on it in Medina, where the issue was much more in doubt, that installed it as one of the major ideals of Islam. The great emphasis upon unity was due to the lack of unity and at this time began the fear of fitna, which later became an important concept in political theory. The Qur'ānic references and the traditions of the sunna gave the basic arguments on which the later theorists based their arguments for the unity of the umma.

The unity of Islam was to dissolve the pre-Islamic bonds which had proved so disruptive of society, especially in Medina, and were already beginning to break apart under the pressure of the changes in society. Eventually Muhammad was successful in destroying these bonds, especially in the case of the Aws and the Khazraj who finally came to be known as the Ansār, although this did not finally occur until after Muhammad's death and during the period of the conquests. Despite this these tribal affiliations were kept alive by the rivalries between the groups especially during the early years of Muhammad's life in Medina. The execution of the B. Qurayza indicates the success that Muhammad was having in his policies. They had been the traditional allies of the Aws and yet it was the leader of the Aws, Sa'd b. Mu'adh, who declared the judgement upon them.

By the time of the election of Abū Bakr to the caliphate of Islam the two rivalries under study had disappeared. The Munāfiqūn were no more; the word was only used as a term of

abuse. The Anṣār were still considered as a separate group; however, they had been completely superceded by the Qurashī Muhājirūn and the recent converts from the same tribe. The pre-Islamic feud between the Aws and the Khazraj was almost gone although it did play a part in the election of Abū Bakr. When the Khazraj tried to effect a fait accompli by electing Sa'd b. 'Ubāda the Aws reacted and gave their support to the party of Abū Bakr, 'Umar and Abū 'Ubāda. This guaranteed the election of Abū Bakr as the Qurashī Muhājirūn were divided with some supporting the claim of 'Alī to the position.

By finally overcoming the Anṣār, the Quraysh, led by the early Muhājirūn and supported by the later converts, guaranteed for themselves and their descendents the continuation of the role of their tribe in the position of power. The antagonism of the Anṣār, although no longer politically effective, led them to play the role of an opposition party to the ruling dynasty from the city of Medina.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS DRAWN FROM

THE STUDY OF THE TWO RIVALRIES

The Bias in the Material: the Islamic Bias

The type of historical writing commonly referred to as sīra literature is the basis for the study of the early history of Islam, meaning by this the biography of Muhammad and the early development of the religion. Modern scholarship has taken various attitudes toward this literature. Perhaps the most cynical has been that evidenced by H. Lammens. He believed that it was of very little use for the study of the history of the period. It was nothing more than traditions transmitted or invented for exegetical purposes or to serve the legal and judicial purposes of a later age. The historical material found in the sīra was a later development which was created in the face of the well-established position of the Christians who were met after the beginnings of the Islamic conquests in Syria and Iraq.⁽¹⁾ This attitude reduces the study of early Islamic history to an examination of the Qur'ān and the beliefs of later Muslims about the period in question. It would be necessary to approach all the historical material from the early period with a sceptical eye searching for those few items which were not introduced at a later date and to discard the largest portion of the available material.

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(1) cf. C.H. Becker, 'Prinzipielles zu Lammens's Sīrastudien', Der Islam, iv (1913), 263-269.

Fortunately this attitude has been discounted by almost all the more recent scholars. Foremost in this regard is the concept put forward by W.M. Watt in which his basic argument is that there is, in all the material, a basic 'core of fact'. It can be extracted if one takes care to observe certain basic rules governing the material at the disposal of the historian.

... the traditional accounts are in general to be accepted, are to be received with care and as far as possible corrected where 'tendential shaping' is suspected, and are only to be rejected outright where there is internal contradiction.⁽²⁾

With this method of approach it is possible to accept and to utilize a much larger proportion of the material.

Yet have the incidents involved in the two rivalries suffered from any 'tendential shaping' of which we are aware? Rosenthal states:

In certain cases, as in the treatment of early Muslim history, every bit of historical writing is strictly partisan.⁽³⁾

This statement would indicate that Rosenthal trusts none of the records of the early period of Islamic history, hence the life of Muhammad, to be without a bias of some kind. The only

(2) William Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, (Oxford, 1968), xiv.

(3) Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography, 2nd edition, (Leiden, 1968), 63.

prejudice that can be accepted to have had as wide a scope as this would be a religious one. A Muslim scholar would shape the material upon which he was working in a manner which would be dictated by his faith and hence the report would be biased toward the glorification of Islam.

Rosenthal has also shown the importance of religion to historical study at this time and the importance of history to the religious man.

As a concrete indication for the primary importance of the religious factor, it may be noted that the early historians, without exception, were representatives of 'knowledge' in its widest sense.⁽⁴⁾

In the light of this it would seem that one must be sceptical of the Arab historians by virtue of their religion. Indeed they were guilty of trying to present the early history of Islam in the best possible light and this provokes a question. Why, therefore, was so much of the material about the rivalries preserved? Surely it cannot be argued that information describing the internal disunity of the umma was preserved out of a sense of pride in the community. The opposite is much more likely; that material of this sort would be forgotten when it conflicted with the ideal picture of early Islam or, at least, with the image that the historian was trying to convey.

This type of distortion is as present as is the type which was done for less noble, political or legal reasons. Ibn

(4) ibid. 130.

Hishām removed a name from the text as he received it from Ibn Ishāq because it mentioned a Companion of the Prophet in rather discreditable circumstances.⁽⁵⁾ He also admitted to changing words in a poem because they cast aspersions on the Prophet himself.⁽⁶⁾ It has been suggested that the reason why al-Wāqidī and al-Balādhurī do not mention the 'Constitution of Medina' was because they failed to see how Muḥammad could have considered pagans and Jews as the equals of the believers.⁽⁷⁾ Watt has suggested that one version of the story of the arbitration of Sa'd b. Mu'adh over the fate of the B. Qurayza may have been prompted by a desire "to magnify the position of the Prophet and his successors."⁽⁸⁾ This type of 'shaping', the result of a sincere belief in Islam, has definitely coloured the material which we have received.

It can be questioned as to whether or not this was a conscious process by the historians. Rosenthal would seem to indicate that it was.

The historian did not keep his personal convictions out of his work. His main weapon was his freedom to omit material from his sources or to add material from

(5) II, 229n; al-Suhaylī, op.cit., ii, 247.

(6) II, 749, # 538 from Ibn Hishām.

(7) A.J. Wensinck, Mohammad en de Joden te Medina, (Leiden, 1928), 85, 93.

(8) William Montgomery Watt, 'The Condemnation of the Jews of Banū Qurayza', Muslim World, xliv (1952), 164.

other sources which must not always have been historical in the proper sense, and this was expected of him.⁽⁹⁾

Yet it must not be forgotten that in the earliest stages this record was kept and transmitted in an oral form.

Although the writing of notes and the actual creation of books certainly began at an earlier period than the Arabs, out of a reverence for the traditions of the past, cared to admit, there was a stage at which this information was passed from person to person as an oral tradition. During this period a great deal of the 'shaping' would have taken place.

Cultural values colour testimonies in three main ways. Through the medium of the first informant, they determine the choice of what events to record and the significance attached to them. Through the medium of certain cultural concepts, chiefly those concerning time and historical development, they distort chronology and the historical perspective. Lastly they make testimonies conform to cultural ideals, thus turning them into examples to be followed. All these are unconscious processes.⁽¹⁰⁾

(9) Rosenthal, op.cit., 64.

(10) Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology, English translation by H.M. Wright, (London, 1965), 108.

This statement, although derived from work done among people far removed from Arabia, has bearing on the question. A transmitter, even if only one or two generations removed from the events whose history he was transmitting, would unconsciously seek to make the history live up to the cultural ideals which had been instilled into him. In the case of an early Arab transmitter he would omit or change any information that would cast a disreputable aura over the period of the Prophet thereby giving the material an Islamic bias. This should include the incidents of the rivalries described above.

Despite this, the accounts of the rivalries give very little evidence of any 'shaping' whether conscious or not. In most of the traditions there seems to be no legal reason which would require their preservation nor any political prejudice. By virtue of the fact that the narrative describes incidents detrimental to the traditional view of the umma, the working of the Islamic bias is precluded. It would seem that the largest portion of the information received about the rivalries is acceptable as 'core' historical material. This is especially true in those cases where the description of the incident is supported by a Qur'ānic reference.

Why was the material preserved?

In the light of the bias discussed above, the question arises as to the reason why the material which concerns the rivalries was transmitted. It would be material of this sort which would be removed from the texts. Watt has pointed out that in those cases where the material has not been altered by

a group, it has probably been preserved because of a sense of pride in the early history of the Islamic community in Medina.⁽¹¹⁾ Yet the Islamic bias would ensure that this pride eliminated the material related to the rivalries.

As regards the rivalry between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn, there is a political reason for the preservation of a small portion of the material and hence 'shaping' of the material. The most outstanding example of this is the incident which took place at al-Ji'rāna. The protest of the Ansār, which was probably led by one clan and attended by certain of the Muhājirūn, although these facts have been played down and the incident expanded to include all of the Ansār, was sufficiently serious to force Muḥammad to become aware of it. By his glowing praise of them and his statements of loyalty, Muḥammad was able to convince the Ansār to give up their protest and to accept his presence among them in lieu of the monetary rewards of the shares in the booty. In its broadest outlines the story would seem to be true and is to be accepted as such. The fact that it can be seen to have been altered by later historians who wished to make it appear as a general protest of all the Ansār would argue that it is a fairly accurate recounting of the incident. It has been preserved in order to glorify, or at least to justify, the position claimed by the Ansār in later years.

This is evidenced by the usage to which the incident is put in at least one later work. In the book known as al-Istibṣār

(11) Materials, 29.

fī Nasab al-Sahāba min al-Ansār, attributed to Ibn Qudāma, the incident is recorded, in detail, in the opening section which is devoted to traditions which praise the position of the Ansār during the early years of the Islamic state in Medina. (12)

Despite the Islamic bias, it was the religious factor which was the most important cause for the preservation of the material. The largest portion of the information was recorded for two reasons allied with religion. Most of the material is actually a tafsīr of the relevant verses from the Qur'an. In addition a further motive for the preservation of the record of the incidents was an attempt to magnify the position of Muhammad and his Companions.

This theological development of the conception of Muhammad (the appearance of the miracle stories, etc.) may be attributed to general religious interests, ... (13)

Especially in the stories surrounding the Munāfiqūn where there is no Qur'ānic quotation, on occasion even when there is one, Muhammad is forced to produce a miracle or to act in a manner which would have been unacceptable in that society, in order to stave off the intrigues of the opposition. These stories were necessary, not only to produce in answer to the challenge presented by the newly conquered Christians, but also

(12) Ibn Qudama, al-Istibṣār fī Nasab al-Sahāba min al-Ansār.
Ed. 'Alī Yūsuf Nuwayhid, (Beirut, 1971), 25-26.

(13) Materials, 24.

to give the Muslims themselves a more acceptable picture of their Prophet. As time passed the need grew for a more than human founder of the religion as the average man could not picture Muhammad as an ordinary man such as himself.

In connection with this magnification or glorification of Muhammad it is interesting to note the work done by Lord Raglan in his study on the hero in myth. Although his basic thesis is largely open to dispute, especially in the Arab context, he develops a pattern of twenty-two points which he then applies to various mythological, biblical and traditional heroes. Although one need not claim that Muhammad was a myth created for ritual dramatic purposes, it is noteworthy how closely he fits into this pattern.⁽¹⁴⁾ Raglan himself interprets his points in a very loose manner and the characters with whom he was dealing were not as bounded by historical fact as was the person of Muhammad. Even allowing for the limits of historical fact and the bounds established by the Arab society of the time, his father was neither a king nor a god, Muhammad fits into a sizable proportion of the points. This would seem to indicate that unconsciously those persons who developed and spread the later stories about the more fabulous incidents in his life were placing him into the role of a mythological hero, a personage quite commonly seen in the traditional literature of the Middle East. The stimulus toward the development of these stories was the Islamic bias of the historians.

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(14) Lord Raglan (Somerset), The Hero: A Study in Tradition Myth and Drama, (London, 1936), 179-180.

As has been seen in the preceding chapters, a great deal of the information in the texts about the outbreaks of hostility between the rival groups is related to verses in the Qur'ān and forms a part of the commentary on these verses. These traditions act as tafsīr of the "occasions of revelation" variety. Yet in many of these reports it goes far beyond the simple description of the reason for the sending of a particular verse to Muhammad. In these cases, the problems on the raid against the B. al-Mustaliq would seem to be an example, the information is so detailed that it would be more accurately described as anecdotal in its nature. As Watt pointed out, in material of this type it is necessary to examine the anecdotes for any evidence of 'tendential shaping' by a later group or party who were using the report of the incident for their private purposes. Very often however, there is no reason to suspect that there has been any 'shaping' of the narrative as there seems to be no later use to which the tradition could have been put.

That much of the information was preserved in order to explain a verse is easily seen in the preceding chapters where the close relationship between the descent of the Qur'ānic verses and the recording of the incidents is indicated. On one occasion an historian tells us that this is exactly what he is doing. Al-Balādhurī, in describing the incident of the 'mosque of dissension', transmits a tradition from 'Urwa b. al-Zubayr and states quite plainly that this tradition was transmitted in explanation of a verse. (15)

(15) Bal, F, 16; Bal, F, 2 (Arabic text).

This is very much in accord with Rosenthal's view on the development of Arab historiography. He shows quite clearly that history, from a very early date, was considered as a distinct part of the scholarly apparatus of the Muslim religious teachers and students. To those primarily concerned with the religious side of scholarship it was decidedly in a second class to those subjects more closely connected to the faith itself. (16)

In the works of Ibn Ishāq and al-Wāqidī the very treatment of the material indicates a great concern with the exegesis of the Qur'ān in its historical context. After each of the major battles and incidents of the life of the Prophet there are large sections, which may even be called chapters, devoted to the verses which were sent down in connection with the event. These are the most obviously tafsīr-like portions of the works and yet material of this type can be found throughout the texts.

There are also portions of almost purely anecdotal material which are concerned with the rivalries in the texts. The most obvious example of this is the chapter which al-Wāqidī devotes to the story of Ibn Ubayy on the occasion of the incident at al-Muraysī'. This is itself followed by a chapter on the 'affair of the lie', an event to which it was connected quite closely, both in chronological terms and also, perhaps, in terms of the underlying rivalries in the umma at that time.

It must be concluded that the historical information relating

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(16) Rosenthal, op.cit., 40.

to the rivalries was preserved for only two reasons: as commentary on the 'occasions of revelation' or as a type of apologetics enhancing the position of the Prophet and attributing to him the type of role that later persons believed that he must have played, despite his own objections to such an image as voiced in the Qur'ān. The material which illuminates a specific verse may be accepted although care must be taken that it does not contradict known facts. Much of the anecdotal material must be rejected, especially that portion which is obviously fabulous. Other parts of it, for example some of the material surrounding the person of Ibn Ubayy, may be retained and it adds to our knowledge of the times.

The usage of the material

It is necessary for a better understanding of the material which records these two rivalries to examine the major accounts of them as they appear. The basis for this examination will be the breakdown of the sīra material as outlined by Watt. He has very carefully analysed the content of the material transmitted by Ibn Ishāq and has divided it into several categories: expansion of the Qur'ān (tafsīr), Arab genealogies and pre-Islamic events, maghāzī-material, poetry, documentary material, and anecdotal material.⁽¹⁷⁾ Into these categories falls all the information in the sīra literature, including that used in the study of the two rivalries under question in this work.

For the purposes of this study there are only two of the

(17) Materials, 23-31.

six types of material which are of importance. The first of these is the material which expanded upon the information received in the Qur'ān. The second is the anecdotal material which is described as all the information which does not fall into the other categories. By far the largest proportion of the information which is relevant to this study falls into these categories. Some small amount of it may be included under the heading of the maghāzī-material, the hard information that was accepted by the Muslim scholars as indisputable fact: the date, objectives, leader, numbers, etc., of the varying raids which were led by or commissioned by the Prophet.

For the purposes of this analysis three of the raids have been selected as being representative: Uhud, the incident on the raid at al-Muraysī', and the raid on Tabūk. Within each of these raids there occurred incidents which are important for this study and also are chronologically varied: early (Uhud), middle (Muraysī'), and late (Tabūk). The material which is to be examined largely concerns the rivalry between the Munāfiqūn and the Muslims although the incident at al-Muraysī' is also closely involved with the problems between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn. The following analysis will examine the use of this material in the Sīra of Ibn Ishāq, the Kitāb al-Maghāzī of al-Wāqidī, and the Tārīkh of al-Tabarī. These books are the major sources for the information on these rivalries.

The description of the actions of Ibn Ubayy and his followers before the battle of Uhud is the same in all three of the texts. The basic story of his agreement with Muhammad about the defence of the city and his later withdrawal is common to

them all and with the lack of Qur'ānic references must be considered as anecdotal material. This category would seem to be the one that fits the vast majority of the material surrounding this raid.

There are several small incidents where persons are referred to as Munāfiqūn: Mirba' b. Qayzī who threw dust at the Prophet, Hātib b. Umayya b. Rāfi', whose nifāq-nature appeared when he was told of the death of his son, and al-Hārith b. Suwayd b. al-Sāmit, who killed a man as an act of revenge. Even Quzmān, whose suicide is used to illustrate the Islamic prohibition of the act, is in one account called a Munāfiq.⁽¹⁸⁾ These are much more easily categorized as anecdotal and in relation to them the major story of the withdrawal of Ibn Ubayy would seem to be of the tafsīr category except for the lack of verses. It has been included as an attempt to explain the defeat and hence is acting in conjunction with the Qur'ānic verses on the battle. The largest number of the verses which were sent down about this battle are an attempt to explain the defeat in terms which would have been acceptable to the Muslims, and hence are supporting the position of Muhammad.

It is worth noting that the reports of the battle in Ibn Ishāq and in al-Wāqidī conform to the pattern outlined by Watt⁽¹⁹⁾ with a separate section devoted to the verses which were sent down. This is not the case with al-Tabarī who includes the Qur'ānic verses into the body of his account.

(18) Wāq, i, 223-234.

(19) Materials, 32.

The version of the battle given by al-Wāqidī is, as stated above, basically the same as that in the other sources. He does, however, add to the fundamental story details which are not found in the other versions. These details, such as Ibn Ubayy and his followers rejoicing at the news of the Muslim defeat⁽²⁰⁾ and Ibn Ubayy upbraiding his son for having gone against his advice and following Muhammad⁽²¹⁾ are anecdotal in their nature.

The incident on the raid against the B. al-Mustaliq at al-Muraysī' involved an outbreak of violence between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn which was used by Ibn Ubayy as a goad in an attempt to provoke a civil war. This incident is, as described in the preceding chapter, confirmed by a Qur'ānic verse which quotes the words used by Ibn Ubayy at this time.⁽²²⁾

By virtue of the fact that there is a relevant verse it may be accepted that the incident is recorded as tafsīr material of the type described as 'occasion of revelation'. This would seem to be a logical assumption and yet Ibn Ishāq in describing the incident does not quote the verse but only says:

The sūra came down in which God mentioned the disaffected with Ibn Ubayy and those like-minded with him. When it came down the apostle took hold of Zayd b. Arqam's ear, saying, 'This is he who devoted his

(20) Wāq, i, 317.

(21) ibid., i, 317.

(22) Qur'an, 63/8.

ear to Allah.'⁽²³⁾

Although this is certainly a reference to the Qur'ān, it is vague and does not specify the verse to which mention is being made.

Al-Tabarī in an account drawn almost word for word from Ibn Ishāq adds to it a specific reference to the first verse of the sūrat al-Munāfiqūn which is the first of the ones traditionally ascribed to this incident.⁽²⁴⁾ He has taken the account of Ibn Ishāq and added the verse in order to make it more definitely an explanation of the reason for the descent of this verse.

Al-Wāqidī accords an honour to this incident by making it the subject of a separate section. He describes the raid against the B. al-Mustaliq mentioning only that more Munāfiqūn than ever before accompanied Muhammad hoping to partake in the booty.⁽²⁵⁾ He then begins another section entitled "Mention of what there was in the affair of Ibn Ubayy".⁽²⁶⁾ In this separate chapter is the most detailed account of the incident and the part played by Ibn Ubayy. The section claims to deal with Ibn Ubayy and is largely concerned with the incident on this raid, although the story of the lost camel on the Tabūk raid is also recounted here and would seem to be misplaced. In narrating this incident al-Wāqidī adds details and dialogue to the story making it much more dramatic and interesting to the

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(23) II, 491-492.

(24) Tab, ii, 607.

(25) Wāq, i, 405.

(26) ibid., ii, 415.

reader, although not necessarily more accurate historically. He uses the Qur'ānic references by inserting them as they appear in the story and they are identified by the usual method of quoting the opening words of the verse. In toto the section must seem to be tafsīr-material; however, the largest proportion of it is more closely akin to the anecdotal material, if only because of the style in which it is written.

The raid on Tabūk combines material that is definitely of the tafsīr type, and confirmed by verses in the Qur'ān, with information that is purely anecdotal in nature and in some cases certainly fabulous. Such stories as the request of al-Jadd b. Qays to be permitted to remain at home⁽²⁷⁾, and the Munāfiqūn trying to keep the people from going⁽²⁸⁾ have been confirmed by the Qur'ān and hence are to be accepted, although such details as the names of the persons who were involved may be later additions. Other stories such as the mocking of 'Alī by the Munāfiqūn until he left Medina to join Muhammad, the two men who disobeyed the orders of the Prophet about leaving the camp, the story of the lost camel whose location was finally revealed to Muhammad, and the Munāfiqūn who drank water despite the prohibition, are all later additions to the story serving the purposes of later persons. The story of 'Alī is certainly an invention by the partisans of the Shī'a as an occasion to have the Prophet praise 'Alī in a manner acceptable to, and necessary for, the later claim to the Caliphate. The other

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(27) Qur'ān, 9/49.

(28) Qur'ān, 9/81-82.

stories mentioned above are of the type invented in order to foster upon the life of Muhammad those miraculous events which were later deemed necessary for the life of a prophet. That these stories were felt necessary after the later contact with the more developed religions of the area is possible, and they were designed to meet the needs of the average person who would expect such supra-human abilities in a man who received revelations from God.

There is also some information which may be taken as being characteristic of the maghāzī-material variety. This includes information such as the reports that certain of the Munāfiqūn came to Muhammad offering excuses to him for not having accompanied the party and these excuses were accepted although the men were not forgiven. Of this same genre of material is the fact that there were more than eighty men who remained behind from this raid. This information would seem to serve no other purpose than to clarify the record in conjunction with the tafsīr material and is to be accepted as probably true.

All three of the texts under consideration use the relevant Qur'ānic verses as they are required in telling the story of the raid. Al-Tabarī goes no further than that; however, Ibn Ishāq and al-Wāqidī continue and present sections devoted to the verses which were sent down on the occasion of this raid. Al-Wāqidī is by far the most complete as he works his way verse by verse through all the revelations which were connected to this raid. This is a tafsīr of the simplest variety. It is divided into two sections both entitled "Mention of what portions of the Qur'ān were sent down on the Tabūk raid" and they are

set on either side of the description of the raid to Dūmat al-Jandal. These sections are tafsīr of the 'occasions of revelation' variety only if they are read in conjunction with the preceding account of the raid itself. For the most part the author is content to explain the difficult meanings and the obscure references rather than go into the reasons behind the verses, possibly feeling that this had already been adequately dealt with.

Ibn Ishāq also makes use of the verses throughout his account of the raid inserting them at the appropriate place. Then, although he does not have a section specifically devoted to the verses deriving from the Tabūk raid, they are included in the sections which give the details surrounding the three good Muslims who stayed back from the raid, and the section which describes the pilgrimage led by Abū Bakr. The latter of the two sections contains the largest proportion of the verses devoted to the actions of the Munāfiqūn on the Tabūk raid and despite the fact that it is entitled "Abū Bakr Leads the Pilgrimage, 9AH" it may be considered, at least in part, as the section which acts as the tafsīr on the verses dealing with the Munāfiqūn at the time of Tabūk. It seems to act as a catch-all as it also includes the references to the death of Ibn Ubayy and the Munāfiqūn among the Arabs in the territory surrounding Medina.

Al-Tabarī uses the Qur'ānic verses as he did in the other raids under discussion; they are an integral part of the story and appear as such in the appropriate place. This would seem to be the standard procedure of al-Tabarī. Even during his

account of the battle of Badr, he uses the verses from the Qur'ān as a portion of the account rather than as an end in themselves.

The material that relates to the rivalries, as it appears in the texts under consideration, is largely of a tafsīr nature. Yet much of it is in the style associated with the anecdotal materials. It is in the form of stories, many of which do not have a Qur'ānic verse specifically associated with them although they further illuminate the verse in question. The anecdotal material is largely of the variety designed to enhance the position of the Prophet; much of it describes miracles, and for the most part this type is to be rejected. It is into this category that the story of the withdrawal of Ibn Ubayy and his followers from Uhud should fall.

There is a definite progression in the handling of the Qur'ānic material and the explanatory stories to be seen in these three texts. Ibn Ishāq (d.151AH/768AD) is the oldest source that has been transmitted to us in almost its complete form. His use of the tafsīr material is rather sketchy, varying from the chapters devoted to the relevant verses, as after the account of the battle of Uhud, to the account of the incident at al-Muraysī', in which he only refers to the fact that a sūra was sent down. This usage of the material seems to indicate a confidence that the reader would know the relevant verses and would understand that the incident being described was the occasion for the sending down of a specific verse. Al-Wāqidī (d. 207AH/823AD) is more conscientious in his elaboration of the verses. He makes reference to the verses

in the text of the account but also follows this up with a section devoted to an explanation designed to clarify the references in the verses. This detailed form of tafsīr, although of a simplistic nature, is evident in the sections following the raid on Tabūk. The large section after the description of the raid on the B. Mustaliq, which is devoted to the activities of Ibn Ubayy, may be seen as an expanded form of the tafsīr clarifying the cause for the descent of the verses. Al-Wāqidī seems to be writing for a more general audience than was Ibn Ishāq. Much more is explained and far less is assumed as to the knowledge of the reader. The increase in detail between the two works indicates the ongoing development of these stories. As the period of time between the present and the lifetime of the Prophet grew so did the legendary material which surrounded him and his Companions. Nevertheless the accounts of the rivalries were preserved in order to explain the Qur'ān and not because of a desire to retain historical fact for its own sake.

It is this final stage which seems to appear in the work of al-Tabarī. His material for the two rivalries is largely drawn from Ibn Ishāq, yet on at least one occasion, as mentioned above, he inserted into an account a reference to a verse which clarifies the statement of Ibn Ishāq. He makes no concession to the study of the material for the sake of the tafsīr. As his own life and work prove, by his time the study of tafsīr had become an academic discipline that could be divorced from the study of history, although it had formed the basis for this work. He deals with the same information as did the previous

scholars but he quotes the Qur'ānic verses as a part of the story, not as the reason for it.

The Omission of Incidents

Since we have a relatively large body of information on these two rivalries, why does so little remain which concerns the other rivalries or areas of political disunity in the umma? That there were other problems is in no doubt.

The most obviously dangerous of these other areas of dispute was the long-standing feud between the Aws and the Khazraj. Their 'days' in the pre-Islamic period have all been well documented, although much of this information is linked to poetry about the credibility of which there is much doubt. Under the unitarian ideal being propagated by Muhammad as a basic tenet of Islam this feuding was to have come to an end in the brotherhood of all the Muslims. Yet, despite a scarcity of information, it is obvious that it did not.

The first teacher whom Muhammad sent to Medina was forced to lead the prayers himself as neither party could "bear to see one of their rivals take the lead".⁽²⁹⁾ How close these feelings were to the surface can be seen in the incident provoked by Shās b. Qays. Out of a fear that the two parties were going to unite in an attack on the Jews he attempted to provoke a renewal of the fighting between them. This was accomplished by the simple expedient of having some of the old poetry of the pre-Islamic 'days' recited before a mixed group.

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(29) II, 199.

Although he was almost successful, Muhammad was able to deal with the outbreak before it became serious. (30)

Islam was even able to make use of this rivalry. This is evident in the assassinations which took place with the blessing of the Prophet, if not at his outright instigation. The Aws had killed Ka'b b. al-Ashraf some time before the battle of Uhud and the Khazraj asked permission of Muhammad for them to kill Abū Rāfi' Sallām b. Abī al-Huqayq out of a fear that the Aws would gain precedence over them in the favour of Muhammad. (31) Throughout the lifetime of Muhammad the Aws and the Khazraj continued to fight under separate banners, separate leaders and on occasion with distinctive battle-cries. At some later period after the death of Muhammad the distinction between these two tribes broke down and they came to be known, and to refer to themselves, as the Ansār. Despite the inferences from the texts it is unlikely that the title of Ansār was in common usage during the early period.

Another rivalry, although one about which almost nothing is known at this time, is that between the two clans, Hāshim and Umayya, of the Quraysh. That such a rivalry did exist can only be deduced from indirect evidence. In the years following the death of Muhammad a rivalry along lines such as these developed and culminated in the civil war between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyā. That there was such rivalry in the pre-Islamic period would seem to be indicated, or at least hinted at, in

(30) II, 261-262; Uṣd, i, 175-176.

(31) II, 482; Tab, ii, 495; Kāmil, ii, 146.

the varying accounts of the political and religious positions held by the clans in Mecca. That this rivalry should have died out during the lifetime of the Prophet is very unlikely. It would be more probable that it continued throughout this period, although any of the traditions which would seem to indicate this are tainted by a political bias, usually in favour of the 'Abbāsids and hence anti-Umayyad.

Another group which would have been a source of disunity in the state is the harem of the Prophet. There is a great deal of information about the jealousies and intrigues, usually centred around 'Ā'isha, which were largely concerned with the gaining or maintaining of precedence as the favourite wife of Muhammad. Yet of far more interest is the possibility that the wives had a direct political influence on the Prophet and would actively support a party or group against its opponents.

Nabia Abbott claims that the political parties of the early Islamic state can be seen at work in the harem.⁽³²⁾ Although this may be an overextrapolation of the available material, the role of women in the conduct of affairs at this time must not be disregarded. As Lichtenstädter pointed out, in the pre-Islamic tribe the advice of women was accepted because so vague was the system of government that the leader would accept good advice from any source.⁽³³⁾ 'Ā'isha herself

(32) Nabia Abbott, The Beloved of Mohammed, (Chicago, 1942), 15.

(33) Ilse Lichtenstädter, Women in the Aiyām al-'Arab,

Royal Asiatic Society Prize Publication Fund vol.xiv,
(London, 1935), 83-85.

was able to give a judgement which influenced a legal matter when she reminded Abū Bakr that the Prophet had forbidden the bequeathing of any property that was sadaqa. The Caliph then dismissed the claim of the other wives to a portion of the properties of Muhammad.⁽³⁴⁾ Even the evidence of the later eras of the Islamic empire show that the harem often had a direct and lasting effect on the conduct of state, especially in the influencing of the ruler toward or against a group or party.

The very fact that six of the Prophet's wives, including his most beloved ones, came from Quraysh must have predisposed him to look with favour on the claims of the Quraysh, even if he were able to forget the fact that he himself was of this tribe. It is possible, without holding the cynical views of Lammens toward 'Ā'isha, to believe that there must have been some interest in politics and hence occasions threatening the unity of the umma.

Yet the question remains as to why so little remains of any occasions when these possibly divisive factors played a part in the affairs of the state. Any incidents, and logic declares that there must have been some, have been carefully edited from the texts as we have received them. With no verses of the Qur'ān to explain and no glory to be spread over anyone, these incidents were allowed to fade away as unnecessary to the history of the period.

This conclusion also relates to the two rivalries under

(34) Bal, F, 51.

study. As has been seen, each outbreak of the rivalries has Qur'ānic verses to be explained. The only exception to this is the battle of Uhud which must be taken as a special case. A few of the outbreaks were preserved by virtue of the desire to glorify the position of Muhammad or the reports were created for that purpose.

An examination of the dating of the varying outbreaks of the rivalries shows that they occurred at times when the fortunes of the Muslims were at a low ebb. The problems at Uhud were a year after the great victory at Badr and the intervening period was not notable for its dramatic successes. After the siege of al-Khandaq, when it was finally demonstrated that the Quraysh were unable to defeat their rivals, the incidents cease to occur with the exception of those surrounding the raid on Tabūk. This expedition took place less than a year after the conquest of Mecca, the battle of Hunayn, and the resulting distribution of booty which so displeased the Anṣār.

It is at times like these that Muhammad would need to make use of the most powerful weapon in his armoury to quell the dissatisfaction among his people, the revelation of verses from the Qur'ān. Even toward the end of his life, Muhammad did not possess that ultimate power that would have allowed him to act as an arbitrary ruler. His strength stemmed from his position as the Messenger of God. It is only logical to assume that there were other occasions when incidents occurred. These would have been dealt with in the customary fashion of the age, through a semi-organized council dominated by Muhammad. If the fortunes of his people were at a peak he

would have been able to call upon the support of several elements among his followers and the strife would have been ended without the need of a revelation. These incidents would have been unconsciously edited out by the transmitters of the history of the period as being of no importance to an understanding of the Qur'ān and beneath the dignity of Muhammad under whose leadership internal friction was unthinkable.

SUMMATION AND CONCLUSION

This study is an attempt to clarify certain aspects of the beginning of the Islamic umma in Medina during the lifetime of the Prophet. The political influence of the two rivalries, which are examined in this work, has in the past been ignored and this factionalism has usually been examined only in its religious aspects. All too often the traditional Muslim views of the Ansār and the Munāfiqūn have been accepted as valid even by modern scholars. The Ansār are only seen in their supporting role in the conflict with the Quraysh and the activities of the Munāfiqūn are limited to the influence which they had upon the religious development of Islam.

When discussing the conflict between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn it must be remembered that Muhammad was not welcomed to Medina by all of the citizens. The stories of his reception were intended to glorify the position of the Ansār and were, for the most part, created at a later date. Muhammad was not immediately accepted as the leader of Medina but was, at best, tolerated by a large proportion of the populace. As it became more obvious that Muhammad was going to be the victor in his struggle against the Quraysh and as the major Jewish tribes were removed from the community, conversion became complete. However, the opposition of the Madinese to the Muhājirūn did not cease and the election of Abū Bakr saw a final attempt to regain control of the community.

Throughout the period in which Muhammad lived in Medina there were incidents which demonstrated the continuance of

of this rivalry. The first indication of a fear of a lack of loyalty among the Companions was the oath of loyalty received by Muḥammad before the battle of Badr, which ensured that he would be supported when they faced the Quraysh. The incident of the division of the booty taken from the B. al-Nadīr lacks any reference to a protest from the Anṣār when they did not receive a share of the booty. This is especially remarkable when it may be seen that the Muḥājirūn were not as devoid of fiscal support as the sources would indicate. This lack of a protest is noticeable when it is compared to the later incident at al-Ji'rāna where a very strong protest was registered forcing Muḥammad to take some action. It is likely that there would have been some protest on the earlier occasion but the lack of any Qur'ānic references has allowed it to be forgotten and the generosity of those members of the Anṣār who agreed to the division of the booty has been remembered because of the verses which commemorate the act.

Ibn Ubayy's attempt to expel the Muḥājirūn after an incident on the raid against the B. al-Mustaliq was the most serious outbreak of this rivalry and the large amount of sympathy and support which Ibn Ubayy received demonstrated how widespread were the feelings which he expressed. Muḥammad was able to forestall the affair by the use of a forced march which exhausted the men but the Qur'ānic references leave no doubt as to its seriousness. Later writers seem to have made a half-hearted effort to alter the story of the incident in an attempt to avoid casting aspersions on Companions of the Prophet.

Following the failure of this, the major bid to expel them,

the Muhājirūn were able to maintain their position of pre-eminence in the community and the following years saw incidents of the rivalry which were of a diminished nature. These took the form of the day-to-day bickering which might be expected from two mutually antagonistic parties living in such close proximity. As mentioned above, at the time when Muhammad was dividing the booty taken from the Hawāzin at al-Ji'rāna the Ansār complained at their exclusion from the spoils. On this occasion the protest is recorded and preserved because later generations of the Ansār were able to make use of the speech of Muhammad to support their claim for a more honoured place in the hierarchy of the Islamic state. Yet the very fact that they had to protest shows that by this time the Ansār were being shunted aside and their place taken by the new converts from Quraysh.

The study of this rivalry is made more difficult by the lack of material which has been preserved about it. Later generations allowed the material to disappear because of their attitude toward the founders of Islam. Only that information which was necessary for an understanding of the Qur'ān or might be used to support the position of the Ansār has been retained.

A basic problem in the study of the Munāfiqūn is the meaning of the word itself. In its religious sense, as seen in the Qur'ān, it could be translated as 'hypocrite' but this is not an accurate representation of the word as it is used in the historical texts. In the accounts of the incidents in which they were involved the Munāfiqūn are seen as disobedient

of the orders and desires of the Prophet but they were still considered as Muslims. The word is also used as a term of abuse hurled at any person who seems to be running counter to Muhammad. Due to these usages it is obvious that 'hypocrite' is not an accurate translation, but there seems to be no single word in English which conveys the full concept implied in the word.

There is more information about this rivalry than there is concerning that between the Ansār and the Muhājirūn. This is certainly due to the fact that there are more references from the Qur'ān to this rivalry and there was less fear of showing the Companions in a bad light. The Munāfiqūn were cast in the role of the villains of the umma and therefore many stories concerning them were invented by later historians. These make up the many small references found throughout the life of Muhammad but they are not supported by the Qur'ān and therefore are not acceptable. The Qur'ān must be accepted as the authoritative text and all incidents are to be judged against it.

The expulsion of the B. Qaynuqā' was the first major incident in which Ibn Ubayy and his followers were involved. They offered to support the Jews but failed to do so when they were asked to fulfil their promise.

The battle of Uhud is of major importance for the study of the actions of the Munāfiqūn because it shows how a story would be altered to suit political purposes. The Qur'ānic references, and the lack thereof, indicate the truth of the matter. Ibn Ubayy and his followers did not retire from the

Muslim army but, rather, were never a part of it. They remained in Medina and this fact probably kept the Quraysh from following up their victory with an attack on the city itself. The story was later altered in an attempt to shift the blame from Muhammad to Ibn Ubayy.

As with the study of the Anṣār, the raid on the B. al-Mustaliq is of importance to the study of the Munāfiqūn. This attempt, led by Ibn Ubayy, indicates how large was their support at that time, but it must be pointed out that the majority of the people willing to consider the ideas put forward by Ibn Ubayy were not 'hard-core' members but Muslims and citizens of Medina who were disgruntled with the growing power and influence of the Muhājirūn.

The 'affair of the lie' which broke out on the return journey to Medina was the occasion for a personal attack on Muhammad through his family. Ibn Ubayy is noted as the major perpetrator of the scandal but of more importance is the manner in which he was protected from the punishment which the others received. This protection was not due to the strength of his supporters but rather the fear that it would cause an outbreak of the pre-Islamic feuding between the Aws and the Khazraj. It is likely that this was the way in which he escaped punishment throughout his career as the leader of the opposition.

The events which occurred on this expedition mark the end of the major opposition to the newcomers. From this time on they are of a much more minor nature, such as those which occurred during the siege of Medina. Even the events on the raid to Tabūk which are related to the Munāfiqūn and the

'mosque of opposition' which occurred at about the same time are the work of individuals or small groups who were disgruntled with the course of events rather than the original core of Ibn Ubayy's supporters, although some of those are still listed as being involved in these activities.

The relationship between the Munāfiqūn and the Jews was close, almost amounting to an alliance on occasion, and because of this the references in the Qur'ān and the historical texts are confused and intermingled. Medina may have been split into a pro-Jewish and a pro-Arab faction with Muḥammad finally, after toying with the former, coming down on the side of the latter. As the major Jewish tribes were eliminated as a power bloc the Munāfiqūn lost their power and influence.

Ibn Ubayy himself has been ignored or vilified by the historians yet he could not have been as bad as he has been portrayed. The position of pre-eminence which he attained during the Jāhiliya rules against that. During the period in which he led the Muslim opposition his support was, for the most part, drawn from the B. al-Aws although he himself was of the Khazraj. This was because the Aws, as the victors at the battle of Bu'āth, had the most to lose if they were replaced as the leading party in Medina by Muḥammad and the Muhājirūn. He made an early conversion to Islam, probably following the example of his people, and finally this conversion must have taken effect as Muḥammad prayed for him upon his death. He was probably a better Muslim than the sources have indicated and he may have been present at Badr, a fact which later historians equated with sincerity in the faith and thus

his participation would have been removed. His actions as leader of the opposition were probably instigated more by a fear that his people were being supplanted than by personal ambition.

The failure of the Munāfiqūn was the failure to realize that society itself was in a process of change and they would have to change with it. They were able to offer to the people no alternative ideology which would satisfy the requirements of the time. There was also a lack of a continued, unified body of support. By the terms of the society of the period the number of their followers was determined by the feelings and attitudes of the individual citizens of the community rather than by following their leaders blindly.

Despite the implications in the texts the major cause of the two rivalries was the fear of the growing power and influence of the Qurashī emigrants. In order to control the rivalries Muhammad was forced to use all of the powers at his disposal. Some of these powers were the traditional usages of a tribal chieftain and others were of an innovative nature stemming from his unique role as the Prophet of God. The need for unity in the umma required that Muhammad expend a great deal of energy in its pursuit and it did not come as easily as the texts would indicate. Not all of the methods employed were successful but he laid the basis of the unity which permitted the later expansion of the state and became a basic tenet of the faith.

In the historical material which records the events of the two rivalries there is a basic core of fact although this

has often been overlaid by the biases of the later historians. The major bias which is operating in this material is a religious one. This caused an unconscious editing of material which was considered unacceptable to the traditional view of the period in question. This is especially true in the case of the Munāfiqūn where the information was only preserved as an explanation of the descent of verses from the Qur'ān or to glorify the role of the Prophet. Some of the material relating to the rivalry between the Anṣār and the Muhājirūn was preserved because it supported the claims of the Anṣār to a preferred place in the state. Other areas of disunity were allowed to fall from memory because the material recording them was not needed for either of these purposes and they detracted from the accepted concept of the state of the umma in Medina.

A study of the material relating to these rivalries adds to an understanding of the development of the earliest historical writing in Islam as it related to the biography of Muhammad. There is an apparent development of the Qur'ānic material as it was used in relation to these rivalries and hence in the development of the writing itself. Ibn Ishāq, the earliest, varies in his usage of the material sometimes giving complete details of the descent of the relevant verses and on other occasions only mentioning that a chapter was sent down. Al-Wāqidī uses the verses in the account of the incident and then devotes a chapter to explaining the verses. He seems to be writing in order to provide an explanation for the Qur'ān rather than for the sake of the preservation of the

history. It is this second attitude which can be seen in the writings of al-Tabarī. He only makes use of the verses as a part of the account of the incident. By his time the study of tafsīr was a separate, although related, discipline.

There is also an obvious development of the fabulous stories which are connected to the life of Muhammad. This is seen most clearly in the works of Ibn Ishāq and al-Wāqidī as the latter's version always seems to have extra details and added dialogue in comparison to the earlier account.

A study of the types of material and their usage makes it obvious that there were other incidents which have not been preserved. As they were not necessary to explain the Qur'ān and added no glory to the person of Muhammad they were dropped as irrelevant. The later historians unconsciously created the vision of the umma as they believed it to be.

APPENDIX A

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OUTBREAKS OF THE
RIVALRIES AND THE FORTUNES OF MUHAMMAD

The following table demonstrates how closely related were the outbreaks of the rivalries to the success or failure of the campaign being waged by Muhammad. The basic facts of the table have been lifted in toto from Excursus B in Prof. W.M. Watt's Muhammad at Medina. To this material, all of which is to be found in columns A, B, C, and D, have been added references to the major outbreaks of the two rivalries.

The battle of Badr was the first victory and the problems which surrounded it were due to the lack of previous success. At the time of Uhud over a year had passed since the initial victory and the year was not notable for its successes. The most serious of all the incidents was that on the expedition to al-Muraysī' and was, again, after a long period without any major triumphs. The expedition to Tabūk was plagued with the activities of the Munāfiqūn and was followed by the affair of the Mosque of Opposition. This was the only major outbreak after the siege of Medina which assured the final supremacy of the Muslims. The problems on the Tabūk raid were probably due to the dissatisfaction felt by the Madinese after the conquest of Mecca when the financial rewards of the campaigning almost ceased.

		<u>Destination.</u>	
<u>AH</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Name or Opponents</u>	<u>Incident</u>
<u>1</u>	<u>622</u>		
1/1	16/7	Beginning of the era of the Hijra	
12/3	24/9	Hijra, arrival in Qubā'	
	<u>623</u>		
9	3	Sif al-Bahr	
10	4	Rābigh	
11	5	al-Kharrār	
<u>2</u>			
2	8	al-Abwā'	
3	9	Buwāt	
3	9	Safwān	
6	12	al-'Ushayra	
	<u>624</u>		
7	1	Nakhla	
9	3	Badr	Oath before battle Ansār rejected from duels Munāfiqūn try to spread bad news
9	3	Killing of 'Asmā'	
10	4	Killing of Abū 'Āfak	
10	4	Qaynuqā'	Munāfiqūn appear urging Jews to resist Ibn Ubayy pleads for the Jews
11-12	5-6	Sawīq	
<u>3</u>			
1	7	al-Kudr	
3	8-9	Killing of Ka'b b. al-Ashraf	Killed by group of men from Aws
3	9	Dhū Amarr	

<u>AH</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Destination.</u> <u>Name or</u> <u>Opponents</u>	<u>Incident</u>
5	10-11	Buhrān	
6	11	al-Qarada	
	<u>625</u>		
10	3	Uhud	Munāfiqūn remain in Medina
10	3	Hamrā' al-Asad	
<u>4</u>			
1	6	Qatan	
1	? 6	Killing of Sufyān al-Lihyānī	
2	7	Bi'r Ma'ūna	
2	7	al-Rajī'	
3	8	Nadīr	Munāfiqūn offer support but fail to supply it Ansār do not receive a share of the booty
	<u>626</u>		
11	4	Badr al-Maw'īd	Munāfiqūn and Jews resist gathering of the army
12	5	Killing of Abū Rāfi'	Killed by group of men from Khazraj
<u>5</u>			
1	6	Dhat al-Riqā'	
3-4	8-9	Dūmat al-Jandal	
	<u>627</u>		
8	1	al-Muraysī'	Ibn Ubayy attempts to incite expulsion of Muhājirūn The affair of the lie
11	4	al-Khandaq	Munāfiqūn attempt to delay work on the trench and to discourage the Muslims
11-12	5	Qurayza	

<u>AH</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Destination, Name or Opponents</u>	<u>Incident</u>
<u>6</u>			
1	6	al-Qurtā	
3	7	Liḥyān	
4	8	al-Ghāba	
4	8-9	al-Ghamr	
4	8-9	Dhū al-Qassa	
4	8-9	Dhū al-Qassa	
?4	9	al-Jamūm	
5	9-10	al-'Īs	
6	10-11	al-Taraf	
6	10-11	Hismā	
7	11-12	Wādī al-Qurā	
8	12-1	Dūmat al-Jandal	
8	12-1	Fadak	
	<u>628</u>		
9	1-2	Killing of Umm Qirfa	
10	2-3	Khaybar	
10	2-3	al-Harra	
?	?	Madyan	
11	3	al-Hudaybiya	Ibn Ubayy refuses offer to visit Ka'ba Ibn Ubayy is quoted about the rain
<u>7</u>			
?1	5-6	Khaybar	
1	5-6	Najd	
8	12	Turba	

<u>AH</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Destination, Name or Opponents</u>	<u>Incident</u>
8	12	Najd	
8	12	Fadak	
8	12	Fadak	
	<u>629</u>		
9	1	Mayfa'a	
10	2	Jināb, Yumn	
11	3	Mecca (Pilgrimage)	
12	4	Sulaym	
<u>8</u>			
2	6	al-Kadīd	
3	7	Dhāt Atlāh	
3	7	Sīy	
5	9	Mu'ta	
6	10	Dhāt al-Salāsil	
7	10	Sīf al-Bahr	
8	12	Khaḍira	
9	12	Batn Idam	
	<u>630</u>		
9	1	Mecca (Conquest)	
9	1	Yalamlam	
9	1	'Urana	
9	1	Jadhīma	
9	1	Various expeditions from Mecca	
10	1	Hunayn	
10-11	2	al-Tā'if	
11	2-3	al-Ji'rāna	Ansār protest at division of booty

<u>AH</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Destination, Name or Opponents</u>	<u>Incident</u>
<u>9</u>			
1	4-5	al-'Arj	
2	5-6	Mashab	
3	6-7	Zujj	
4	7-8	Shu'ayba	
4	7-8	al-Fuls	
?	?	al-Hubāb	
7-9	10-12	Tabūk	Many references to activities of the Munāfiqūn Affair of Mosque of Opposition upon return from this expedition Fatal illness of Ibn Ubayy at this time
7	10	Dūmat al-Jandal	
	<u>631</u>		
12	3-4	Pilgrimage of Abū Bakr	
<u>10</u>			
3	6-7	al-Yaman	
9	12	al-Yaman	
	<u>632</u>		
12	3	Farewell Pilgrimage	
<u>11</u>			
4	6-7	Mu'ta	
3	6	Death of the Prophet	

APPENDIX B

A LISTING OF THE MUNĀFIQŪN

The following list of the Munāfiqūn is very much of a preliminary study. Only a limited number of sources have been consulted and a great deal more work will have to be done before any definite conclusions may be reached. Nevertheless support is given to several points which have been made in the text of this study.

The close relationship between the Munāfiqūn and the Jews is clearly seen by the number of men from the Qaynuqā' who are listed as being among the Munāfiqūn.

The problems which the later historians and transmitters had in clearly identifying the Munāfiqūn is also demonstrated. The confusion over names and tribal affiliations is due to the reluctance which the historians had toward passing on this information; in some cases it is certainly due to a copyist's error.

Also seen is the problem which the historians had in reconciling the fact that some of the Munāfiqūn had been at Badr. This came to be seen as a mark of excellence in the faith and caused great problems in relation to a man such as Mu'attib b. Qushayr. His record makes it obvious that he was one of the leaders of the Munāfiqūn, probably on a par with Ibn Ubayy, yet the fact that he was a Badrī prompted the suggestion that he was not a Munāfiq.

The proportion of men from the various tribes is also of interest. The largest number of men among the Munāfiqūn were

from the Aws, as were Abū 'Āmir al-Rāhib and his followers who fled to Mecca. This tribe had been predominant in Medina after their victory at the battle of Bu'āth and had the most to lose through the rise to power of the Muslims.

In this list text notes rather than footnotes have been used for ease of reference. In the notes abbreviations have been used. Those which are not in the table of abbreviations clearly identify works in the bibliography by reference to a distinctive word in the title of the work or the name of the author.

‘Abbād b. Hunayf b. Wāhab b. al-‘Ukaym

B. al-Aws

Among the builders of the Mosque of Opposition (II,243; Tab,iii,111; Wāq,iii,1047; Muhabbir,468) and caused Qur’ān 9/65 to be sent down. (Bal,A,i,277).

‘Abd Allah b. Nabtāl b. al-Ḥārith al-Anṣārī

B. ‘Amr b. ‘Awf of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,243).

After Badr he said that they had only gone out for the booty. (Wāq,i,121)

He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble began at al-Muraysī‘. (Wāq,ii,416)

At the time of Tabūk he was one of the leaders of the Munāfiqūn and remained in Medina. He caused the descent of Qur’ān 9/48. (Tab,iii,103)

Among the builders of the Mosque of Opposition. (Wāq,iii,1047). He used to relate the sayings of Muḥammad to the Munāfiqūn. (Bal,A,i,275-276; Muhabbir,468)

‘Abd Allah b. Sayf

He agreed with two others to pretend to believe in Muḥammad's mission at one time and to deny it at other times so as to confuse the Muslims. This caused the descent of Qur’ān 3/64 (II,260-261)

‘Abd Allah b. Ubayy b. Salūl al-‘Awfī

B. ‘Awf b. al-Khazraj of the B. al-Ḥublā of Khazraj.

The major references to his activities are in the text of the study.

Abū Ḥabība b. al-Az‘ar b. Zayd b. al-‘Atṭāf b. Dubay‘a al-Anṣārī

B. Dubay‘a b. Zayd of Aws.

He was among those involved in the building of the Mosque of Opposition. (II,243; Tab,iii,111; Wāq,iii 1047; Bal,A,i,276; Muḥabbir,468)

He was said to have been at Uhud. (Isāba,iv,41,no.254)

Abū Ḥādir al-A‘rābī

He is listed as having been a Munāfiq and involved in the attempted assassination of Muḥammad on the Tabūk expedition. (Ma‘ārif,343)

Abū Nu‘mān al-Anṣārī

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir,470)

Abū Rāfi‘

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir,470)

‘Adīy b. Rabī‘a

Khazraj.

He was a blind man who threw excrement at the Prophet.

(Bal,A,i,274; Muḥabbir,469-470)

‘Adīy b. Zayd

He agreed with two others to pretend to believe in Muḥammad's mission at one time and to deny it at other times so as to confuse the Muslims. This caused the descent of Qur‘ān 3/64.(II,260-261) He is also said to have caused the descent of Qur‘ān 4/161.

‘Amīr b. Khālīd

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir,470)

'Amr b. Khidhām

B. Dubay'a(?) of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,243)

'Amr b. Qays

B. Ghanm b. Mālik b. al-Najjār of Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,245)

He was thrown out of the mosque on Muhammad's order by Abū Ayyūb Khālīd b. Zayd b. Kulayb for making fun of the Prophet's stories. (II,246-247)

'Aqaba b. Kadīm b. 'Adīy b. Hāritha b. 'Amr b. Zayd Manāt b. 'Adīy b. 'Amr b. Mālik b. al-Najjār al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī

Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir, 469)

He was at Uhud and those expeditions after it. Al-Wāqidī said that he was a Munāfiq during the early years and then repented. (Isāba, ii, 491, no. 5610)

Aws (b. al-Khawlī ?)

He mocked the Muslims at al-Hudaybiya. (Wāq, ii, 588-589)

Aws b. Qays

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq (Muḥabbir, 470).

Aws b. Qayzī/Qibtī b. 'Amr b. Zayd b. Jusham b. Hāritha b. al-Hārith b. Aws al-Anṣārī al-Awsī

B. Hāritha b. al-Hārith b. al-Khazraj b. 'Amr b. Mālik b. al-Aws of B. al-Nabīt of Aws

During the siege of al-Khandaq his words caused Qur'ān 33/13 to be sent down. (Muḥabbir, 469). He was involved in the dispute between the Aws and the Khazraj provoked by Shās b. Qays which caused Qur'ān 3/99 to be sent down. (II, 262; Isāba, i, 87, no. 351).

Bahzaj

B. Dubay'a (?) of Aws

He was among the builders of the Mosque of Opposition.

(II,243; Tab,iii,111)

(Possibly this man is confused with Bakhdaj due to scribal error).

Bakhdaj

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,470)

(Possibly this man is confused with Bahzaj due to scribal error.)

Bashīr b. Ziyād

Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. He was the brother of Rāfi'. (Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,277)

Bijād b. 'Uthmān b. 'Āmir

B. Dubay'a b. Zayd b. Mālīk b. 'Awf b. 'Amr b. 'Awf of Aws

He was involved with the Mosque of Opposition. (Tab, iii,111; Wāq,iii,1047).

He was listed as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,467; Bal,A,i,275).

Bishr b. Zayd

B. 'Ubayd b. Zayd b. Mālīk of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,244)

He and three others caused the sending down of Qur'ān 4/63. (II,245)

Bushayr b. Ubayriq Abū Tu'ma (Ubayriq's name was al-Hārith b. 'Amr b. Hāritha b. al-Haytham b. Zafar.)

B. Zafar of Aws

He, or his brother Bishr, caused the descent of

Qur'an 4/105-110. (Bal,A,i,277-281)

It may only have been Qur'an 4/107 which was sent down. (II,244-245; Suhaylī,ii,292-293).

al-Dahhāk b. Khalīfa b. Tha'laba b. 'Adīy b. Ka'b b. 'Abd al-Ashhal al-Ansārī al-Ashhālī

Aws

He is listed among the Munāfiqūn. (Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,281)

His first expedition with Muḥammad was either Uhud or Nadīr. (Usd,iii,46)

He was involved with the Mosque of Opposition. (II,782,no.858 from Ibn Hishām; Isāba,ii,205,no.4162)

al-Dahhak b. Thābit

B. 'Abd al-Ashhal of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,245)

Dā'is

Khazraj

Qaynuqā' (Wāq,iii,1059; Muhabbir,470)

He and others offered to support the B. al-Nadīr causing the descent of Qur'an 9/11-16. (II,246,437; Tab,ii,554)

He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble started on the expedition to al-Muraysī' (II,246)

Durrī b. al-Hārith

Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Bal,A,i,275; Muhabbir,467)

He was thrown out of the mosque by a man from B. 'Amr b. 'Awf. (Bal,A,i,283)

al-Ḥārith b. 'Amr

He is listed as a Munāfiq. He was thrown out of the mosque on Muhammad's orders. (II,247)

al-Ḥārith b. 'Awf

He agreed with two others to pretend to believe in Muhammad's mission at one time and to deny it at other times so as to confuse the Muslims. This caused the descent of Qur'ān 3/64 (II,260-261)

al-Ḥārith b. Ḥatīb

B. Umayya b. Zayd b. Mālīk of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,243)

Ibn Hishām says that he may have been at Badr and therefore not a Munāfiq. (II,731-732,no.297 from Ibn Hishām)

Ibn Ishāq lists him among those who went out to Badr. (II,331)

al-Ḥārith b. Suwayd b. al-Sāmīt

Aws

He was the brother of Julās. During the battle of Uhud he killed two men as an act of revenge and then joined the Quraysh. This caused the descent of Qur'ān 3/86.

(II,242-243; Muḥabbir,467; Suhaylī,ii,292; Bal,A,i,275; Isāba,i,280,no.1423)

al-Ḥārith b. Yazīd al-Tā'i

An ally of the B. 'Amr b. 'Awf of Aws.

On the Tabūk raid he and three others disobeyed

Muhammad forcing him to perform a miracle. (Wāq,ii,1039)

Hatib b. Umayya b. Rafi' b. Suwayd

B. Zafar of Aws

His nifaq-nature appeared when his son was wounded at Uhud. (II,244,383; Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,277; Isaba,i,564,565, no.2891)

al-Humayyir b. al-Humayyir

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,470)

He was involved in the Mosque of Opposition. (Isaba, i,357, no.1844)

Husayn b. Numayr al-Ansārī

He is listed as a Munāfiq for stealing some dates which were sadaga. (Ma'arif,343; Isaba,i,399,no.1746)

Jāriya b. 'Amir/'Amr b. al-'Attāf/Mujammi'

B. Tha'laba of Aws

He and his two or three sons were involved with the building of the Mosque of Opposition. (II,243-244; Tab,iii,111; Wāq,iii,1047; Bal,A,i,276; Muhabbir,468)

al-Jidd b. Qays b. Sakhr b. Khansā' b. Sinān b. 'Ubayd b. Ghanm b. Ka'b b. Salima al-Ansārī, Abū 'Abd Allah

B. Jusham of the clan of B. Salima of Khazraj

He was the only person who hung back from the oath of Ridwān. (II,503-504; Tab,ii,632; Wāq,ii,588-589; Isaba,i,466-467)

He requested permission to remain behind from the Tabūk expedition causing the descent of Qur'an 9/49. (II,245; Muhabbir,469; Isaba,i,466-467; Bal,A,i,274).

(al-)Julās b. Suwayd b. al-Sāmit

B. Hubayb b. 'Amr b. 'Awf of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,467; Ma'arif,343)

He and three others caused the sending down of
Qur'an 4/60. (II,245)

His actions on the expedition to Tabūk caused the
descent of Qur'an 9/74. (II,242; Wāq,iii,1003;

Isāba,i,241,no.1176) This verse may have been sent
down concerning his activities at the time of Uhud
after which he may have been executed. (Bal,A,i,275)

Khidhām b. Khālīd

B. 'Ubayd b. Zayd b. Mālīk of B. 'Amr b. 'Awf of Aws

It was from his house that the Mosque of Opposition
was made. (II,244; Tab,iii,110-111; Wāq,iii,1047;
Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,277)

Kināna b. Sūriyā/Sawīrā

Qaynuqā' ?

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq.
(II,246; Muhabbir,470)

Mālīk b. Abī Nawfal

Qaynuqā'

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn.
(Wāq,iii,1059)

Mālīk b. Abī Qawqal

Khazraj

He was involved with the unfulfilled offer of aid to
the Nadīr about which Qur'an 59/11-16 was sent
down. (II,246,437; Tab,ii,554)

He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble began
at al-Muraysī' and was involved in the descent of
Qur'an 63. (II,246; Wāq,ii,416).

Mālik b. 'Amr

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir,470)

Mālik b. al-Dukhsham

B. Sālim b. 'Awf of Khazraj ?

B. 'Awf b. 'Amr b. 'Awf of Aws ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir,480)

He was at Badr (II,312) and there is some debate as to whether or not he was a Munāfiq. (Isāba,iii,343-344, no.7624)

Mālik b. Khālīd

Khazraj ?

He is listed by al-Kalbī as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir, 470)

Mirba' b. Qayzī

B. Hāritha b. al-Hārith b. al-Khazraj b. 'Amr b. Mālik b. al-Aws of B. al-Nabī't of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir, 469)

He was a blind man who refused to allow Muḥammad to pass through his property on the way to Uhud. (II,244; Bal,A,i,276-277).

At the time of Khandaq he may have caused the descent of Qur'ān 33/13 or it may have been his brother Aws or Mu'attib b. Qushayr. (Bal,A,i,276-277). He may have repented and become a faithful Muslim. (Isāba,iii, 397,no.7869)

Mu'attib b. Qushayr b. Balīl b. Zayd b. al-'Attāf b. Dubay'a b.
Zayd b. Mālik b. 'Awf b. 'Amr b. 'Awf b. Mālik b. al-Aws al-
Ansārī al-Awsī

B. Dubay'a of Aws

He may not have been a Munāfiq because he was at Badr.

(II,764,no.698 from Ibn Hishām; Isāba,iii,443,no.8119)

He and three others caused the sending down of Qur'an
4/60 (II,245; Muhabbir,468; Bal,A,i,276)

He and Tha'laba b. Hātib made a covenant with God which
resulted in the sending down of Qur'an 9/75. (II,243;
Bal,A,i,276)

His comments after the battle of Uhud caused the sending
down of Qur'an 3/154. (II,243; Bal,A,i,276)

He was one of the men sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the
trouble started at al-Muraysī'. (Wāq,ii,416)

During the siege of Medina he caused the sending down
of Qur'an 33/12 (II,243), although it may have been
al-Jidd b. Qays (Bal,A,i,276)

He mocked Muhammad about the division of booty at
al-Ji'rāna (Wāq,iii,949)

On the Tabūk raid he and three others disobeyed the
Prophet's orders forcing him to perform a miracle.
(Wāq,iii,1039)

He was involved in the building of the Mosque of
Opposition. (Tab,iii,111; Wāq,iii,1047)

Mujammi' b. .Haritha

He is listed as a Munāfiq and may have been involved in
the attempted assassination of Muhammad on the Tabūk
expedition. (Ma'ārif, 343)

Mukhashshin/Makhshī b. Humayyir

B. Ashja', an ally of B. Salima

His activities on the Tabūk raid caused the sending down of Qur'an 9/65. (II,606-607,622; Wāq,iii,1003; Isāba,iii,391,no.7841)

He then repented, became a Muslim and died as a martyr at Yamāma. (II,606-607; Uṣd,v,122)

Mulīh al-Taymī

He is listed as a Munāfiq and among those who attempted to assassinate Muḥammad on the Tabūk raid. (Ma'ārif,343)

Murra b. Rabī'

He is listed as a Munāfiq and among those who attempted to assassinate Muḥammad on the Tabūk raid. (Ma'ārif,343)

Nabtāl b. al-Ḥārith b. Qays b. Zayd b. Dubay'a b. Zayd b. Mālik b. 'Awf b. 'Amr b. 'Awf al-Anṣārī al-Awsī

B. Dubay'a of Aws

He used to relate Muḥammad's words to the Munāfiqūn and because of one of his comments Qur'an 9/61 was sent down. (II,243; Bal,A,i,275; Isāba,iii,549,no.8675)
He was involved in the building of the Mosque of Opposition. (Tab,iii,111)

Nu'mān b. Abī 'Āmir

Qaynuqā'

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn (Wāq,iii,1059)

(al-)Nu'mān b. Awfā b. 'Amr

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq. (II,246; Muḥabbir,470)

Qays b. 'Amr b. Sahl b. Tha'laba b. al-Hārith b. Zayd b. Tha'laba
b. 'Ubayd b. Ghanm b. Mālik b. al-Najjār al-Ansārī

B. al-Najjār of Khazraj

He is listed among the Munāfiqūn (II,245)

Al-Wāqidī said that he was a Munāfiq but it seems that
he later converted and transmitted traditions. (Isāba,
iii,255-256,no.7211)

He was the only young man among the Munāfiqūn. (II,247)

He was thrown out of the mosque on the orders of
Muhammad. (II,247; Bal,A,i,283)

Qays b. Rifā'a al-Wāqifī

B. Wāqif b. Imru' al-Qays b. Mālik b. al-Aws of Aws

He was a poet and is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,
469; Bal,A,i,277; cf. Isāba,iii,246-247,no.7169)

Qays b. Zayd

B. Dubay'a of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq and was killed at Uhud.
(Muhabbir,468)

He may have been killed at Uhud by a Munāfiq. (Isāba,
iii,247-248, no.7174)

Quzmān b. al-Hārith

Ally of b. Zafar of Aws.

He is listed as a Munāfiq because of his suicide.

(II,245; Bal,A,i,281; Muhabbir,469; Isāba,iii,235,
no.7108)

Rāfi' b. Huraymila/Harmala

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a
Munāfiq. (II,246)

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn. (Wāq iii,1059)

He and another man made impossible requests of Muhammad and therefore Qur'ān 2/108 was sent down. (II,257-258)
His death was announced by Muhammad on the Tabūk raid (II,246; Muhabbir,470)

Rāfi' b. Wadī'a

B. al-Najjār of Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq and he was thrown out of the mosque on the orders of Muhammad. (II,245-247)

Rāfi' b. Zayd

B. 'Ubayd b. Zayd b. Mālik of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,244)

He and three others caused the descent of Qur'ān 4/60. (II,245; Muhabbir,468, Bal,A,i,276)

Rāfi' b. Ziyad

Aws

He was the brother of Bashīr and is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,277)

Rifā'a

He and another person became Muslim but were Munāfiqūn and some of the Muslims became friendly with them.
This caused Qur'ān 5/61 to be sent down. (II,269)

Rifā'a b. Zayd b. al-Tābūt

Qaynuqā'

He remained behind from the Tabūk raid and was referred to as one of the great ones of the Munāfiqūn. (Tab,iii, 103; cf. Isāba,i,517,no.2661)

cf. Zayd b. Rifā'a b. al-Tābūt

Sa'd b. Abī Sarh

He is listed as a Munāfiq and one of those persons who attempted to assassinate Muhammad on the return from Tabūk. (Ma'arif, 343)

Sa'd b. Hunayf

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq. (II,246; Muhabbir,470)

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn. (Wāq, iii,1059)

Sa'd b. Zarāra b. 'Adis b. 'Ubayd b. Tha'laba b. Ghanm b. Mālik b. al-Najjār al-Ansārī

B. al-Najjār of Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muhabbir,469; Bal,A,i,274)

He may have repented. (Isāba,ii,27,no.3155)

Salama b. al-Humām

Qaynuqā'

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn.

(Wāq,iii,1059)

Silsila b. Barhām

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq.

(II,246; Muhabbir,470)

Suwayd b. al-Hārith

Khazraj/Qaynuqā'

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn. (Wāq, iii,1059)

He had accepted Islam as a Munāfiq and become friendly

with some Muslims. Therefore Qur'ān 5/57-61 was sent down. (II,269; Bay,ii,157)

He was among those who offered to help the Nadīr but failed to do so. Therefore Qur'ān 59/11-16 was sent down. (II,246; Tab,ii,554)

He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble started at al-Muraysī'. (Wāq,ii,416)

Suwayd b. 'Adīy b. Rabī'a

Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Muḥabbir,470; Bal,A,i,274)

Suwaylim

The Munāfiqūn were gathering in his house so Muḥammad ordered that it be burned down. (II,782,no.858 from Ibn Hishām)

Tha'laba b. Ḥatīb/Abī Ḥatīb al-Anṣārī

B. Umayya b. Zayd of Aws

He and Mu'attib b. Qushayr made a covenant with God which resulted in the sending down of Qur'ān 9/75.

(II,243; Muḥabbir,468; Bal,A,i,276; Isāba,i,198,no.928)

He tried to stop the people from going on the Tabūk raid. (Wāq,iii,1003)

He was involved in the building of the Mosque of Opposition. (Tab,iii,111; Wāq,iii,1047)

He may have been at Badr and therefore not a Munāfiq.

(II,731-732,no.297 from Ibn Hishām; Isāba,i,198,no.928)

Tu'ma/Tu'ayma b. Ubayriq b. 'Umayr al-Anṣārī

Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq and among those who attempted

to assassinate Muhammad on the Tabūk raid. (Muhabbir,469;
Ma'ārif,343)

Some doubt is raised as to whether or not he was a
Munāfiq. (Isāba,ii,224, no.4245)

'Uthmān b. Awfā

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq.
(II,246)

'Uqba b. Qadīm

Ally of Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (Bal,A,i,274)

Wadī'a

B. 'Awf

He was involved with the problems at al-Muraysī' and
therefore the descent of Qur'ān 63 (II,246).

He was involved in the offer made to the Nadīr which
was never fulfilled and therefore the descent of
of Qur'ān 9/11-16. (II,246; Tab,ii,554)

This name may refer to Wadī'a b. Thābit

Wadī'a b. Thābit

B. 'Amr b. 'Awf/B.Umayya b. Zayd b. Mālik/ B.'Awf
b. al-Khazraj

He was among those who offered their help to the Nadīr
but did not fulfil their promise. (II,437)

He was on the Tabūk raid and caused the sending down
of Qur'ān 9/65. (II,606-607; Wāq,iii,1003,1039)

He was involved in the building of the Mosque of
Opposition. (II,244; Tab,iii,111; Muhabbir,468-469;
Wāq,iii,1047)

Wahb b. Zayd

He and another man made impossible demands on Muhammad and Qur'ān 2/108 was sent down. (II,257-258)

Yazīd b. Jāriya b. 'Amr/'Āmir b. Muḡammi'/al-Attāf

Aws

He, his father and his brothers were involved in the building of the Mosque of Opposition. (Wāq,iii,1047; Muḡabbir,468; Bal,A,i,276).

Zayd b. 'Amr

B. al-Najjār of Khazraj

He is listed as a Munāfiq and was thrown out of the mosque at the orders of the Prophet. (II,245,247; Muḡabbir,469; Bal,A,i,274,283)

Zayd b. Jāriya b. 'Amr/'Āmir b. Muḡammi'/al-'Attāf

B. Tha'laba of Aws

He, his father and his brothers were involved with the building of the Mosque of Opposition. (II,243-244; Tab,iii,111; Wāq,iii,1047; Muḡabbir,468; Bal,A,i,276)

Zayd b. (al-)Luṣayt/(al-)Luṣayb

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq. (II,246; Muḡabbir,470)

He was one of the most wicked of the Munāfiqūn. (Wāq, iii,1059)

He was sitting with Ibn Ubayy when the trouble began at al-Muraysī'. (Wāq,ii,416)

On the raid to Tabūk there were two occasions when his activities forced Muhammad to perform a miracle. (II,246; Wāq,ii,423-425,iii,1039; Isāba,i,571,no.2932)

Zayd b. Rifā'a b. al-Tābūt

Qaynuqā'

He was a Jewish rabbi who accepted Islam as a Munāfiq.

(II,246; Muhabbir,470)

He was a great Munāfiq whose death was announced by Muhammad on the return from al-Muraysī'. (Wāq,ii, 422-423)

Because of his activities Qur'an 5/57-61 were sent down. (II,269; Bay,ii,157)

cf. Rifā'a b. Zayd b. al-Tābūt

Zuwayy b. al-Hārith

B. Lawdhān b. 'Amr b. 'Awf of B. 'Amr b. 'Awf b. Mālik of Aws

He is listed as a Munāfiq. (II,242)

He was thrown out of the mosque on the orders of Muhammad. (II,247)

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